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ENVISIONING COPYRIGHT LAW’S DIGITAL FUTURE
PETER S. MENELL*
“May you live in interesting times.”1
Copyright initially developed in response to the printing press and gradually
evolved to encompass other methods of mechanically storing and reproducing works of
authorship, such as photography, motion pictures, and sound recordings.  The advent of
broadcasting — the ability to perform works at distant points — led to the expansion of
copyright to encompass exploitation of creative expression in new markets.  The digital
revolution represents a third distinct wave of technological innovation that portends
significant changes in copyright protection.  By bringing about new modes of expression
(such as computer programming and digital sampling of music) and empowering any-
one with a computer and an Internet connection to flawlessly, inexpensively, and instan-
taneously reproduce and distribute works of authorship on a wide scale, digital
technology represents possibly the most profound challenge to copyright law.  This article
divides the analysis of digital technology into two categories: (1) squeezing computer
software within copyright’s non-functionally oriented protection regime and (2) develop-
ing new rules and governance institutions to address the ease of reproduction and poros-
ity of the digital platform.  Part I of the article traces the two decades of evolution of
copyright protection for computer software and demonstrates that copyright law has
proven quite adaptable to this hybrid of expressive and utilitarian creativity.  The courts
have enabled copyright law to serve effectively as an anti-piracy regime without allowing
it to intrude unduly into patent law’s domain.  This holding of the line has in fact
moved the battles over legal protection for software into the patent and contract realms.
Part II explores the implications of digital distribution of content for copyright’s future.
Content industries perceive grave threats to their continued existence (and the production
of creative works) while technology companies and a growing array of consumer,
programmer, and civil liberty organizations fear that further expansion of copyright pro-
tection jeopardizes technological innovation and basic civil liberties.  A growing cadre of
legal academics predict copyright’s ultimate demise.  As a basis for assessing these claims
and understanding the implications of this new and rapidly improving digital platform,
this article examines the technological changes taking place, industry structures, legal
environment, and evolving social and political landscape.  Although these forces remain
in flux, the digital revolution can be seen increasingly to shift resources and pressure for
reform toward copyright enforcement, standard setting (in an effort to develop effective
* Professor of Law, University of California at Berkeley School of Law (Boalt
Hall) and Executive Director, Berkeley Center for Law & Technology.  I owe a great
debt of gratitude to Judge Jon O. Newman, for whom I clerked in 1986-87, for enrich-
ing my understanding and interest in so many areas of the law, but none more than
copyright.  Mark Lemley and David Nimmer provided valuable comments on an earlier
draft.   I also thank Kate Williams and Matt Staples for research assistance.
1. Attributed to an ancient Chinese curse. See NOBLE (North of Boston Library
Exchange), Reference File, May You Live in Interesting Times , at  http://
www.noblenet.org/reference/inter.htm (last visited Apr. 29, 2002).
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controls on content distribution), antitrust regulation of standard setting processes, and
a more general transformation of copyright law from a property rights orientation toward
a regulatory regime.
Like the printing press and broadcast technology, the digital revolu-
tion represents a profound set of opportunities and challenges for those
engaged in the creation and distribution of original works of authorship
and the consumer products that allow these works to be perceived, repro-
duced, altered, and distributed.  It also actuates lobbyists, legislators, ju-
rists, and scholars to rethink the legal regimes governing these activities
and industries.  Digital technology has enabled new modes of expression
(including computer programming, synthesized music, video games,
multi-media works), dramatically reduced the costs for artists and authors
to compose new works (for example, recording artists today can record
and mix professional quality recordings using relatively inexpensive re-
cording equipment and software), and opened up vast networks for the
distribution of expressive works.
Copyright law has served as a principal means for protecting works of
authorship for nearly three centuries.  It would be a mistake, however, to
view copyright as a static body of law.  Its very contours have been shaped
by advances in the technologies of creating, reproducing, and disseminat-
ing such works.2  Copyright developed in response to the printing press
and gradually evolved to encompass other methods of mechanically stor-
ing and reproducing works of authorship, such as photography, motion
pictures, and sound recordings.  The advent of broadcasting — the ability
to perform works at distant points — led to the expansion of copyright to
encompass exploitation of creative expression in new markets.  The digital
revolution represents a third distinct wave of technological innovation.  By
bringing about new modes of expression (such as computer program-
ming) and empowering anyone with a computer and an Internet connec-
tion to flawlessly, inexpensively, and instantaneously reproduce and
distribute works of authorship, it represents possibly the greatest set of
challenges to the copyright law.
Although digital technology became a reality more than 50 years ago,
the only adjustments made to copyright law to address this new technology
until a decade ago consisted of the addition of a brief definition of “com-
puter program” and authorization for those who lawfully acquire com-
puter programs to run such programs on their computers and make a
2. See PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT’S HIGHWAY: FROM GUTENBERG TO THE CELES-
TIAL JUKEBOX (1994); Jessica Litman, Copyright Legislation and Technological Change, 68
OR. L. REV. 275, 353-54 (1989).
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backup copy.3  The past decade, however, has witnessed rapid evolution of
case law applying copyright law to the protection of computer programs
and a deluge of new provisions driven by the threat of unauthorized repro-
duction and distribution of copyrighted works by means of computers and
networks.  More pages of copyright law have been added to the U.S. Code
in the past decade than in the prior 200 years of the republic, dating back
to the first U.S. Copyright Act adopted in 1790.
The explanation for this upheaval reflects two distinct ways in which
digital technology “challenges” copyright law.  The first concerns the
copyrightability of computer software.  As written expression intended to
serve utilitarian purposes (instructing machines), computer software does
not fit comfortably within the copyright scheme.  Copyright law protects
expression, but excludes function so as not to impinge upon patent law’s
more exacting threshold and shorter duration for protection of utilitarian
works.  Yet Congress’ pragmatic decision to extend copyright protection to
software (while at the same time reaffirming the exclusion of functional-
ity) posed substantial challenges for the software industry and the courts.
After some early struggles that threatened to afford software developers
far-reaching control over basic features of computer technology through
copyright law, the federal courts have, following the Second Circuit’s lead
in the Altai case, developed and implemented a practical test for distin-
guishing idea from expression in software programs that finessed the met-
aphysical dilemmas and avoided the creation of undue economic power in
computer markets.4  Copyright law provides a thin layer of protection for
computer software, effectively prohibiting wholesale piracy of computer
programs without affording control for interface specifications and other
3. The grand overhaul of copyright law enacted in 1976 paid scant attention to
the novel issues and challenges posed by digital technology.  The legislative history of
the 1976 Act, however, acknowledged that “computer data bases, and computer pro-
grams, to the extent that they incorporate authorship in the programmer’s expression
of original ideas, as distinguished from the ideas themselves” fall within the definition
of “literary works” covered by the Act.  H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, 54 (1976).  Congress had,
in 1974, referred the question of how best to protect computer software to the National
Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works (CONTU).  Act of Dec.
31, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-573, § 201, 88 Stat. 1873.  In its 1979 report to Congress,
CONTU concluded that the intellectual work embodied in computer software should
be protected principally under copyright law.  National Commission on New Techno-
logical Uses of Copyrighted Works, Final Report (1979).  Congress adopted these rec-
ommendations a year later in the Computer Software Copyright Act of 1980, Pub. L.
No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3007, 3028 (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 117).  A 1990 amendment
prohibited the rental of computer software. See Computer Software Rental Amend-
ments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089, 5134-37 (1990) (codified at 17
U.S.C. § 109(b)).
4. See Peter S. Menell, An Epitaph for Traditional Copyright Protection of Network Fea-
tures of Computer Software, 43 ANTITRUST BULL. 651 (1998).
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essential elements of computer functionality.  The courts have also al-
lowed subsequent software developers some leeway to reverse engineer
software programs in order to develop interoperable programs.  As a re-
sult, there has not been significant legislative pressure to re-equilibrate
this balance.
The  threat to the copyright system posed by digital reproduction and
distribution through  computer networks has taken a bit longer to de-
velop, but manifest it has with a vengeance unmatched in the annals of
copyright history.  The explanation for this delayed onset lies in the tech-
nology itself.  Until the early 1980s, most copyrighted works, apart from
computer software itself and text, were not available in digital form.  The
size of high quality digital files and the computer speed needed to per-
ceive high fidelity sound recordings and high resolution video outstripped
the memory capacity and processor speeds of all but the most advanced
computers.  Like early generations of phonographs and film projectors,
digital content was beyond the reach of the consumer marketplace.  Be-
ginning with the compact disk technology in the early 1980s and the bur-
geoning microcomputer marketplace soon thereafter, rapid advances in
digital technology have increasingly brought digital content to consumers.
The World Wide Web, inaugurated in the early 1990s, opened up vast new
pathways for content to flow and further innovations in computer storage
capacity, processor speed, data compression, consumer electronic prod-
ucts (MP3 players, digital video recorders), network software (including
peer-to-peer architectures), and bandwidth have transformed the distribu-
tion of content.  The effects have been most strongly felt in the sound
recording industry, but the film and television industries have also begun
to experience the effects of the digital revolution.
Copyright’s adaptation to the unauthorized reproduction and distri-
bution of protected works through digital technology has proven much
more wrenching and much less stable than its expansion to protect com-
puter software.  Notwithstanding the tremendous reach of copyright, the
major content industries have come to believe that existing law may not be
adequate to protect content in the digital age.5  The rapid rise of peer-to-
peer networks and the success of hackers in cracking and disseminating
means of decrypting the DVD Content Scrambling System (and other
technological protection measures) demonstrate the vulnerability of the
current network architecture to widespread unauthorized distribution and
5. See Declan McCullagh, Anti-Copy Bills D.C. (Mar. 22, 2002), at http://
www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,51245,00.html; Declan McCullagh, The DMCA is
the Toast of D.C. (May 17, 2002) (“To Hollywood, the DMCA is just the first step: It only
made most types of ‘circumvention’ illegal.  Now movie studios want to require copy-
protection technology in most software and hardware.”), at http://www.wired.com/
news/politics/0,1283,52602,00.html.
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the limited capacity of existing legal protections to combat “digital
piracy.”6  Moreover, the intrusive and chilling effects of copyright’s most
recent protections against digital piracy have aroused concerns about the
freedom of technology companies to innovate, the “rights” of consumers
to engage in fair use of protected works, the ability of computer program-
mers to study encryption techniques, the privacy of Internet users, and
competition in content creation and distribution.  Just about everyone
with a computer, an Internet connection, and a desire to access content
has become aware of the raging debate over copyright’s proper role.  As a
result, the next chapter of copyright law is still on the drafting table with
the outcome a mystery.  We can expect frequent installments to follow.
This symposium celebrates Judge Newman’s remarkable 30 years on
the federal bench by  exploring the future of bodies of law in which he
took particular interest, copyright among them.  Before turning to the
particular challenges posed by digital technology, Judge Newman’s larger
body of copyright and related intellectual property jurisprudence deserves
at least brief mention.  Judge Newman has authored more than two dozen
copyright opinions covering the gamut of doctrines and works of author-
ship.7  His decisions have revealed coherence and clarity in a notoriously
6. See Melanie Warner, Free Music: The New Napsters (Aug. 12, 2002), at http://
www.fortune.com/indext.jhtml?channel=print_article.jhtml&doc_id=208834.
7. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001); Itar-Tass
Russian News v. Russian Kurier, 153 F.3d 82 (2d Cir. 1998); Samara Bros. v. Wal-Mart,
165 F.3d 120 (2d Cir. 1998) (dissent); Ringold v. Black Entertainment, 126 F.3d 70 (2d
Cir. 1997); Beaudin v. Ben & Jerry’s, 95 F.3d 1 (2d Cir. 1996); Merchant v. Levy, 92 F.3d
51 (2d Cir. 1996); Agee v. Paramount Communications, 59 F.3d 317 (2d Cir. 1994);
Twin Peaks Productions, Inc. v. Publications Int’l, Ltd., 996 F.2d 1366 (2d Cir. 1993);
United States v. Larracuente, 952 F.2d 672 (2d Cir. 1991); Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d
500 (2d Cir. 1991); Kregos v. Associated Press, 937 F.2d 700 (2d Cir. 1991); ASCAP v.
Showtime/The Movie Channel, 912 F.2d 563 (2d Cir. 1990); New Era Publications Int’l
v. Henry Holt Co., 884 F.2d 659 (2d Cir. 1989) (dissenting from denial of en banc
rehearing); Silverman v. CBS Inc., 870 F.2d 40 (2d Cir. 1989); Gaste v. Kaiserman, 863
F.2d 1061 (2d Cir. 1988); Salinger v. Random House, 811 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1987); Finan-
cial Information, Inc. v. Moody’s Investors Service, Inc., 751 F.2d 501 (2d Cir. 1984)
(concurrence); Warner Bros. Inc. v. ABC, 720 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1983); RX Data Corp. v.
Dep’t of Soc. Serv., 684 F.2d 192 (2d Cir. 1982); Burroughs v. MGM, Inc., 683 F.2d 610
(2d Cir. 1982) (concurrence); Stern Electronics, Inc. v. Omni Video Games, Inc., 669
F.2d 852 (2d Cir. 1982); CBS v. ASCAP, 620 F.2d 930 (2d Cir. 1980); Chappell v. Pum-
pernickel Pub., 79 F.R.D. 531 (D. Conn. 1977).
Judge Newman has also contributed to academic scholarship on copyright law. See
Jon O. Newman, Academia and the Bench: “Toward a More Productive Dialogue” in Ex-
panding the Boundaries of Intellectual Property (Mar. 2001): Jon O. Newman, New Lyrics for
an Old Melody: The Idea/Expression Dichotomy in the Computer Age, 17 CARDOZO ARTS &
ENT. 691 (July 1999); Jon O. Newman, Not the End of History: The Second Circuit Struggles
with Fair Use, 37 J. COPYRIGHT SOCIETY OF THE USA, No. 1 (Oct. 1989); Jon O. Newman,
Copyright Law and the Protection of Privacy, 12 COLUM.-VLA J. L. & ARTS 459 (1988).
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complex and subtle body of law.  Soon after ascending to the Second Cir-
cuit in 1979, Judge Newman dealt with the tail end of a series of antitrust
disputes facilitating the licensing of music to broadcasters, the legacy of
copyright’s adaptation to the second major technological era.8  He has
since authored numerous opinions applying copyright law’s subtle and
delicate balances across the gamut of works of authorship.  On multiple
occasions, Judge Newman has developed intellectual property doctrines
that have been adopted widely across the circuit courts and embraced by
the United States Supreme Court.9
Given Judge Newman’s service on the Second Circuit, with its jurisdic-
tional hub in one of the world’s leading centers of the arts, finance, and
industry, it is not surprising that he would be called upon to apply copy-
right law to challenges posed by digital technology.  This article places
these contributions within the larger fabric of copyright’s adaptation to
the digital age.  Part I of this article examines how copyright law has been
adapted to afford protection for computer software.  Part II examines the
larger structural challenges to copyright law posed by the development
and diffusion of digital reproduction and distribution technologies.
I. COPYRIGHT PROTECTION FOR COMPUTER SOFTWARE
Although computer technology became a reality more than 50
years ago, the evolution of copyright protection for computer software
took some time to develop.  Over the past two decades, software pro-
tection has become a significant part of copyright’s landscape.  This
section first traces the origins of legal protection for computer
software.  It then focuses on the development of copyright protection
and the principal challenges posed by according copyright protection
to a form of expression inherently intertwined with the accomplish-
ment of functional tasks.  It concludes by examining the future role
8. Columbia Broad. System, Inc. v. Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors and Pub-
lishers, 620 F.2d 930 (2d Cir. 1980).
9. Judge Newman’s analysis of joint authorship in Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d
1227 (2d Cir. 1991) has been followed widely. See, e.g., Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d
1227 (9th Cir. 2000); Erickson v. Trinity Theatre, Inc., 13 F.3d 1061 (7th Cir. 1994); see
also Thomson v. Larson, 147 F.3d 195 (2d Cir. 1998).  As another example, in Financial
Information, Inc. v. Moody’s Investors Service, Inc., 751 F.2d 501, 509 (2d Cir. 1984)
(concurrence), Judge Newman questioned the view of some Second and Ninth Circuit
decisions endorsing the so-called “sweat of the brow” rationale “that copyright protec-
tion should be extended solely because of laborious effort.”  Explaining that such effort
“is no reason for us to disregard the statutory criteria that Congress articulated in 1976
when it enacted the current statute,” Judge Newman foreshadowed the Supreme
Court’s later decision reinforcing this principle. See Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel.
Service Co., Inc., 506 U.S. 984 (1991).
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and importance of copyright protection for the computer software
industry.
A. Evolution of Legal Protection for Computer Software in the Early
Computer Industry
In order to place copyright protection for computer software in
proper perspective, it is useful to trace the development of computer
technology and the formation of the computer industry.
1. The Development of Computer Technology and the
Computer Industry10
The Advent of Digital Computer Technology.  In the mid-19th century,
Charles Babbage envisioned mechanical devices (the Difference En-
gine and the Analytical Engine) to perform arithmetic operations.  His
designs, involving thousands of gears, proved impractical.  One of his
students, Lady Ada August Lovelace, proposed the use of punched
cards to automate the operation of such devices.
Toward the end of the 19th century, a U.S. Census Bureau agent
named Herman Hollerith developed a punched-card tabulating ma-
chine to automate the census.  Drawing upon the use of “punched
photography” by railroads (to encrypt passengers’ hair and eye color
on tickets), Hollerith proposed the encoding of census data for each
person on a separate card which could be tabulated mechanically.  Af-
ter developing this technology for the Census Bureau, he formed the
Tabulating Machine Company in 1896 to serve the growing demand
for office machinery, such as typewriters, record-keeping systems, and
adding machines.  The company grew through the expansion of its
business and merger with other office supply companies and in 1924,
Thomas J. Watson, the company’s general manager, changed the com-
pany’s name to International Business Machines Corporation (IBM).
By the late 1920’s, IBM was the fourth largest office machine supplier
in the world, behind Remington-Rand, National Cash Register (NCR),
and Burroughs Adding Machine Company.  IBM made numerous im-
provements to tabulating technology during the 1920s and 1930s,
eventually developing a machine that could compare cards, a signifi-
10. The discussion that follows draws upon PAUL E. CERUZZI, A HISTORY OF
MODERN COMPUTING (1998) and MARTIN CAMPBELL-KELLY & WILLIAM ASPRAY,
COMPUTER: A HISTORY OF THE INFORMATION MACHINE (1996).
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cant innovation which enabled machines to perform simple logic (if-
then) operations.
The critical breakthrough defining modern computers was the
harnessing of electrical impulses to process information.  In 1939, Pro-
fessor John Vincent Atanasoff, with the help of his graduate student
Clifford Berry, developed the first electronic calculating machine.
This computer could solve relatively complicated physics computa-
tions.  They built a more sophisticated version, the ABC (Atanasoff
Berry Computer), in 1942.  Shortly thereafter, driven in part by war-
time demand for computing technology, Professor Howard Aiken,
funded in substantial part by IBM, developed a massive electromechan-
ical computer (MARK I).  This machine contained three-fourths of a
million parts, hundreds of miles of wire, and was 51 feet long, 8 feet
high and 2 feet deep. It could perform three additions per second and
one multiplication every six seconds.  Although it used an electric mo-
tor and a serial collection of electromechanical calculators, the MARK
I was in many respects similar to the design of Babbage’s analytical
engine.
At about this same time, Dr. John Mauchly persuaded the U.S.
Army to fund the development of a new computing device to compute
trajectory tables to improve the targeting of ordnance.  Mauchly envi-
sioned using vacuum tubes rather than mechanical relays to store bi-
nary information. In collaboration with J. Presper Eckert, Jr., a young
electrical engineer, Mauchly completed the Electronic Numerical Inte-
grator and Computer (ENIAC) in 1946.  This computer occupied
15,000 square feet, weighed 30 tons, and contained 18,000 vacuum
tubes.   It operated in decimal (rather than binary) code and therefore
needed 10 vacuum tubes to represent a single digit. The ENIAC could
perform over 80 additions or 8 multiplication operations per second.
Subsequent computers use a binary base.  By setting electrical
switches to “on” (electrical current is flowing) or “off” (current is not
flowing), early computers could create a single “bit” of information.
That piece of information is read as either a 1 (“on”) or a 0 (“off”).  By
translating information into a series of such 1s and 0s, computers
could perform mathematical operations.
The first computing machines did not utilize computer “pro-
grams” in a form that we would recognize today.  These machines were
in essence a series of hard-wired circuits constructed to perform one
particular computational task.  That is, the mathematical function per-
formed by the computer was determined by the physical arrangement
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and structure of the circuits.  The computers had to be rewired in or-
der to perform a different function.  These machines were comprised
solely of what we today call “hardware” — the physical circuits that
make up the machine.
During the late 1940s, scientists developed the first machines that
could store and use encoded instructions or programs.  This set of in-
novations dramatically increased the flexibility and usefulness of com-
puters.  Users could perform a variety of computational tasks without
having to rewire the basic hardware of the computer.  Instead, they
could simply direct the computer to perform one of the functions that
it had stored in its memory.  The actual computer in these program-
mable or “universal” machines is the central processing unit (CPU).
The CPU has two principal components: an arithmetic logic unit
which performs a basic set of “primitive functions” such as addition
and multiplication and a control unit which directs the flow of electric
signals within the computer.  In essence, a computer processes data by
performing controlled sequences of primitive functions.
First Generation of Programmable Computers (1951-59). The flexibility
provided by programmability greatly enhanced the utility of com-
puters.  In the early 1950s, Mauchly and Eckert developed the first
commercially viable electronic computer, the Universal Automatic
Computer (UNIVAC I) for Remington-Rand Corporation.  Limitations
on electronic technology, however, constrained the computing power
of the first generation of computers.  These computers relied upon
vacuum tubes, which were bulky, failed frequently, consumed large
amounts of energy, and generated substantial heat.  This first genera-
tion of computers was programmed in binary code (zeros and ones),
which could be understood by only a few specialists.  IBM introduced
its first commercial computer, the IBM 650, in 1954.  IBM made incre-
mental improvements to this technology and emerged as the market
leader.
Second Generation Computer Technology (1959-63).  Because com-
puters use binary electronic switches to store and process information,
the great challenge for the computer industry was to reduce the size of
these switches.  The second generation of computers replaced vacuum
tubes with transistors, which were smaller, required less power, and ran
without generating significant heat.  This and other innovations in
data storage technology made computers smaller, faster, and more reli-
able.  The first scientific computer using transistors was the IBM 7090.
A second important innovation of this era was the development of
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high-level computer languages, which enabled computer specialists to
write programs using coded instructions that resemble human lan-
guage.  The IBM 705, introduced in 1959, used the FORTRAN lan-
guage processor.  This model became the standard machine for large
scale data processing companies.   Notwithstanding these innovations,
computers of this generation remained complex and expensive be-
cause circuits had to be wired by hand.
 Third Generation Computer Technology (1963-75).  The development
of integrated circuits enabled computer manufacturers to incorporate
many transistors within the layers of semiconductor material.  The
greater computing power and efficiency of computers brought the cost
of data processing services within the reach of an increasing number of
businesses.  Many businesses contracted with companies specializing in
data processing services.  A few acquired their own computers.  IBM’s
360 series of mainframe computers emerged during this period as the
market leader.  These machines used a single machine language.  As
businesses upgraded their equipment within the 360 series, they could
continue to use the same computer programs.  This increased the ben-
efit of owning a computer (rather than out-sourcing data processing)
and expanded the mainframe market.  This larger market generated
greater demand for computer programmers and spawned new compa-
nies to provide computer-related services.  An independent software
industry began to emerge.   The third generation of computer technol-
ogy also witnessed the implementation of time-sharing and telecom-
munication technologies, which enabled multiple users to access a
computer from remote terminals.  In addition, computers developed
during this period could handle multiple tasks simultaneously (parallel
processing and multiprogramming).
In 1965, the Digital Equipment Corporation introduced the first
minicomputer, the PDP-8 (Programmed Data Processor).  This ma-
chine was substantially smaller and about one-fourth the price of main-
frame computers.  Minicomputers substantially widened the market
for computers and computer programmers.  Domestic consumers pur-
chased 260 minicomputers and 5,350 mainframes in 1965.  It was at
that time that Gordon Moore, one of the founders of Intel Corpora-
tion, noted that the number of transistors per square inch on inte-
grated circuits had doubled every year since the integrated circuit was
invented and he predicted, in what has come to be known as “Moore’s
Law,” that this trend would continue for the foreseeable future. In sub-
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sequent years, the pace slowed down a bit, but data density has
doubled approximately every 18 months.
By the 1970s, computers incorporated “semiconductor chips” no
larger than a human fingernail and containing more than 100,000
transistors.  Minicomputer unit sales surpassed mainframe unit sales by
1974.  As chip technology advanced, the size of computers decreased
while their computing power increased.  Semiconductor chips today
can hold many millions of transistors.
Fourth Generation Computer Technology (1975-present). In the early
1970s, Intel Corporation developed the microprocessor, a chip that
contains the entire control unit of a computer.  Very large scale inte-
gration (VLSI) technology led to the development of the microcom-
puter.  Originally oriented toward computer hobbyists,
microcomputers came to dominate the computer industry by the mid-
1980s.  With its Apple II computer system, which included a keyboard,
monitor, floppy disk drive, and operating system, Apple Computer
vastly expanded the market for computers.  Microcomputer unit sales
surpassed minicomputer unit sales in 1976, their second year of pro-
duction.  By 1986, sales of microcomputers (costing less than $1000)
reached approximately 4 million units and produced revenues of al-
most $12 billion, giving microcomputers the largest share of computer
industry revenues.
2. Legal Protection for Computer Software
During the early stages of the computer industry (through 1965),
most computer software was provided by computer manufacturers
along with the hardware.  By bundling software in this way, computer
manufacturers could fully recoup their investments in developing com-
puter programs.  Computers were highly specialized machines that
were not sold through retail channels of distribution and manufactur-
ers could adequately protect their technology through contractual
agreements and trade secrecy protections.  There was little or no inter-
est in protecting software technology separately because patent protec-
tion adequately protected innovations in these manufacturers’
products.
As computers became more powerful and versatile, specialty
software firms emerged to provide customized and general purpose
software in direct competition with the mainframe manufacturers.
The contract/trade secrecy  model continued to meet the needs of
most firms in the nascent industry.  Programming continued to be a
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highly specialized field in which programs were customized to the spe-
cific machine, customer, and tasks.  A software company could tailor a
contract to the specific customer and monitor and enforce the
agreement.
As computer technology advanced, computers proliferated, and
specific models emerged as market leaders, it became feasible for
software companies to market systems and particular application pro-
grams  to a wider market.  The advent of minicomputers in the mid-
1960s furthered this development.  As a result, the market for software
expanded from service and custom programming to the development
and marketing of software products that could be installed with rela-
tively little customization to the user’s computer system.  The un-
bundling of application software products from IBM hardware in 1970,
as a result of antitrust pressures, further spurred the market for
software products.
Trade secret provided the principal means of protecting com-
puter software up until the early 1980s.11  The marketing of computer
software products, however, raised questions regarding whether trade
secrecy protection could be maintained after products have been re-
leased in the open market.  A line of cases quelled this concern by
affirming that trade secrecy protection remained viable so long as the
product was distributed in a form (such as object code) that made it
difficult for others to decipher its secrets.12  It is very difficult and time
consuming to reverse engineer a computer program from its object
code.13
Nonetheless, as software products supplanted custom program-
ming and entered larger markets, software companies became increas-
ingly concerned that trade secret protection would not provide
sufficient protection for their products.  While trade secret law pro-
11. See MacGrady, Protection of Computer Software – An Update and Practical Synthesis,
20 HOUS. L. REV. 1033, 1045 (1983).
12. See Q-Co Industries v. Hoffman, 625 F.Supp. 608, 617 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (pro-
gram secret where source code secret, even though object code disseminated); Telex
Corp. v. IBM, 510 F.2d 894, 911, 928-30 (10th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 423 U.S. 802 (1975);
Data General Corp. v. Digital Computer Controls, Inc., 297 A.2d 433 (Del. Ct. Chanc.
1971), aff’d, 297 A.2d 437 (Del. S.Ct. 1972); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETI-
TION § 39 cmt. f, Reporter’s Note (“[P]ublic sale of a product does not preclude contin-
ued protection against the improper acquisition of use of information that is difficult,
costly, or time-consuming to extract through reverse engineering.”)
13. See Andrew Johnson-Laird, Software Reverse Engineering in the Real World, 19
UNIV. DAYTON L. REV. 843 (1994).
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vided rights against those in a direct contractual relationship with the
software manufacturer, it did not provide adequate means of protect-
ing against competition from third parties.  In addition, the cost of
maintaining trade secret protection for a product could be significant.
Yet computer software, by its very nature as written work intended to
serve utilitarian purposes, defied easy categorization within the ex-
isting modes of intellectual property protection: as written code, it
could be analogized to literary expression, which is typically protected
through copyright law; but as sets of instructions for performing tasks,
software was more closely related to the functional works protected by
patent law.
Patent protection for computer software, however, would not take
off until the 1980s for a variety of reasons.  In the 1960s, the major
computer manufacturers generally opposed software patents.  As the
leading manufacturer of computer hardware (and relying upon a busi-
ness model of bundling hardware with software which enabled it to
appropriate ample return to its investment in software innovation),
IBM opposed the patenting of software, which could pose a threat to
its dominance of the computer market.  Other computer manufactur-
ers shared this view.  A Presidential Commission, including executives
from leading computer manufacturers, recommended against patent
protection for computer software.14  Nonetheless, the Patent and
Trademark Office did issue some software patents during this period.15
In 1968, the PTO instituted guidelines stating that “a computer pro-
gramming process which produces no more than a numerical, statisti-
cal or other informational result is not directed to patentable subject
matter.”16
The Supreme Court’s 1972 decision in Gottschalk v. Benson17
proved a more significant impediment to the patenting of computer
software.  The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, the predecessor
to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, had found that a
method of programming a general-purpose computer to convert bi-
14. Report of the President’s Commission on the Patent System, “To Promote the
Progress of . . . Useful Arts” in an Age of Exploding Technology (1966).
15. For example, Applied Data Research, Inc. received a patent on a sorting pro-
gram in 1968. U.S. Patent No. 3,380,029 (1968).
16. 33 Fed. Reg. 15,609, 15, 610 (1968).  The guidelines did, however, provide
that a programmed computer could be claimed as a component of a patentable process
if it was “combined in an unobvious manner with physical steps” that produced a physi-
cal result.
17. 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
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nary-coded decimal numerals into pure binary form fell within the sub-
ject of the Patent Act.18  The Supreme Court reversed on the ground
that such a patent would effectively preempt an algorithm for con-
verting one form of numerical representation to another.  Although
leaving open the door to software-related inventions — “We do not
hold that no process patent [involving a computer] could ever qualify
if it did not meet the requirements of our prior precedents”19 — the
Court’s decision created uncertainty regarding the standards for ob-
taining patent protection for computer-related inventions and pushed
the industry toward a copyright solution.
B. Squeezing Computer Software into the Copyright Mold
From rather inauspicious beginnings, copyright law emerged as a
principal mode of legal protection for computer software by the early
1980s.  A commentator in 1968 wrote that “the scope of copyright’s
protection may be so limited and uncertain in application that pro-
grammers would hesitate to seek copyright.”20  Although expressing
doubt as to the copyrightability of computer programs, the Copyright
Office decided to permit registration of programs so long as three con-
ditions were met:  (1) the work contained sufficient original author-
ship; (2) the work was published with a copyright notice; and (3)
copies of the program submitted for registration were in human-reada-
ble form (i.e., source code, not object code).21  From 1964 through
January 1, 1977, only 1205 programs had been registered with the
Copyright Office, of which 971 came from just two leading mainframe
manufacturers, IBM and Burroughs.
Faced with the difficult challenge of fitting computer and other
new information technologies under the existing umbrella of intellec-
tual property protection, Congress in 1974 established the National
Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works
(CONTU), to study the implications of the new technologies and rec-
ommend revisions to the federal intellectual property laws.  After con-
ducting hearings and receiving expert reports, a majority of the panel
18. In re Benson, 441 F.2d 682 (C.C.P.A. 1971).
19. Gottschalk, 409 U.S. at 71.
20. Note, Computer Programs and Proposed Revisions of the Patent and Copyright Laws,
81 HAR. L. REV. 1541, 1549 (1968).
21. See Announcements SML-47 from the Office of the Register of Copyrights
(May 1964); Copyright Office Circular 31D (Jan. 1965); George D. Cary, Copyright Regis-
tration and Computer Programs, 11 BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 362 (1964).
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of copyright authorities and interest group representatives concluded
that “computer programs, to the extent that they embody an author’s
original creation, are proper subject matter of copyright.”22  CONTU
was clear, however, that the fundamental limitation reflected in the
idea/expression dichotomy that copyright law cannot protect “any
idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, prin-
ciple, or discovery”23 should apply with equal force with regard to com-
puter programs.24
Congress implemented CONTU’s recommendations in 1980 by
adding a definition of “computer program” to §101 of the Copyright
Act and amending §117 of the Act to authorize the owner of a copy of
a computer program to make another copy or adaptation of the pro-
gram for the purpose of running the program on a computer.25  Con-
gress defined “computer program” as “a set of statements or
instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer in order to
bring about a certain result.”
The copying of literal program code and other aspects of com-
puter programs, such as structural features of a program, operating
elements (e.g., menu command systems), program outputs (e.g.,
screen displays), and user interfaces, quickly became the focus of nu-
merous lawsuits and the courts were called upon to determine the
scope of copyright protection for computer software.  The first genera-
tion of cases involved literal copying of program code and the courts
did not have much difficulty in finding that wholesale reproduction of
a computer program, in whatever form the computer program was em-
bodied,26 was a violation of the Copyright Act.  One of the very first
22. National Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works, Fi-
nal Report 1 (1979) (hereinafter CONTU Report).
23. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b).
24. See CONTU Report, supra note 22, at 20.  “[C]opyright protection for pro-
grams does not threaten to block the use of ideas or program language previously de-
veloped by others when that use is necessary to achieve a certain result.  When other
language is available, programmers are free to read copyrighted programs and use the
ideas embodied in them in preparing their own works.” Id. (emphasis in original).
“One is always free to make the machine do the same thing as it would if it had the
copyrighted work placed in it, but only by one’s own creative effort rather than by
piracy.” Id. at 21.
25. H.R. REP. NO. 96-1307, at 23, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6460, 6482 (noting
that the 1980 Amendments to the Copyright Act were intended to implement
CONTU’s recommendations).
26. See NEC v. Intel Corp., 1989 WL 67434, at *1 (N.D. Cal. 1989) (microcode);
Apple Computer v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1246-48 (3d Cir. 1983),
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such cases, Stern Electronics v. Kaufman,27 came before Judge Newman a
few years after his accession to the Court of Appeals.  This case raised a
novel twist.  The owner of rights in an arcade video game sued a com-
petitor for infringing the copyright in the audiovisual work comprising
the game.  The competitor defended on the ground that it had not
copied the underlying computer code, but rather had imitated the
screen display images, which failed to satisfy the fixation and original-
ity requirements of the Copyright Act.28  Since the player of the game
affects the displayed image through manipulation of the game control-
ler, the owner of the copyright in the underlying code could not, in
the view of the defendant, establish that the displayed image is “fixed”
or “original.”  Judge Newman acknowledged this nuance, but noted
that:
many aspects of the sights and the sequence of their ap-
pearance remain constant during each play of the game.
These include the appearance (shape, color, and size) of
the player’s spaceship, the enemy craft, the ground mis-
sile bases and fuel depots, and the terrain over which
(and beneath which) the player’s ship flies, as well as the
sequence in which the missile bases, fuel depots, and ter-
rain appears. Also constant are the sounds heard when-
ever the player successfully destroys an enemy craft or
installation or fails to avoid an enemy missile or laser. It is
true, as appellants contend, that some of these sights and
sounds will not be seen and heard during each play of the
game in the event that the player’s spaceship is destroyed
before the entire course is traversed. But the images re-
main fixed, capable of being seen and heard each time a
player succeeds in keeping his spaceship aloft long
enough to permit the appearances of all the images and
sounds of a complete play of the game. The repetitive se-
quence of a substantial portion of the sights and sounds
cert. dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984) (program stored in ROM); Williams Electronics,
Inc. v. Arctic Int’l, Inc., 685 F.2d 870 (3d Cir. 1982) (object code, program stored in
ROM).
27. 669 F.2d 852 (2d Cir. 1982).
28. Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 102 (a) provides that “[c]opyright protection sub-
sists . . . in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression,
now known or later developed in which they can be perceived, reproduced, or other-
wise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device. . . .”
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of the game qualifies for copyright protection as an audio-
visual work.29
A more vexing issue for the courts proved to be the extent to
which copyright protection extends to non-literal aspects of computer
programs (such as their sequence, structure, and organization) and
interface specifications.  The language in some of the early cases, how-
ever, was uncritically expansive,30 and some later courts31 failed to ap-
ply doctrines limiting copyright protection for functional works in a
manner that was faithful to §102(b) of the Copyright Act, its jurispru-
dential antecedents, and the definition of “computer program” in the
Act.  Over the past decade, the courts have largely overcome these
early missteps and interpreted the copyright law in a way that mini-
mizes incursion into the patent law’s domain: the protection of utilita-
rian works.  Four particular issues proved particularly challenging: (1)
protection for those aspects of computer software that allow for inter-
operability, whether between computing machines, machines and
software programs, or different software programs; (2) whether pro-
grammers can reverse engineer software programs; (3) the protection
of menu command structures; and (4) protection for graphical user
interfaces.32
1. Protectability of Interface Specifications
In the first major test of copyright protection for computer
software, Franklin Computer Corporation copied nearly verbatim four-
teen computer programs developed by Apple Computer Corporation
for its Apple II line of products.  Franklin sought to make its computer
“compatible” with the Apple II, for which a large supply of indepen-
dently developed application programs were available.  Apple sued for
copyright infringement.  Franklin defended principally on the ground
that operating system programs, as opposed to application programs,
are not within the proper domain of copyright law.  The lower court
29. Stern Electronics, 669 F.2d at 885.
30. See, e.g., Apple Computer v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1246-48
(3d Cir. 1983), cert. dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984).
31. See Whelen Associates, Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc., 797 F.2d 1222
(3d Cir. 1986); Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software, Int’l, 740 F.Supp. 37 (1990);
Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int’l, 799 F.Supp. 203 (1992).
32. The discussion that follows draws upon Peter S. Menell, An Epitaph for Tradi-
tional Copyright Protection of Network Features of Computer Software, 43 ANTITRUST BULL. 651
(1998).
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and the Third Circuit ruled in Apple’s favor.33  The defendant made
no attempt to determine which elements of the program were protect-
able and which were not.  Nonetheless, in addressing the issue of
whether achieving interoperability would justify some limited copying,
the court commented that:
The idea which may merge with the expression, thus mak-
ing the copyright unavailable, is the idea which is the sub-
ject of the expression.  The idea of one of the operating
system programs is, for example, how to translate source
code into object code.  If other methods of expressing
that idea are not foreclosed as a practical matter, then
there is no merger. Franklin may wish to achieve total com-
patibility with independently developed application programs
written for the Apple II, but that is a commercial and competitive
objective which does not enter into the somewhat metaphysical is-
sue of whether particular ideas and expressions have merged.34
Since two entirely different programs may achieve the same “certain
result[s]” (e.g., generate the same set of protocols needed for inter-
operability), the court was not justified in making such an expansive
and uncritical statement about the scope of copyright protection for
computer programs.  CONTU was clear that “[o]ne is always free to
make the machine do the same thing as it would if it had the copy-
righted work placed in it, but only by one’s own creative effort rather
than by piracy.”35  In addition, applying the merger analysis at such a
high level of abstraction (where the idea of the program is how to
translate source code into object code) would essentially block the de-
velopment of interoperable systems, creating a powerful property right
through copyright protection.
A few years later the Third Circuit reinforced this misguided appli-
cation of the merger doctrine in assessing copyright protection for ap-
plication programs.  In Whelan Associates, Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory,
Inc.,36 the owner of a dental laboratory hired a custom software firm to
develop a computer program that would organize the bookkeeping
and administrative tasks of its business.  Whelan, the principal
programmer, interviewed employees about the operation of the labo-
ratory and then developed a program to run on the laboratory’s IBM
33. Apple Computer v. Franklin Computer Co., 545 F.Supp. 812 (E.D. Pa. 1982),
aff’d 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984).
34. Apple Computer, 714 F.2d at 1253 (emphasis added).
35. See CONTU Report, supra note 22, at 21.
36. 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied 479 U.S. 1031 (1987).
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Series One computer.  Under the terms of an agreement, Whelan re-
tained the copyright in the program and agreed to use its best efforts
to improve the program while Jaslow Laboratory agreed to use its best
efforts to market the program.  Rand Jaslow, an officer and share-
holder of the laboratory, set out to create a version of the program that
would run on other computer systems.  Whelan sued for copyright in-
fringement.  At trial, the evidence showed that the Jaslow program did
not literally copy Whelan’s code, but there were overall structural simi-
larities between the two programs.  As a means of distinguishing pro-
tectable expression from unprotectable idea, the court reasoned:
[T]he purpose or function of a utilitarian work would be the
work’s idea, and everything that is not necessary to that purpose
or function would be part of the expression of the idea.  Where
there are many means of achieving the desired purpose,
then the particular means chosen is not necessary to the
purpose; hence, there is expression, not idea.37
In applying this rule, the court defined the idea as “the efficient man-
agement of a dental laboratory,” for which countless ways of expressing
the idea would be possible.38  Drawing the idea/expression dichotomy
at such a high level of abstraction implies an expansive scope of copy-
right protection.  Furthermore, the court’s conflation of merger analy-
sis and the idea/expression dichotomy implicitly allows the protection
under copyright of procedures, processes, systems, and methods of op-
eration, which are expressly excluded under §102(b).  Although the
case did not directly address copyright protection for computer code
establishing interoperability protocols for computer systems, the
court’s mode of analysis dramatically expanded the scope of copyright
protection for computer programs.  If everything below the general
purpose of the program was protectable under copyright, then it
would follow that particular protocols were protectable because there
would be other ways of serving the general purpose of the program.
Such a result would effectively bar competitors from developing inter-
operable programs and computer systems.
The Whelan test was roundly criticized by commentators39 and
other courts began developing alternative approaches to the scope of
37. Id. at 1236 (emphasis in original, citations omitted).
38. Id.
39. See, e.g., Stephen R. Englund, Idea, Process, or Protected Expression?: Determining
the Scope of Copyright Protection of the Structure of Computer Programs, 88 MICH. L. REV. 866,
881 (1990); Menell, infra note 49, at 1074, 1084-85; Marc T. Kretschmer, Copyright Protec-
tion For Software Architecture: Just Say No!, 1988 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 823, 837-39; Peter G.
Spivack, Does Form Follow Function? The Idea/Expression Dichotomy in Copyright Protection of
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copyright protection that better comported with the fundamental prin-
ciples of copyright protection.  A few months after the Whelan decision,
the Fifth Circuit confronted a similar claim of copyright infringement
based upon structural similarities between two programs designed to
provide cotton growers with information regarding cotton prices and
availability, accounting services, and a means for conducting cotton
transactions electronically.40  In declining to follow the Whelan ap-
proach, the court found that the similarities in the programs were dic-
tated largely by standard practices in the cotton market (what the
court called “externalities”), such as the “cotton recap sheet” for sum-
marizing basic transaction information, which constitute unprotect-
able ideas.41
Five years later, the Second Circuit in Computer Associates Interna-
tional v. Altai, Inc.42  expressly rejected the Whelan approach to deter-
mining the scope of copyright protection for computer programs.
Computer Associates, a leading developer of mainframe software, had
Computer Software, 35 U.S.L.A. L. REV. 723, 747-55 (1988); Thomas M. Gage, Whelan
Associates v. Jaslow Dental Laboratories: Copyright Protection for Computer Software Structure –
What’s the Purpose?, 1987 WIS. L. REV. 859, 860-61 (1987); 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT
§ 13.03(F), at 13-62.34.  The principal defenders of the Whelan approach were lawyers
for software companies seeking broad protection under copyright law. See Arthur R.
Miller, Copyright Protection for Computer Programs, Databases, and Computer-Generated Works:
Is Anything New Since CONTU?, 106 HARV. L. REV. 977 (1993) (counsel for Lotus Dev.
Corp.); Jack E. Brown, “Analytical Dissection” of Copyrighted Computer Software – Complicat-
ing the Simple and Confounding the Complex, 25 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 801 (1993) (counsel for
Apple Computer Corp.); Anthony L. Clapes, Patrick Lynch & Mark R. Steinberg, Silicon
Epics and Binary Bards: Determining the Proper Scope of Copyright Protection for Computer Pro-
grams, 34 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1493 (1987) (lawyers for IBM).
40. Plains Cotton Cooperative Assoc. v. Goodpasture Computer Service, Inc., 817
F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1987).
41. Id. at 1262.  The court found persuasive the decision in Synercom Technol-
ogy, inc. v. University Computing Co., 462 F.Supp. 1003 (N.D.Tex. 1978), in which
Judge Higginbotham analogized the “input formats” of a computer program (the or-
ganization and configuration of information to be inputted into a computer) to the
“figure-H” pattern of an automobile stick shift.
Several different patterns may be imagined, some more convenient for the
driver or easier to manufacture than others, but all representing possible
configurations. . . .  The pattern (analogous to the computer “format”) may
be expressed in several different ways: by a prose description in a driver’s
manual, through a diagram, photograph, or driver training film, or other-
wise.  Each of these expressions may presumably be protected through cop-
yright.  But copyright protects copying of the particular expressions of the
patterns, and does not prohibit another manufacturer from marketing a
car using the same pattern. Use of the same pattern might be socially desir-
able, as it would reduce the retraining of drivers.
Id. at 1013.
42. 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992).
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developed a program which could operate on different IBM main-
frame computers (with different operating systems).  With access to
the Computer Associates’ program, Altai developed a competing pro-
gram serving a similar purpose which also operated on multiple IBM
mainframes.  Computer Associates sued for infringement.  The District
Court criticized Whelan’s “simplistic test” for determining similarity be-
tween computer programs,43 rejecting the notion that there is but one
idea per program and that as long as there were alternative ways of
expressing that one idea, then any particular version was protectable
under copyright law.  Focusing on the various levels of the computer
programs at issue, the court determined that the similarities between
the programs were dictated by external factors —  such as the interface
specifications of the IBM operating system and the demands of func-
tionality — and hence no protected code was infringed.44
On appeal, the Second Circuit fleshed out a detailed analytical
framework for determining copyright infringement of computer pro-
gram code:
In ascertaining substantial similarity under this approach,
a court would first break down the allegedly infringed
program into its constituent structural parts.  Then, by ex-
amining each of these parts for such things as incorpo-
rated ideas, expression that is necessarily incidental to
those ideas, and elements that are taken from the public
domain, a court would then be able to sift out all non-
protectable material.  Left with a kernel, or perhaps ker-
nels, of creative expression after following this process of
elimination, the court’s last step would be to compare this
material with the structure of an allegedly infringing
program.45
The court’s abstraction-filtration-comparison test46 recognized that
ideas could exist at multiple levels of a computer program and not
solely at the most abstract level.  It also emphasized that the ultimate
comparison is not between the programs as a whole but must focus
solely on whether protectable elements of the program were copied.
Of most importance with regard to fostering interoperability, the court
43. Computer Associates Int’l v. Altai, Inc., 775 F.Supp. 544, 558 (E.D.N.Y. 1991).
44. Id. at 561-62.
45. Altai, 982 F.2d at 706.
46. The court derived this formulation from 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIM-
MER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §§ 13.03[F] (1991). See also David Nimmer, Richard L.
Bernacchi & Gary N. Frischling, A Structured Approach to Analyzing the Substantial Similar-
ity of Computer Software in Copyright Infringement Cases, 20 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 625 (1988).
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held that copyright protection did not extend to those program ele-
ments where the programmer’s “freedom to choose” is
circumscribed by extrinsic considerations such as (1)
mechanical specifications of the computer on which a
particular program is intended to run; (2) compatibility
requirements of other programs with which a program is
designed to operate in conjunction; (3) computer manu-
facturers’ design standards; (4) demands of the industry
being serviced; and (5) widely accepted programming
practices within the computer industry.47
Directly rejecting the dictum in Apple v. Franklin,48 the Second Circuit
held that external factors such as interface specifications, de facto indus-
try standards, and accepted programming practices are not protectable
under copyright law.  The Second Circuit’s test judges these external
factors at the time of the allegedly infringing activities (i.e., ex post),
not at the time that the first program is written.49
Commentators warmly embraced the Altai decision50 and the ab-
straction-filtration-comparison approach has been universally adopted
by the courts since 1992.51  Although a few courts have misapplied the
test in specific instances, the Altai test has supplanted the overbroad
merger analysis set forth in Whelan.  In the context of network technol-
ogies, this doctrinal shift has effectively excluded protocols from the
scope of copyright protection.  In Gates Rubber v. Bando Chem. Indus.,
Ltd.,52 the Tenth Circuit expressly adopted the Altai approach and ex-
panded the range of external factors to be used in filtering out unpro-
47. Altai, 982 F.2d at 709-10 (citing 3 NIMMER, at § 13.03[F][3]).
48. 982 F.2d 1246, 1253 (3d Cir. 1983).
49. The court emphasized that the first to write a program for a particular applica-
tion should not be able to “‘lock up’ basic programming techniques as implemented in
programs to perform particular tasks.”  982 F.2d at 712 (quoting Peter S. Menell, Analy-
sis of the Scope of Copyright Protection for Application Programs, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1045, 1087
(1989)).
50. See Bender, Computer Associates v. Altai: Rationality Revails, 8 THE COMPUTER
LAWYER 1 (Aug. 1992); Peter S. Menell, The Challenges of Reforming Intellectual Property
Protection for Computer Software, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2644, 2652 (1994); Lemley, Conver-
gence in the Law of Software Copyright?, 10 HIGH TECH. L.J. 1 (1995).  The principal excep-
tions were lawyers for software companies that have advocated for a broad scope of
copyright protection for their client’s products. See Clapes & Daniels, Revenge of the
Luddites: A Closer Look at Computer Associates v. Altai, 9 THE COMPUTER LAWYER 11 (Nov.
1992); Brown, supra note 39, at 816-18.
51. More than a dozen courts have expressly followed the Altai approach. See, e.g.,
Baystate Tech., Inc. v. Bentley Systems, Inc., 947 F.Supp. 1079 (D.Mass. 1996).
52. 9 F.3d 823 (10th Cir. 1993).
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tectable elements to include hardware standards and mechanical
specifications, software standards and compatibility requirements, in-
dustry programming practices, and practices and demands of the in-
dustry being serviced.53  The court also noted that processes used in
designing a computer system, or components therein (e.g., modules,
algorithms), must also be filtered out as unprotectable under
§102(b).54  While not ruling that interface specifications are un-
copyrightable as a matter of law, the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Bate-
man v. Mnemonics, Inc.55 joined other circuits following Altai in holding
that “external considerations such as compatibility may negate a find-
ing of infringement.”56  The court commented that “[i]t is particularly
important to exclude methods of operation and processes from the
scope of copyright in computer programs because much of the con-
tent of computer programs is patentable.  Were we to permit an author
to claim copyright protection for those elements of the work that
should be the province of patent law, we would be undermining the
competitive principles that are fundamental to the patent system.”57
2. Permissibility of Reverse Engineering
A related issue bearing on the extent to which copyright protec-
tion may impede the development of interoperable computer systems
concerns the extent to which competing manufacturers are able to re-
verse engineer a computer system to determine the codes governing
interoperability.58  Most computer software is distributed in object
code form only, which is not directly readable by humans.  If a software
manufacturer is able to prevent competitors from learning the inter-
face specifications necessary for interoperability because of more gen-
53. Gates Rubber, 9 F.3d at 836-43. See also Mitel v. Iqtel, 124 F.3d 1366, 1375 (10th
Cir. 1997).
54. Gates Rubber, 9 F.3d at 836-37.
55. 79 F.3d 1532 (11th Cir. 1996).
56. Bateman, 79 F.3d at 1547.  In an accompanying footnote, the court
commented:
Note that we use the word “may.”  Such a finding will depend on the partic-
ular facts of a case, and thus it would be unwise for us to try to formulate a
bright-line rule to address this issue, given the importance of the factual
nuances of each case.  In no case, however, should copyright protection be
extended to functional results obtained when program instructions are exe-
cuted and such results are processes the type better left to patent and trade
secret protection.
57. Id. at 1541 n.21.
58. See generally Pamela Samuelson & Suzanne Scotchmer, The Law and Economics
of Reverse Engineering, 111 YALE L.J. 1575 (2002).
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eral restrictions on the copying of program code containing the
protocols, then the fact that the protocols are not protectable under
copyright law would be nugatory since competitors would be pre-
cluded from learning the interoperability protocols.  In some contexts,
a computer program can be understood through input/output testing
or other means (for example, physically and chemically peeling the
layers of a chip and studying the design of the chip with a microscope)
that do not require the making of copies of the computer code in
which the protocols are embedded.  In most circumstances, however,
the only feasible means of deciphering the protocols governing inter-
operability is disassembly of the program, which involves translating
the machine-readable binary object code into a form comprehensible
by humans.59  If the making of such copies (or translations) is an in-
fringement, then the protocols would be effectively protected by copy-
right law.
In the 1980 amendments to the Copyright Act implementing the
CONTU recommendations, Congress authorized the owner of a copy
of a computer program to make another copy or adaptation of the
program for the purpose of running the program on a computer.60  In
Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd.,61 Vault, the manufacturer of a com-
puter program designed to prevent unauthorized duplication of an-
other program on the same diskette, alleged that Quaid had infringed
its copyright in the copy protection program by loading it into its com-
puter’s memory for the purpose of reverse engineering the copy-pro-
tection device so as to circumvent it.  Vault argued that §117 did not
authorize such copying of the program because it was not for the “in-
tended purpose” of running the program.62  The court declined to
construe §117 so narrowly on the ground that the statutory language
did not contain any such restriction.63
Beyond the authorization to make copies of computer software as
a means for utilizing the program within a computer (loading the pro-
59. See generally Johnson-Laird, supra note 13.
60. 17 U.S.C. § 117.
61. 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988).
62. Id at 261.
63. Id. Where the company making the intermediate copies is not an “owner,”
then the authorization to make internal copies does not apply. See MAI Systems Corp.
v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. dismissed, 501 U.S. 1033
(1994).  It seems apparent, however, that licensees may properly invoke § 117. See
David Nimmer, Elliot Brown & Gary N. Frischling, The Metamorphosis of Contract into
Expand, 87 CAL. L. REV. 17 (1999).
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gram into the internal memory of the computer), courts have afforded
competitors substantial leeway to make copies and translations of ob-
ject code for the purpose of studying how they operate and to develop
interoperable products.64  In Atari Games v. Nintendo,65 Nintendo pro-
tected access to its video game console through proprietary interface
specifications embedded in a computer program.  After Atari Games
deciphered the interface specifications and developed different (and
non-infringing) computer code that enabled its games to run on
Nintendo’s game console, Nintendo sued for copyright infringement
on the grounds that Atari Games copied protected elements of the
Nintendo computer code in the process of decompilation.  In assessing
the appropriateness of making intermediate copies for the purpose of
decompiling a competitor’s computer program, the Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit emphasized the principle that the fair use doc-
trine generally “permits an individual in rightful possession of a copy
of a work to undertake necessary efforts to understand the work’s
ideas, processes, and methods of operation.”66  The court noted that
“[a]n author cannot acquire patent-like protection by putting an idea,
process, or method of operation in an unintelligible format and assert-
ing copyright infringement against those who try to understand that
idea, process, or method of operation.”67  Applying these principles,
the court reasoned that “[w]hen the nature of a work requires inter-
mediate copying to understand the ideas and processes in a copy-
righted work, that nature supports a fair use for intermediate copying.
Thus, reverse engineering object code to discern the unprotectable
ideas in a computer program is a fair use.”68  The court placed the
following limits on reverse engineering of object code: (1) “Any repro-
duction of protectable expression must be strictly necessary to ascertain
the bounds of protected information within the work”;69 (2) Reverse
engineering does not authorize commercial exploitation of “protected
64. See Julie E. Cohen, Reverse Engineering and the Rise of Electronic Vigilantism: Intel-
lectual Property Implications of “Lock-out” Programs, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1091 (1995); Hayes,
The Legality of Disassembly of Computer Programs, 12 COMPUTER/L.J. 1 (Oct. 1993); LaST
Frontier Conference Report on Copyright Protection of Computer Software, 30 JURIMETRICS J. 15,
24-25 (1989) (hereinafter Consensus Statement).
65. 975 F.2d 832 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
66. Id. at 842. See Consensus Statement, supra note 64, at 23-25.
67. Atari Games, 975 F.2d at 842.
68. Id. at 843.
69. Id. (emphasis added).
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expression”;70 and (3) “To invoke the fair use exception, an individual
must possess an authorized copy of a literary work.”71
A short time later, the Ninth Circuit adopted a similar interpreta-
tion of the fair use defense in Sega Enterprises Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc.72  As
in Atari Games, the maker of a video game console (Sega) sought to
prevent unauthorized game manufacturers from developing games
that could operate on their hardware.  In the process of deciphering
the interface specifications for the Sega system, Accolade made inter-
mediate copies of the Sega software.  Even though the final product
did not infringe any protectable computer code, Sega sued on the
ground that the intermediate copies infringed Sega’s copyright in the
console system software.  On the basis of a thorough fair use analysis,
the Ninth Circuit held that such intermediate copies were excused.  Of
particular note with regard to the network aspects of the technology,
the court emphasized the strong public policy reasons for allowing a
competitor to create interoperable works.73   “If disassembly of copy-
righted object code is per se an unfair use, the owner of the copyright
gains a de facto monopoly over the functional aspects of his work.”74
The court concluded that “an attempt to monopolize the market
[through copyright] by making it impossible for others to compete
runs counter to the statutory purpose of promoting creative expression
and cannot constitute a strong equitable basis for resisting the invoca-
tion of the fair use doctrine.”75
70. Id. at 844.
71. Id. at 843 (emphasis added).  Since Atari Games had acquired a copy of
Nintendo’s source code under false pretenses – by misrepresenting to the Copyright
Office that Atari Games was defending a copyright infringement action and that it
would use the source code only in putting on its defense – the court refused to allow
Atari Games use of the equitable defense of fair use. Id. at 841.
72. 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1993).
73. Id. at 1526.  Thus, the court rejected the dictum in Apple v. Franklin, 714 F.2d
at 1253, stating that achieving compatibility “is a commercial and competitive objective
which does not enter into the somewhat metaphysical issue of whether particular ideas
and expressions have merged.”
74. Sega Enterprises, 977 F.2d at 1526. See also Brief Amicus Curiae of Copyright
Law Professor, Sega v. Accolade, 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992) (No. 92-15655), reprinted
in 33 JURIMETRICS J. 147 (Fall 1992).
75. Sega Enterprises, 977 F.2d at 1524. See Cohen, supra note 64; Consensus State-
ment, supra note 64; CONTU Report, supra note 22, at 20 (“[C]opyright protection for
programs does not threaten to block the use of ideas or program language previously
developed by others when that use is necessary to achieve a certain result.  When other
language is available, programmers are free to read copyrighted programs and use the
ideas embodied in them in preparing their own works.”).  The Ninth Circuit reinforced
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Thus, the courts have determined that competitors may reverse
engineer computer programs to understand the manner in which they
operate and to determine interface specifications so to be able to de-
velop interoperable programs.76  Where necessary, such reverse engi-
neering may properly involve the creation of intermediate copies of
protected computer program code.  Decompilation, however, can be
laborious, time-consuming, and expensive.77  In addition, prudent de-
velopers of interoperable products can significantly reduce their expo-
sure to copyright liability by using “clean room” procedures, which add
additional time and cost to the development process, but avoid the
copying of protected computer code in their own products.78   None-
theless, as properly (and currently) applied by the courts, copyright
law does not stand in the way of achieving interoperability at the level
of hardware-hardware, hardware-software, or software-software inter-
face specifications.
3. Protection for Menu Command Hierarchies
As noted earlier, Congress distinguished in its definition of “com-
puter program” in §101 of the Copyright Act between the “set of state-
ments or instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer”
and the “certain result[s]” that they bring about.  Thus, the language
of the statute indicates that it is the program code itself that was
brought within the scope of the Copyright Act in the 1980 Amend-
ments and that the behavior of the program79 (the “certain result[s]”)
and expanded this doctrine in Sony Computer Entertainment, Inc. v. Connectix Corp.,
203 F.2d 596 (2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 871 (2000).
76. See, e.g., Bateman v. Mnemonics, Inc., 79 F.3d 1532, 1540 (11th Cir. 1996)
(following Sega v. Accolade); Computer Associates Int’l, Inc. v. Intel Corp., 982 F.2d
693, 700, 714-15 (2d Cir. 1992); NEC Corp. v. Intel Corp., 10 U.S.P.Q.2d 117 (N.D. Cal.
1989); E.F. Johnson Co. v. Uniden Corp. of America, 623 F.Supp. 1485, 1501 n.17 (D.C.
Minn. 1985).
77. See Johnson-Laird, supra note 13.
78. A clean room procedure involves using two sets of computer engineers – one
to decompile the target program to determine the interface specification and a second
team that does not have access to the target program which develops the interoperable
program solely on the basis of the interface specifications – to ensure that the final
product does not contain any infringing code (and that the development team can
prove that they independently developed their code).  Copyright lawyers have devel-
oped detailed procedures for ensuring the integrity of this process. See Davis, Scope of
Protection of Computer-Based Works: Reverse Engineering, Clean Rooms and Decompilation, 370
PLI/Pat 115, 151 (1993).
79. See Samuelson, et al., infra note 198, at 2316-26.
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— such as the screen displays and menu command structures — are
not covered by the copyright in the program.80  These behaviors of the
program are copyrightable, if at all, because they separately meet the
requirements of the Copyright Act.81
The Altai court appreciated this distinction.82  Although some
courts have not clearly distinguished between copyright protection for
the computer code and the “certain results” that they generate, they
have nonetheless applied a sensible reading of §102(b) of the Act to
limit protection of command systems governing the operation of a
computer program.
The issue of the copyrightability of command systems for com-
puter software arose most directly in litigation surrounding spread-
sheet technology.  Building upon the success of the Visicalc program
developed for the Apple II computer, the Lotus Corporation marketed
an enhanced and faster operating spreadsheet program incorporating
many of Visicalc’s features and commands into its 1-2-3 program for
the IBM PC platform.83  Lotus 1-2-3 quickly became the market leader
for spreadsheets running on IBM and IBM-compatible machines and
knowledge of the program became a valuable employment skill in the
accounting and management fields.  The 1-2-3 command hierarchy
was particularly attractive because it provided a logical structuring of
more than 200 commands and it enabled users to develop customized
programs (called “macros”) to automate particular accounting and
business planning functions in their workplace.  Businesses and users
increasingly became “locked-in” to the 1-2-3 command structure as
their human capital investments in learning the system and library of
macros grew.84  By the late 1980s, software developers seeking to enter
the spreadsheet market could not ignore the large premium that many
consumers placed on being able to use their investments in the 1-2-3
80. See Dennis S. Karjala & Peter S. Menell, Applying Fundamental Copyright Princi-
ples to Lotus Development Corp. v. Borland Int’l, Inc., 10 HIGH TECH. L.J. 177 (1995).
81. To find otherwise would make little sense since different programs can pro-
duce the same behavior, as in interface specifications and screen displays.
82. [W]e note that our decision here does not control infringement actions
regarding categorically distinct works, such as certain types of screen dis-
plays.  These items represent products of computer programs, rather than
the programs themselves, and fall under the copyright rubric of audiovisual
works.
Altai, 982 F.2d at 703.
83. See Menell, supra note 50, at 1057.
84. See Neil Gandal, Hedonic Price Indexes for Spreadsheets and an Empirical Test for
Network Externalities, 25 RAND. J. ECON. 160 (1994).
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system in a new spreadsheet environment, even where a new spread-
sheet product offered significant technical improvements over the Lo-
tus spreadsheet.85
In the mid 1980s, Paperback Software International introduced a
spreadsheet program (VP-Planner) that largely emulated the opera-
tion of the Lotus 1-2-3 product.86  Paperback was careful to ensure that
the program code did not copy the 1-2-3 code.  Nonetheless, Lotus
sued Paperback for copyright infringement, alleging that VP-Planner
inappropriately copied the 1-2-3 menu structure, which included the
choice of command terms, the structure and order of those terms,
their presentation on the screen, and the long prompts.  Relying upon
the Third Circuit’s merger test in Whelan and hence focusing simply
upon whether such elements could be expressed in a variety of ways,
Judge Keeton of the District Court of Massachusetts found for Lotus.
Facing bankruptcy, Paperback agreed not to appeal the judgment as
part of a settlement.87
After three years of intensive development efforts, Borland Inter-
national, developer of  several successful software products including
Turbo Pascal and Sidekick, introduced Quattro Pro, its entry into the
spreadsheet market.  Unlike Paperback’s VP-Planner spreadsheet
which offered little beyond the 1-2-3 product, Quattro Pro made sub-
stantial design and operational improvements and earned accolades in
the computer product review magazines.88  Also unlike VP-Planner,
Quattro Pro offered a new interface for its users which many purchas-
85. See, e.g., Hogan, Product Outlook: Fresh from the Spreadsheet Oven, PC WORLD, Feb.
1998, at 100-02; Magis, “Surpass” Spreadsheet Program Lives Up to Name, Beats Lotus 1-2-3,
WASH. POST, Apr. 25, 1998, at 26.
86. See Licklider, Ten Years of Rows and Columns, BYTE, Dec. 1989, at 324.
87. See Ould, Legal Dispute Kept Paperback from Lotus Appeal, PC WEEK, Jan. 21, 1991,
at 138.
88. See Spreadsheet; Borland International Inc.’s Quattro Pro for Windows and Quattro
Pro 4.0 for DOS, PC-COMPUTING, Dec. 1992, at 140 (“No doubt about it: Quattro Pro for
DOS is the best DOS spreadsheet there is. Period.”); Borland’s Quattro Pro Tops 2.5 Mil-
lion Units Shipped, BUSINESS WIRE, July 1, 1992 (“Since its introduction in October 1989,
Quattro Pro has won an unprecedented 42 industry awards and honors worldwide from
its users and product reviewers.  Borland’s Quattro Pro continues to outscore compet-
ing versions of Lotus 1-2-3 in key testing lab reviews.  In two separate reviews, InfoWorld
awarded Quattro Pro a spreadsheet report card score of 7.3 (INFOWORLD, Apr. 6, 1992),
while Lotus 1-2-3 Release 2.4 received a 6.2 (INFOWORLD, June 1, 1992).  Quattro Pro
outscored Lotus 1-2-3 for DOS by significant margins in an independent study con-
ducted by Usability Sciences Corp.  Representative spreadsheet users determined Quat-
tro Pro 4.0 to be easier to use, richer in features, more productive and the preferred
spreadsheet over Lotus 1-2-3 for DOS.”); Software Review, Quattro Pro 4.0; Borland Inter-
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ers of spreadsheets preferred over the 1-2-3 interface.  Nonetheless, be-
cause of the large number of users already familiar with the 1-2-3
command structure and those who had made substantial investments
in developing macros to run on the 1-2-3 platform, Borland considered
it essential to offer an operational mode based on the 1-2-3 command
structure as well as macro compatibility.89  Unlike VP-Planner, Bor-
land’s visual representation of the 1-2-3 command mode substantially
differed from the 1-2-3 screen displays.
In order to clarify the legal status of its product, Borland brought
a declaratory judgment action in California.  Through astute jurisdic-
tional maneuvering, Lotus was able to have the case consolidated with
the Paperback case before Judge Keeton.  After protracted litigation,90
Judge Keeton found for Lotus using a somewhat refined version of the
Whelan merger test to find that a menu command structure is protect-
able if there are many such structures theoretically available.  He also
found that Borland was not permitted to achieve macro compatibility
with the 1-2-3 product, distinguishing the treatment of external con-
straints noted in the Altai decision on the ground that such constraints
had to exist at the time that the first program was created — both the
Altai and Computer Associates programs were designed to provide in-
teroperability across IBM platforms.  Thus, Judge Keeton effectively
ruled that constraints governing the design of computer systems must
be analyzed ex ante (based on technical considerations at the time the
first program is written) and not ex post (after the market has operated
to establish a de facto standard).
Borland appealed the judgment to the First Circuit.91  By this
point in time, the Second Circuit’s Altai decision had received a
national Inc.’s Spreadsheet Software, COMPUTER SHOPPER, June 1992, at 536 (“Quattro Pro
4.0 simply shames other DOS-based spreadsheets, especially Lotus 1-2-3 r2.”).
89. See Software Review: Revamped Quattro Pro Closes in on Lotus 1-2-3, PC COMPUT-
ING, Nov. 1989, at 50 (favorable review noting that “Quattro Pro’s compatibility with
Lotus 1-2-3 Release 2.01 is as good as Lotus’ own Release 3 – if not better.  You can read
or write 1A, 2.01, or 2.2 files, use a Lotus-compatible menu, and run 1-2-3 macros with-
out conversion . . . .  If you choose to avoid Windows, then Quattro is the leader in
spreadsheet publishing and database integration.  Its high degree of Lotus compatibil-
ity means that 1-2-3 retraining is minimal, and its moderate hardware requirements (512
K of RAM and a hard disk) give is maximum flexibility.” (emphasis added).
90. See Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int’l, Inc., 778 F.Supp. 78 (D. Mass. 1992);
Lotus Dev. Corp v. Borland Int’l, Inc., 799 F.Supp. 203 (D. Mass 1992); Lotus Dev.
Corp. v. Borland Int’l, Inc., 831 F.Supp. 202 (D. Mass. 1993); Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Bor-
land Int’l, Inc., 831 F. Supp. 223 (D. Mass 1993).
91. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int’l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995).
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favorable reception in the professional and academic journals and its
approach had been adopted by a number of courts.  The Ninth Circuit
and the Federal Circuit had issued the Sega and Atari Games decisions,
further emphasizing the legitimacy of developing interoperable sys-
tems.  In addition, the Supreme Court’s decision in Feist Publications,
Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co.,92 denying copyright protection for
alphabetically organized telephone directories for lack of originality,
repudiated the “sweat of the brow” doctrine93 and reaffirmed the “long
recognized” principle “that the fact/expression dichotomy limits se-
verely the scope of protection in fact-based works.”94  In addition, the
Borland case had attracted tremendous interest among academics and
interest groups.95
The First Circuit viewed the case as presenting an issue of first
impression: “[w]hether a computer menu command hierarchy consti-
tutes copyrightable subject matter.”96  The court properly distin-
guished Altai as dealing with protection of programming code and not
the results of such code.  Instead, the court saw the subject matter of
this case as a “method of operation” falling directly within the exclu-
sions from copyright set forth in §102(b).97
We think that “method of operation,” as that term is used
in §102(b), refers to the means which a person operates
something, whether it be a car, a food processor, or a
computer.  Thus a text describing how to operate some-
thing would not extend copyright protection to the
92. 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
93. A few lower courts had found that copyright could be established on the basis
of substantial effort in gathering facts. See, e.g., Leon v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 91 F.2d
484 (9th Cir. 1937); Jeweler’s Circular Publ’g Co. v. Keystone Publ’g Co, 281 F. 83 (2d
Cir. 1922).  The Supreme Court in Feist rejected this “sweat of the brow” theory and
held that originality is a requirement of copyright and therefore, unless a factual work
exhibits originality as a compilation, it cannot receive protection under the Copyright
Act.
94. Feist, 499 U.S. at 350.
95. Amicus briefs were filed on behalf of computer scientists, intellectual property
professors, the Computer Software Industry Association, a coalition of users’ groups,
the Software Entrepreneurs’ Forum, the American Committee for Interoperable Sys-
tems, two coalition of major computer and software manufacturers, and the Computer
and Business Equipment Manufacturers Association.
96. Borland, 49 F.3d at 813.
97. The court noted that it did not need to determine whether the menu com-
mand hierarchy was also unprotectable under copyright law because it was a system,
process, or procedure. Id. at 814.
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method of operation itself; other people would be free to
employ that method and to describe it in their own words.
Similarly, if a new method of operation is used rather
than described, other people would still be free to employ
or describe that method.
We hold that the Lotus menu command hierarchy is an
uncopyrightable “method of operation.”  The Lotus
menu command hierarchy provides the means by which
users control and operate Lotus 1-2-3.  If users wish to
copy material, for example, they use the “Copy” com-
mand.  If users wish to print material, they use the “Print”
command.  Users must use the command terms to tell the
computer what to do.  Without the menu command hier-
archy, users would not be able to access and control, or
indeed make use of, Lotus 1-2-3’s functional capabilities.
The Lotus menu command hierarchy does not merely ex-
plain and present Lotus 1-2-3’s functional capabilities to
the user; it also serves as the method by which the pro-
gram is operated and controlled. . . .98
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed without opin-
ion by an equally divided vote.99
Subsequent appellate decisions have reached similar outcomes, al-
though they have not fully subscribed to the First Circuit’s reasoning.
In MiTek Holdings, Inc. v. ARCE Engineering Co.,100 the holder of a copy-
right in an application program which designed and arranged wood
trusses for the framing of building roofs brought an infringement ac-
tion against the maker of a competing program which featured a simi-
lar menu command tree and user interface.  Affirming the lower
court’s decision, the Eleventh Circuit held that the menu and sub-
menu command structure of the truss design program was un-
copyrightable under §102(b) of the Copyright Act because it
represents a process.101  The court did not need to reach the broader
98. Id. at 815.
99. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int’l, Inc., 516 U.S. 233 (1996) (Justice Stevens
did not participate in the consideration of this case).
100. 89 F.3d 1548 (11th Cir. 1996).
101. Id. at 1556-57.  The Court further noted that the lower court’s decision could
be sustained on the grounds that the menu and submenu command structures were
unoriginal (“The look of the ACES program is basically industry standard computer-
aided-design (CAD)”) and that idea and expression had merged (“the ACES programs
‘mimic the steps a draftsman would follow in designing a roof truss plan by hand’
[quoting the conclusion of the district court] . . . The logical design sequence is akin to
a mathematical formula that may be expressed in only a limited number of ways; to
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question, addressed in Lotus, of whether all menu command structures
are uncopyrightable as a matter of law.  In Mitel, Inc. v. Iqtel, Inc.,102
Mitel, the maker of a widely adopted computer system for automating
the selection of telephone long distance carrier and remotely activat-
ing optional telecommunications features such as speed dialing, sued a
competing firm which used the identical command codes for copy-
right infringement.  Because Mitel’s system had become a de facto stan-
dard in the marketplace, Iqtel defended its use of compatible
controller codes on the ground that “technicians who install call con-
trollers would be unwilling to learn Iqtel’s new set of instructions in
addition to the Mitel command code set, and the technician’s employ-
ers would be unwilling to bear the cost of additional training.”103  As
Borland had done, Iqtel’s product included both its own set of com-
mand codes as well as a “Mitel Translation Mode.”  While commenting
that a method of operation may in some circumstances contain copy-
rightable expression, the Tenth Circuit nonetheless concluded that
the Mitel command codes, which were arbitrarily assigned, lacked the
minimal degree of creativity to qualify for copyright protection.104
The court further held that Mitel’s command codes should be denied
copyright protection under the scenes à faire doctrine because they
are largely dictated by external factors such as compatibility require-
ments and industry practices.105
4. Protection for Computer User Interfaces
The interface between the computer and the user consists of a
variety of input/ouput devices, including a keyboard, pointing tools
(such as a mouse, joystick, and interactive pen), disk drives, audio
equipment, microphone, and screen displays.  Copyright law excludes
from protection such obviously functional works as keyboards, point-
ing objects, speaker systems, and other hardware devices.  The courts
have also found that data input formats, such as the order and size of
data fields, are not protectable under copyright law.106  The visual
images and text of screen displays may qualify as audiovisual, graphic,
or literary works under copyright.107  Some early courts afforded sub-
grant copyright protection to the first person to devise the formula effectively would
remove that mathematical fact from the public domain.”).
102. 124 F.3d 1366 (10th Cir. 1997).
103. Id. at 1369.
104. Id. at 1373-74.
105. Id. at 1374-76.
106. Feist, 499 U.S. at 350.
107. See, e.g., Stern Electronics, Inc. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852 (2d Cir. 1982).
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stantial protection to elements of a user interface.108   Such works re-
main, however, subject to the originality requirement and functionality
limitations of §102(b), the merger doctrine, and Baker v. Selden.  As a
result of the network features of computer-human interfaces, many as-
pects of these works are not protectable under copyright law.
The Ninth Circuit addressed some of the limitations on copyright
protection for audiovisual displays of computer programs in Data East
USA, Inc. v. Epyx, Inc.,109 in which the manufacturer of a video game
depicting a karate match sought to prevent another firm from market-
ing a competing game featuring many of the same audio and visual
elements.  Notwithstanding the many similarities between the two
works, the court held that no infringement had occurred because the
similarities flowed from “constraints inherent in the sport of karate it-
self” and “various constraints inherent in the use of [the particular type
of] computer.”110  After filtering out the unprotectable ideas in the
work, the court applied a standard of “virtual identity” in determining
that the competing work did not infringe.111
The most significant case to address the scope of copyright protec-
tion for network features of a computer-human interface is Apple Com-
puter, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp,112 in which Apple Computer alleged that
Microsoft’s Windows operating system and Hewlett-Packard’s New-
Wave operating system infringed Apple’s copyrights in the desk-top
graphical user interface for its Macintosh computer system.  The copy-
right issue was somewhat muddied by the existence of a licensing
agreement authorizing the defendants to use aspects of Apple’s graphi-
108. See, e.g., Broderbund Software, Inc. v. Unison World, 648 F.Supp. 1127, 1134
(N.D. Cal. 1986) (holding that the choice of typeface on user screen display and choice
of works “Choose a Font” as the title for a screen for producing cards, brochures, and
other printing projects were examples of audiovisual displays “dictated primarily by ar-
tistic and aesthetic consideration, and not by utilitarian or mechanical ones”); Digital
Communications Associates, Inc. v. Softklone Distrib. Corp., 659 F.Supp. 449 (N.D. Ga.
1987) (finding that the arrangement of status screens and commands for a data com-
munication program are protectable expression).
109. 862 F.2d 204 (9th Cir. 1988).
110. Id. at 209. See also Interactive Network v. NTN Communications, 875 F.Supp
1398 (N.D. Cal. 1995), aff’d 57 F.3d 1083 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (finding that football video
game was not infringed because similarities between works were based on the rules of
football and the idea of an interactive prediction game).
111. Prior case law in the Ninth Circuit held that “[w]hen idea and expression
coincide, there will be protection against nothing other than identical copying.”  Sid &
Marty Krofft Tel. Prod. v. McDonald’s Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1168 (9th Cir. 1977).
112. 799 F.Supp. 1006 (S.D. Cal. 1992), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 35 F.2d 1435 (9th
Cir. 1994), cert. denied 513 U.S. 1884 (1995).
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cal user interface.  The court determined, however, that the licensing
agreement was not a complete defense to the copyright claims113 and
therefore undertook an analysis of the scope of copyright protection
for a large range of audiovisual elements of computer screen displays.
In framing the analysis, the district court expressly recognized the
importance of standardization to consumers and the cumulative na-
ture of innovation to the scope of copyright protection.114  The court
proceeded to determine those elements of the graphical user interface
which were not protected on the grounds that they lacked originality
or were not protectable under section 102(b), the doctrine of scenes à
faire,115 the merger of idea and expression, or due to the limited num-
ber of ways in which an idea could be expressed or the external con-
straints imposed by the computer system.  The court found that all of
the alleged similarities between Apple’s works and Microsoft’s Win-
dows not authorized by the licensing agreement were either not pro-
tectable or subject to at least one of the limiting doctrines.  As a result,
the court applied the “virtual identity” standard in comparing the
works as a whole and determined that no infringement had occurred.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district’s court’s dissection
of the work in question to determine which elements are protectable,
filtering out of unprotectable elements, and application of the “virtual
identity” standard in this context.116
The Apple litigation established that many elements of the
desktop-based graphical user interface are in the public domain and
that the originality requirement and functionality doctrines of copy-
right law substantially limit the protection afforded the desk-top user
interface.  The Eleventh Circuit has since joined the Ninth Circuit in
adopting the “virtual identity standard” for claims of software infringe-
ment in a computer-user interface based on a compilation of un-
copyrightable elements.117
113. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 709 F.Supp. 925, 930 (N.D. Cal.
1989); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 717 F.Supp. 1428 (N.D. Cal. 1989):
Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 759 F.Supp. 1444 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
114. Apple, 799 F.Supp. at 1025-26.
115. Under the doctrine of scenes à faire, a copyright protection is denied to ex-
pressions that are “as a practical matter, indispensable or at least standard in the treat-
ment of a given [idea].”  Atari, Inc. v. North American Phillips Consumer Electronics
Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 616 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982).
116. Apple, 35 F.3d 1435 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied 513 U.S. 1184 (1995).
117. MiTek Holdings, Inc., 89 F.3d at 1558.
\\server05\productn\N\NLR\46-1-2\NLR106.txt unknown Seq: 36 24-FEB-03 13:39
98 NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46
C. The Future of Copyright Protection for Computer Software
The federal courts’ success in delimiting copyright protection for
computer software shifted the software industry’s attention to pursuing
other means for protecting software innovation beyond the relatively
thin protection available through copyright law.  The courts have now
fully opened the patent office to software-related inventions118 and
software developers have increasingly pursued that means of protec-
tion.  In addition, the software industry has discovered contract law –
in the form of shrinkwrap and clickwrap licenses – to be an inexpen-
sive and reasonably effective means of protecting their products.119
While the applicability of these other modes of protection raise a host
of troubling issues,120 they have largely dissipated pressure to push
copyright protection for software beyond copyright’s inherent limiting
doctrines.
II. COPYRIGHT IN THE AGE OF DIGITAL REPRODUCTION
AND DISTRIBUTION
Even though computer technology became a reality more than
half a century ago, it is only in the past decade that it has begun to
disrupt the foundations of the principal content industries — publish-
ing, music, film, and television.  The content industries’ long-standing
business models – selling books, newspapers, magazines, and records
(and later tapes and CDs), exhibiting films (and later selling and rent-
ing home videos and DVDs), and broadcasting music and television
shows – have proven quite resilient to the early generations of com-
118. See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981) (holding that a claim to a process
for curing rubber that involved the use of a computer to calculate a mathematical equa-
tion constituted patented subject matter); State Street Bank & Trust v. Signature Finan-
cial Group, 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1093 (1999).
119. See Bowers v. Baystate Technologies, Inc., 302 F.3d 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2002);
ProCD v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996); Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, The Li-
cense is the Product: Comments on the Promise of Article 2B for Software and Information Licens-
ing, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 891 (1998).
120. See, e.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Are Business Method Patents Bad for Busi-
ness?, 16 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 263 (2000); John R. Thomas, The
Patenting of the Liberal Professions, 40 B.C. L. REV. 1139 (1999); Robert P. Merges, As
Many as Six Impossible Patents Before Breakfast: Property Rights for Business Concepts and Pat-
ent System Reform, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 577 (1999); David Nimmer, Elliot Brown &
Gary N. Frischling, The Metamorphosis of Contract into Expand, 87 CAL. L. REV. 17 (1999);
Mark A. Lemley, Beyond Preemption: The Federal Law and Policy of Intellectual Property Licens-
ing, 87 CAL. L. REV. 112 (1999); Dennis J. Karjala, Federal Preemption of Shrinkwrap and
On-Line Licenses, 22 U. DAYTON L. REV. 511 (1997).
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puter technology. The relatively late onset of the digital “piracy” threat
can be attributed to the sheer informational magnitude of music and
film and the inability, until recently, to bring to market affordable,
high resolution means for perceiving (listening to and viewing) digital
content. Even with the introduction and rapid popularity of digitally-
encoded compact disks (CDs) and the proliferation of microcom-
puters beginning in the early 1980s, the record industry did not appre-
ciate the dramatic changes that would be brought about by the
emerging digital technologies.  Available microprocessors, the low fi-
delity of computer peripherals, and limitations of memory storage ca-
pacity prevented music from being stored, perceived, and reproduced
efficiently on computer devices until the mid-1990s.
As Moore’s law (and related advances) continued to improve the
capability and reduce the cost of computing, microcomputers became
an attractive platform for video games, multimedia content, and music
by the late 1980s and early 1990s.121  The development of consumer
versions of digital audio tape (DAT) technology around this same time
set off the first alarm bells within the record industry.  Concomitant
with these developments, advances in network technology, eventually
leading to the World Wide Web, data compression technologies, a new
wave of consumer electronics (including portable hard drives for stor-
ing music), and the deployment of broadband for Internet home users
drove the convergence of digital computers and traditional content.
In so doing, the deployment of digital technology set the stage for what
has become an epic battle over the future of copyright law.
Because digital sound recording files are widely available and rela-
tively small (in comparison to film files), the sound recording industry
has been the first content industry to be affected by the capabilities of
the emerging digital platform.  It has been referred to as the  prover-
121. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the motion picture and television industries
perceived a threat from a new analog technology – the video cassette recorder (VCR).
See JAMES LARDNER, FAST FORWARD: A MACHINE AND THE COMMOTION IS CAUSES (1987).
This concern, however, proved misplaced as rental and sale of home video emerged by
the mid-1990s as the leading revenue source for the movie industry. See HAROLD L.
VOGEL, ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY ECONOMICS: A GUIDE FOR FINANCIAL ANALYSIS 62 (5th
ed. 2001). Similarly, the recording industry became concerned about the proliferation
of analog cassette tape recorders and the rise of home copying. See Office of Technol-
ogy Assessment, U.S. Congress, Copyright and Home Copying: Technology Challenges
Law (Oct. 1989).  This threat did not prove a significant loss to the industry.
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bial canary in the coal mine.122  The health of the music canary, how-
ever, is a source of great controversy.  Music industry profits remained
robust throughout the 1990s, even as portable hard drives (MP3 play-
ers) became popular and consumers became able to copy and move
sound recordings in much the way that they manipulated word
processing files.123  Bracing for the digital onslaught, content and tech-
nology industries in 1998 successfully pressed the Clinton Administra-
tion and Congress to enact legislation prohibiting circumvention of
technological protection measures designed to prevent unauthorized
access and use of digital content.
Less than a year later, however, the instant popularity and rapid
diffusion of Napster, the first widely distributed peer-to-peer software
application brought the digital piracy issue to the forefront of legal,
economic, social, and political debate.  Tens of millions of Internet
users actively downloaded music over Napster’s peer-to-peer network
during its relatively short lifespan, resulting in the unauthorized distri-
bution of potentially billions of copies of sound recordings.124
Scarcely a teenager in America, the principal market for new sound
recordings, was unaware of this new means of accessing and obtaining
music.  The market for MP3 players and recordable CD drives (and
blank media, CD-Rs) skyrocketed.  The record industry promptly
brought suit against Napster for contributory and vicarious copyright
liability, obtaining a preliminary injunction125 which was later stayed126
and then reinstated.127  Although Napster has not operated since
March 2001, its function has since been filled by numerous other peer-
to-peer software programs and services, resulting in even greater unau-
thorized distribution of sound recordings.128
122. See NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, THE DIGITAL DILEMMA: INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 76 (2000) (hereinafter “Digital Dilemma Report”).
123. Record labels attempted to subject these devices to a tax that Congress im-
posed on digital audio recording devices in 1992. See Recording Industry Ass’n of
America v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., 180 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 1999), discussed infra text
accompanying notes 203-08, 239-49.
124. See Melanie Warner, Free Music: The New Napsters, FORTUNE, Aug. 12, 2002,
available at http://www.fortune.com/indext.jhtml?channel=print_article.jhtml&doc_id
=208834.
125. See A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F.Supp.2d 896 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
126. See A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
127. See A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 2001 WL 227083 (N.D. Cal. 2001).
128. See Brad King, While Napster Was Sleeping (Jul. 24, 2001), at http://
www.wired.com/news/mp3/1,1285,45480,00.html; Melanie Warner, Free Music: The New
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Despite this largely unregulated source of free music, the record
industry’s revenue stream has shown only a modest fall-off that argua-
bly can be attributed to the economic recession of 2000-01, a dearth of
new releases from blockbuster artists, and other cyclical determinants
of music sales.  Nonetheless, surveys and various other forms of evi-
dence increasingly suggest that teenagers (a prime target audience for
record labels) and others now consider peer-to-peer networks to be the
most attractive source for obtaining sound recordings.129  At the same
time, digital technology has dramatically reduced the cost of produc-
ing, recording, marketing, and distributing sound recordings, sug-
gesting that the supply of new music is richer and more diverse than
ever before.
The computer and consumer electronics industries, a variety of
online and consumer organizations, copyright scholars, and some re-
cording artists have questioned the magnitude (and, in some cases, the
existence) of the digital piracy threat.130  They contend that the con-
tent industries are merely crying wolf, much the way that traditional
print publishers did in arguing that public libraries131 and later
Napsters, FORTUNE, Aug. 12, 2002, available at http://www.fortune.com/indext.jhtml?
channel=print_article.jhtml&doc_id=208834.
129. See Edison Media Research, The National Record Buyers Study II, at http://
www.edisonresearch.com/R&RRecordBuyersII.htm (last visited July 8, 2002).
130. See, e.g., SIVA VAIDHYANATHAN, COPYRIGHTS AND COPYWRONGS: THE RISE OF IN-
TELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND HOW IT THREATENS CREATIVITY (2001); Raymond Shih Ray
Ku, The Creative Destruction of Copyright: Napster and the New Economics of Digital Technology,
69 U. CHI. L. REV. 263 (2002); JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT (2001); LAWRENCE
LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS (2001); Janis Ian, The Internet Debacle – An Alternative View,
PERFORMING SONGWRITER MAGAZINE (May 2002), available at http://www.janisian.com/
article-internet_debacle.html; John Borland, Rapper Chuck D Throws Weight Behind Nap-
ster (May 1, 2000) (seeing Napster as a unique promotional tool for lesser known art-
ists), available at http://news.com/2100-1023-239917.html.
131. As noted by a mid-19th century observer,
when circulating libraries were first opened, the booksellers were much
alarmed; and their rapid increase added to their fears, and led them to
think that the sale of books would be diminished by such libraries.  But
experience has proved that the sale of books, so far from being diminished
[by public libraries], has been greatly promoted; as from these repositories
many thousand families have been cheaply supplied with books, by which
the taste of reading has become more general, and thousands of books are
purchased each year by such as have first borrowed them at those libraries,
and after reading, approving of them, have become purchasers.
CHARLES KNIGHT, THE OLD PRINTER AND THE MODERN PRESS 285 (1854). See also CARL
SHAPIRO & HAL R. VARIAN, INFORMATION RULES: A STRATEGIC GUIDE TO THE NETWORK
ECONOMY 94-95 (1999).
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photocopiers132 would undermine the market for books and journals,
radio would rob the music industry,133 the video cassette recorder
would lead to the demise of the film and television industries,134 and
analog cassette recorders would destroy the sound recording indus-
132. Early in the congressional hearings on copyright law revision [leading up to
the 1976 Act], it became apparent that problems raised by the use of the new technolo-
gies of photocopying and computers on the authorship, distribution, and use of copy-
righted works were not dealt with by the then pending bill.  Because of the complexity
of these problems, CONTU [the National Commission on New Technological Uses of
Copyrighted Works] was created to provide the President and Congress with recom-
mendations concerning those changes in copyright law or procedure needed both to
assure public access to copyrighted work used in conjunction with computer and ma-
chine duplication systems and to respect the rights of owners of copyrights in such
works, while considering the concerns of the general public and the consumer. See
CONTU Report, supra note 22, at 1.  In the end, CONTU offered relatively modest
recommendations regarding the threat of photocopying – proposing only that fair use
guidelines be developed, that the Register of Copyrights conduct a study of the impact
of photocopying on proprietors’ rights and the public’s access, and that publishers,
libraries, and government agencies cooperate in making information about the copy-
right status of published works more readily available to the public. Id. at 2.
133. Radio eventually became the leading promotional mechanism for sound re-
cordings and a rich revenue stream for song composers and music publishers.
134. Jack Valenti, President of the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA)
testified at a House Judiciary Committee hearing in 1982 that the video cassette re-
corder represented a “growing and dangerous” threat to the film industry’s “economic
vitality and future security.”
There is going to be a VCR avalanche.  Exports of VCR’s from Japan totaled
2.57 million units in 1981. No. 2, the United States is the biggest market.
No.3, February 1982, which is the latest data, shows the imports to the
United States are up 57 percent over 1981.  This is more than a tidal wave.
It is more than an avalanche.  It is here.
Now, that is where the problem is.  You take the high risk, which means we
must go by the aftermarkets to recoup our investments.  If those
aftermarkets are decimated, shrunken, collapsed because of what I am go-
ing to be explaining to you in a minute, because of the fact that the VCR is
stripping those things clean, those markets clean of our profit potential,
you are going to have devastation in this marketplace. ***
We are going to bleed and bleed and hemorrhage, unless this Congress at
least protects one industry that is able to retrieve a surplus balance of trade
and whose total future depends on its protection from the savagery and the
ravages of this machine.
Now, the questions comes, well, all right, what is wrong with the VCR.
One of the Japanese lobbyists, Mr. Ferris, has said that the VCR – well, if I
am saying something wrong, forgive me.  I don’t know.  He certainly is not
MGM’s lobbyist.  That is for sure.  He has said that the VCR is the greatest
friend that the American film producer ever had.  I say to you that the VCR
is to the American film producer and the American public as the Boston
strangler is to the woman home alone.
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try.135  Various advocates and commentators contend that the content
industries are merely trying to reimpose bottlenecks within the distri-
bution pipeline and exert unwarranted control over the works of
authorship.136
While there is little doubt that the leading companies within the
traditional content industries seek to protect their “turf” and ensure
continued success in the digital domain, extrapolating from these ear-
lier analog piracy threats overlooks critical differences.  Whereas pro-
tecting computer software within copyright law can be analogized to
squeezing a square peg into a round hole, preventing the unautho-
rized distribution of copyrighted works through digital networks
amounts to containing water in a sieve.  The ease with which digital
technology enables anyone with a computer and an Internet connec-
tion to reproduce and make available for wide-scale distribution flaw-
less reproductions of works of authorship has proven a far greater
concern and more wrenching adjustment for copyright law than ac-
commodating computer software.  This section begins by explaining
the significance of the shift from analog media (paper, tape, film, and
vinyl) to digital encoding and distribution for the principal content
industries.  It then examines the new provisions that have been added
to copyright law over the past decade in response to digital technology
and the first wave of enforcement actions applying these and tradi-
tional copyright protections.  Section C describes the various forces —
economic, technological, social, and legal — emerging in the copy-
right policy arena.  Section D explores the likely contours and role of
copyright law in the digital future.
A. The Shift from Analog to Digital Technology
Copyright law has always been a means to an end – the protection
of authors and publishers from competition in the sale of original
135. In the words of Federal Reserve Chairman, Alan Greenspan, then Chairman
and President of Townsend-Greenspan & Co., Inc., and economic consulting firm,
[f]or economic incentives to work appropriately, property rights must pro-
tect the rights of capital assets . . . . At present . . . severe economic damage
[is being done] to the property rights of owners of copyrights in sound
recordings and musical compositions . . . under present and emerging con-
ditions, the industry simply has no out . . . Unless something is done to
respond to the problem, the industry itself is at risk.
Testimony of Alan Greenspan, Hearings on the Home Recording Act, H. Rep., Sub-
comm. On Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks (Oct. 25, 1983).
136. See supra note 130.
\\server05\productn\N\NLR\46-1-2\NLR106.txt unknown Seq: 42 24-FEB-03 13:39
104 NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46
works for sufficient time to promote creative expression.137   The ad-
vent of the printing press and other mechanical means of reproducing
works of authorship opened up vast new opportunities for the produc-
tion of creative works while at the same time enabling those who have
not created to compete with authors and their publishers in the sale of
such works.  Because the copyist did not bear the cost of authorship,
their rapid entry into the market could undermine the incentives of
authors and their publishers in producing and marketing their cre-
ations.  Copyright law was “invented” to restrain such copyists, at least
for a limited time deemed appropriate to enable authors and their
publishers to reap a reasonable return on their endeavors.  The evolu-
tion of copyright law has been driven by technological innovation in
the means for capturing, reproducing, and distributing works of au-
thorship.138  Thus it is important to understand the technologies for
storing and distributing content and how the shift from analog to digi-
tal technology alters the appropriation problem faced by content
industries.
1. The Analog Age
For most of the history of copyright law, content storage and dis-
tribution innovations centered around means for mechanically captur-
ing and reproducing works of authorship – such as phonographs,
photographs, film, and photocopies – and new devices and methods
for distributing, receiving, and perceiving content, such as broadcast-
ing and cable television.  All of these technologies have been based
upon what has come to be known as an “analog” platform.  They re-
cord or, to use copyright law’s rubric, “fix” works of authorship
through some human or mechanical process of deforming a physical
object (such as stone, paper, vinyl, film) in a manner that conveys an
image (a letter, number, or graphic image) or signal varying in audio
frequency (sound) or light or color intensity (film).  The term “ana-
log” is used to signify that the medium uses an “analogy” to represent
137. See Statute of Anne (1710).  The first “copyright” granted in England in 1556
by royal decree also served political ends – consolidating the new printing business in
the hands of the Stationers’ Company, which refused to publish books that the Crown
considered politically or religiously objectionable. See David Lange, At Play in the Fields
of the Word: Copyright and the Construction of Authorship in the Post-Literate Millennium, 55
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 139 (1992).
138. Cf. Jessica Litman, Copyright Legislation and Technological Change, 68 OR. L. REV.
275, 353-54 (1989).
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the phenomenon.  Even the advent of broadcasting technology — the
transmission of a signal to multiple receiving devices — has been based
upon analog propagation (wave forms) of analog encoded content
(sound recordings etched in vinyl and later tape and audiovisual works
fixed in film).
The principal content industries — publishing, sound recording,
film, and television industries — formed, developed, and thrived
around analog technology platforms in part because they inherently
impeded unauthorized reproduction and distribution of works of au-
thorship.  In the case of book publishing, at least prior to the advent of
xerography in the late 1950s, a second comer would have to expend
substantial resources to typeset a book or newspaper.  Even after the
availability of xerography, unauthorized copies produced using this
mechanical system lacked the quality of the original.  Furthermore, the
cost of producing any substantial quantity of  reading material using
this technology was more expensive per volume than traditional print-
ing.  These costs, in combination with the relative ease of detecting
unauthorized commercial-scale publication, provided an effective de-
terrent to copyright infringement in the publishing industry.
The sound recording and film industries had even stronger “natu-
ral” protection inherent in the underlying media and business models.
By owning the master recording from which commercial recordings
were made, the record labels had exclusive control over the best ver-
sions of the sound recordings commercially available.  While this did
not prevent competition from sound-like bands, who could gain au-
thorization to record underlying musical compositions through a com-
pulsory license, it did ensure that no second comer could offer the
same quality as the original.  Thus, even though Congress did not ex-
tend federal copyright protection to sound recordings until 1972,139
the record industry thrived.  Even after the advent of recordable media
for the consumer market such as reel-to-reel machines (in the 1960s)
and later cassette tape (in the 1970s), the quality of such second and
third generation recordings paled in comparison to the original. The
audiocassette copy of an analog recording suffers substantial degrada-
tion of quality due to distortions, such as background hiss and speed
and alignment variation (wow and flutter), introduced by the limita-
tions of the mechanical devices used for reproduction.  Each subse-
139. Prior to that time, state protection existed for sound recordings. See MAR-
SHALL LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW 137 (3d ed. 1999).
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quent generation compounds these distortions.  Consequently, the
retail distribution model for sound recordings did not face significant
threats of unauthorized reproduction and distribution, particularly af-
ter the enactment of federal copyright protection.
The film industry had even greater inherent controls on the unau-
thorized reproduction and distribution of their works.  As with analog
sound recordings, the quality of films degrade across successive gener-
ations of reproductions.  By owning the physical film master, the movie
studio controls the best version of the work.  Furthermore, for most of
the history of the industry, films have been distributed first through
theatrical release.  Therefore, consumers gain access to the works only
through paying for admission.  The prized asset of film industry re-
mains under control of a relatively small group of theater owners.  It
was not until the advent of the VCR in the 1980s that typical consumers
had the means of possessing a physical copy of a film product.140
Thus, movie studios could directly control the release and viewing of
their films and charge consumers on a pay-per-view model.
The advent of television provided a second market for feature
films, as well as a primary market for a wide range of live and shorter
duration programming.  Here again, the original work could only be
accessed in a constrained environment that maintained control over
the physical storage media in the hands of copyright owners and their
licensees (broadcasters).  Consumers never gained physical control
over the work.  Unlike the theatrical release model, the television me-
dium was complicated by the fact that it was not possible to set up
ticket windows or other means of rationing access to television trans-
missions.  This led to the development of an advertising-based model.
As noted by one industry observer, television “programs are scheduled
interruptions of marketing bulletins.”141  Film and television produc-
ers get paid by advertisers who sponsor the broadcasts.
This advertising model proved extraordinarily successful and has
largely sustained the television industry throughout its history.  With
the widespread diffusion of television technology by the 1950s, adver-
tisement-supported television has become one the central institutions
in American society.  By the 1960s, a large and growing percentage of
140. A relatively small industry of film rental libraries existed prior to the 1980s
which rented films for exhibition.  This industry was largely eclipsed by the video rental
industry.
141. See HAROLD L. VOGEL, ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY ECONOMICS: A GUIDE FOR FI-
NANCIAL ANALYSIS 173 (5th ed. 2001).
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Americans would tune into one of the three major networks around
the dinner hour for news and entertainment.  The 6:00 pm to 9:00 pm
window came to be known as “prime time” which many companies
came to see as an unparalleled way of capturing the attention of a large
audience.  Competition for this limited resource – three principal net-
works – yielded a large and stable source of revenue, which enabled
television networks and production companies to underwrite substan-
tial programming investments.  Unauthorized reproduction and distri-
bution of television programming did not present much concern to
the industry.  Constraints on the telecommunications spectrum and
the relatively high cost of broadcasting limited the number of broad-
casters and allowed for the systematic monitoring and control of such
activities.  Furthermore, consumers could be relied upon to sit
through whatever advertisements were embedded in the program-
ming.  Even after the development of remote control devices, mute
buttons, and VCRs, most consumers took in the advertisements along
with the featured programming.  Even if consumers switched channels,
the other two networks were likely to have commercials at roughly the
same intervals.
Given the technological constraints on unauthorized reproduc-
tion and distribution of works of authorship, copyright law played an
important, but relatively passive role in the development of these in-
dustries.  Copyright did, of course, affect the ability of record labels
and television and film producers to base new projects on protected
musical compositions, scripts, and novels, but once produced with
proper authorization, these works could be exploited without much
risk of unauthorized reproduction and distribution.  Apart from ad-
dressing the problem of wholesale counterfeiting, copyright owners
could rely principally upon “technological” impediments attributable
to the analog nature of the recording media to stave off unauthorized
reproduction and distribution of their works.  The business models
supporting the sound recording, film, and television industries implic-
itly assumed a zero or low risk of downstream reproduction and distri-
bution of protected works.
Advances in consumer electronics gradually reduced the cost and
increased the ease of capturing and copying works of authorship.
Tape recording decks and VCRs afforded consumers the ability to re-
cord protected works, but the quality of second generation copies, the
time required, the cost of blank media, and the risk of copyright en-
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forcement142 curtailed any significant black market for such works. As
of the late 1980s, even though approximately forty percent of a repre-
sentative sample of consumers reported engaging in some “home copy-
ing” of copyrighted music, the predominant motivation for such
activities was to create cassettes of already owned records and CDs for
listening in car stereos or in portable devices.  Such activities did not
significantly erode the primary market for such works.143  Because of
the limitations of analog media and devices, the quality of the repro-
ductions were below what could be obtained from the record com-
pany.  With regard to films and television programming, although
VCRs had become popular by that time, relatively few consumers used
them for recording over-the-air broadcasts.  Playing prerecorded home
videos became the major use for such devices, creating a vibrant mar-
ket for the rental and purchase of video cassettes.  Furthermore, any
recordings of television shows included the commercials accompany-
ing the programming.  Although most VCRs included fast forward but-
tons by that time, skipping commercials required more effort than
most consumers were willing to expend.  Hence, the VCR served to
augment film and television industry income by creating new means of
exploiting feature films and increasing the viewership of advertise-
ment-supported programming.  Contrary to Jack Valenti’s dire predic-
tions,144 the VCR would propel the home video market past theatrical
release in terms of total movie industry revenue by the mid-1990s.145
Thus, even though advances in consumer electronics built upon the
analog platform loosened record company, film studio, and television
networks’ control over downstream availability of their works, they
more than offset the effect on bottom lines through increased demand
for entertainment industry products and expanded revenue channels.
2. The Digital Age
Digital technology offers a much more versatile, although more
porous, platform for storing, distributing, and reproducing works of
142. See, e.g., Electra Records v. Gem Electronic Distributors, 360 F.Supp. 821
(E.D.N.Y. 1973) (holding electronic manufacturer and record store contributorily lia-
ble for copyright infringement for making available to consumers a coin-operated mag-
netic tape duplicating system which could reproduce 35 to 45 minute recordings on
blank eight-track cartridges in approximately two minutes).
143. See United States Office of Technology Assessment, Copyright and Home Copy-
ing: Technology Challenges Law (Oct. 1989).
144. See Valenti, supra note 134.
145. See VOGEL, supra note 141, at 62.
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authorship.  Digital computers recognize fluctuations in electrical volt-
age.  Information is encoded using a massive array of binary switches
which can be turned on or off depending upon whether they have a
high or low charge.146  By encoding works in binary form, digital com-
puters enable perfect reproduction of whatever is captured across un-
limited generations of reproductions.  Furthermore, by enabling
anyone to “broadcast” via the Internet, digital networks  remove many
of the constraints of traditional broadcasting and limit the ability of
content owners to control and monitor what is distributed.  Although
various factors have delayed and limited the digital revolution, the past
several years have brought to fruition and diffused a powerful digital
platform that is well along the way toward supplanting the analog stor-
age and distribution media on which the content industries were built.
The inexorable operation of Moore’s law continues to reduce the cost
and increase the power of this platform, rapidly bringing the analog
age to a close.  Just as word processing programs on general computers
and laser printers have displaced typewriters, digital technologies and
formats (CDs, MP3, and DVDs) have largely relegated analog storage
media to historical interest.  This shift portends profound implications
for the content, computer, and computer electronics industries.
a. Principal Characteristics of the Emerging Digital
Content Platform
It has taken a few decades for digital technology to supplant ana-
log media.  The sound recording industry began the shift in 1981 with
its embrace of the compact disk (CD) format.  Because CD devices of
this era did not enable consumers to record from or onto this me-
dium, CD technology did not significantly alter the traditional control
of the record labels, at least until the mid-1990s.  By offering a cleaner
and more resilient sound quality – approximating the clarity of master
recordings – and greater convenience, the CD boosted record industry
profits as consumers repurchased works that they already owned in
vinyl and magnetic tape formats.  Furthermore, the improved sound
quality and durability of this new medium increased consumers’ will-
ingness to pay, raising profit margins for record labels.  Digital technol-
ogy has only recently reached the consumer video market with the
146. The smallest unit of memory in a computer is called “a bit,” a switch with a
value of “0“ (off) or “1” (on).  A byte consists of group of eight bits.  A kilobyte (“K”)
contains 1024 (210) bytes, a megabyte (“MB”) 1024 kilobytes, and a gigabyte (“GB”)
1024 megabytes.
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introduction of the DVD format in 1997.  Its popularity has grown rap-
idly as prices have declined.147  Many consumers appreciate the high
resolution, ease of search, added features, and ability to watch feature
length motion pictures on portable devices and laptop computers.
The availability of recording capability in the past year has further
stirred interest in the DVD format.   Digital technology has also broken
into the book publishing industry through eBooks, although consumer
acceptance of this format has been sluggish.
Over the past three years, the broader implications of the digital
platform for the content industries have come into sharper focus as
consumer adoption of enabling technology and the rollout of high
bandwidth Internet access have unleashed the extraordinary capabili-
ties of digital devices and networks.  In order to appreciate these impli-
cations, it is necessary to understand the factors and characteristics
responsible for the emergence of the digital content platform, the
most important of which are: (1) dramatic advances in microprocessor
speed,  memory storage, and data compression; (2) achievement of
high sampling rates in capturing digital content; (3) development of
improved technologies for perceiving (listening to and viewing) digital
content; (4) essentially flawless, inexpensive, and rapid reproduction
capabilities; (5) precise manipulability of digital content; (6) archive
management and searchability; (7) portability; (8) development of dig-
ital networks for distributing content (including broadband); and (9)
convergence of distribution platforms.
Processor Speed, Memory Storage, and Data Compression.  Notwithstand-
ing the invention of computer technology more than half a century
ago, the shift to a digital content platform could not begin until com-
puters possessed the speed and memory capacity to handle the vast
amount of information contained in music and audiovisual works at a
reasonable price.  This was far from achievable even after the early
generation of microcomputers revolutionized the computer industry.
These machines were too slow and cumbersome to handle the file sizes
needed to encode digital content.  The first such machines were chal-
lenged by simple video games (such as Breakout and Pong).  Within a
few years, they could handle more sophisticated multimedia works.
The rapid improvement in microprocessor speed and memory storage,
approximated by Moore’s Law and related concepts, eventually
147. See Greg Wright, Will DVD Popularity Drive VCRs to Extinction?, DETROIT NEWS,
Jan. 1, 2001.
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brought general purpose computers to the point that they could serve
as a platform for storing and reproducing rich entertainment works.
To put this rate of technological advance in perspective, the capacity of
a standard hard drive today (20 gigabytes) has 500,000 times more ca-
pacity than a standard hard drive a decade ago for even lower cost.148
Just as expanded memory enables computers to handle informa-
tionally rich digital content, more efficient file formats and compres-
sion technology reduce the memory capacity and bandwidth necessary
to access and store such content.149  The MP3 format, which refers to
the Moving Picture Experts Group 1 Layer 3 file format for audio cod-
ing, maintains the original sound quality at a data reduction of 1:12 by
reducing the size of codes and taking advantage of the fact that both
channels of a stereo channel pair contain much of the same informa-
tion.150  Combining the latest developments in portable hard drive ca-
pability and MP3 compression technology, Apple’s iPod, a pocket-sized
10 gigabyte hard drive weighing just 6.5 ounces (including a 10-hour
battery supply), can hold 2,000 songs.151  This device currently sells for
$400.  Smaller capacity devices, capable of holding an hour of music,
can be purchased for under $100.  The DivX compression algorithm,
an open source software program,152 can reduce a 5 gigabyte file into
148. IBM recently announced a new storage density milestone, compressing one
trillion bits of data per square inch, approximately 25 times greater than current hard
drives.  This technology can potentially hold 25 million printed pages on a surface the
size of a postage stamp. See Kenneth Chang, A New System for Storing Data: Think Punch
Cards, but Tiny, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2002; Lisa Gill, IBM Storage Breatkthrough Goes Na-
notech (June 11, 2002), available at http://www.newsfactor.com/perl/story/18172.html.
149. Such technology is often referred to as a “codec,” or compression/decompres-
sion algorithm.  A computer running a compressed file must have software to decom-
press the file.
150. See Fraunhofer Institut (creator of the format), at http://www.iis.fhg.de/
amm/techinf/layer3/index.html.
151. See Apple Web Site, at http://www.apple.com/ipod/.  Creative Labs’ Nomad
3 Jukebox Player, which weighs less than a pound, can store 8,000 songs and sells for
under $400.  “Digital home jukeboxes” can store nearly 1,000 CDs, eliminating the
need for stacks of CDs and providing convenient access to an entire library of music.
See Good-Bye CD Towers, WIRED, July 2002, at 82. Sony’s PlayStation3 game console, which
is scheduled for release in 2005, is expected to be able to hold 12,800 hours of music or
2,000 hours of video. See Dean Takahasi, The Accelerator, RED HERRING, July 2002, at 37-
38.
152. The DivX algorithm is no relation to Divx, a proprietary standard developed
for use as a pay-per-view platform for DVDs. See Michael Stutz, Divx Protects Content, But
Not Your Liberties, WIRED NEWS, Sept. 17, 1997.  This standard ultimately failed to gain
acceptance in the marketplace and was abandoned by its principal commercial backer,
Circuit City, in 1999. See End of the Road for Pay-Per-View DVDs (June 16, 1999), at http://
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approximately 650 megabytes, the storage size of a recordable CD,
without significant loss in resolution or sound quality.153  This technol-
ogy enables near-DVD quality films to be downloaded through broad-
band connections in a few hours.154
High Sampling Rates.  As noted above, sound and visual motion are
analog phenomena, continuous wave forms, not discrete data points.
Yet digital technology captures these phenomena as discrete data,
whereas analog sound recording technology (vinyl records and tapes)
use continuous representations to approximate the phenomena to be
captured.  In order to approximate the continuous nature of sound
and visual images, digital technology must “sample” the physical phe-
nomena at a sufficiently high rate so that the human ear and eye can-
not perceive differences between the real phenomenon and its digital
representation.  Advances in digital technology have surpassed these
milestones over the past two decades.  To put this in perspective, a
standard music CD format takes measurements 44,100 times per sec-
ond, using coding numbers ranging from 0 to 65,535 (16 bit sample
(216)).155  Thus, a two channel (stereo recording) requires 176,400
bytes/second or roughly 10 megabytes per minute of music recorded.
A full length CD (one hour) contains approximately 320 million
samples.
Analog motion pictures have always relied upon sampling rates,
but two phenomena must be distinguished: the capturing of static
images (e.g., colors and composition) and the juxtaposition of tempo-
ral sequencing of static images.  Analog motion pictures used analog
technology (photography) to capture the former (although television
monitors reproduce these images using a discrete number of cross-
hatched lines) and rely upon adequate sampling rates to capture the
dynamic dimension.  Early film technology used relatively low sam-
pling rates, which produced the impression of staccato images.  In that
sense, motion pictures have always involved capturing analog phenom-
ena through discrete representations.  Digital motion picture technol-
ogy uses discrete representations of both the still images (color bit
www. Salon.com/tech/log/1999/06/16/dvd/; Stephanie Mills, Behind Death of Divx
Were Angry Customers (June 17, 1999), at http://news.com.com/2100-1040-227248.html.
153. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F.Supp.2d 294, 313-14
(S.D.N.Y. 2000).
154. See John Borland, Hacked Video Technology Provides Look at MP3-like Films (Mar.
27, 2002), at http://news.com.com/2100-1023-238468.html.
155. See Digital Dilemma Report, supra note 122, at 29-30.
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maps) and the dynamic dimension.  The technology has now devel-
oped for using digital means for capturing both the static and dynamic
elements of motion, although the resulting file requires comparatively
large storage capacity.
Digital photography illustrates well the role of sampling rates (and
memory storage capacity) in the transition from analog to digital plat-
forms.  The early generations of digital cameras for the consumer mar-
ketplace were expensive, constrained by memory capacity, and unable
to capture the quality of reproduction available through traditional
(analog) photography. Within the space of just a few years, digital cam-
eras have come down substantially in price while gaining ground in
terms of resolution.  Digital storage technology provides great advan-
tages over analog technology, such as the ability to port images to
other digital devices and manipulate the images.  Digital video technol-
ogy is making comparable inroads into the traditional video
marketplace.
Transparent Perception. Digital media have the ability to provide for
more accurate reproduction of recordings and visual images (assum-
ing sufficiently high sampling rates).  Whereas analog sound technolo-
gies – vinyl records or magnetic tapes – introduce some imperfections
in sound quality through the process of mechanical reproduction
(even in the first generation copy), compact disks offer sound quality
essentially equivalent to the master recording by duplicating the pre-
cise binary code.  Furthermore, playback technology does not involve
the use of moving parts to decipher the encoded content, thereby
eliminating other distortions present in analog technology.  This attri-
bute has been particularly important in the market for portable hard
drives that allow runners to listen to music files without any distortion
from movement.
Until recently, computers lacked the sound reproduction and
video resolution of home stereo and television monitors.  These dis-
tinctions have gradually been eliminated to the point that computer
based displays typically offer greater resolution than traditional televi-
sion monitors.  As will be discussed below, computers are increasingly
integrated with high fidelity stereos and high resolution monitors.
Digital technology has yet to penetrate some content markets ef-
fectively due to limitations in visual quality of computer displays.  The
eBook market, for example, has been slow to form in part because
many consumers do not find the displays for perceiving content to be
as comfortable as printed books.  Such devices do yet offer the resolu-
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tion and readability in a wide range of environments (such as bright
sunlight).  As children increasingly grow up reading on video screens
and the technology for eBook readers advance, this technology –
which offers  great storage capacity (e.g., five books and a dictionary
on a device that is smaller than a paperback book), interchangeability
of files, the ability to search and research texts, and integration with
other media and functionality (e.g., sound, video, telecommunica-
tions) – will make inroads into the traditional book marketplace.
Flawless, Inexpensive, and Rapid Reproduction.  The ability to store
digital content in general purpose computing devices enables these
files to be accessed and reproduced with the same ease as other digital
files – such as word processing documents and spreadsheets.  Although
content files tend to be substantially larger than typical word process-
ing files, the enhanced speed and memory capacity of modern com-
puters enables them to be accessed and reproduced essentially
instantaneously.  The ability to store and reproduce content files has
also been enhanced by the development of new storage media capable
of holding vast amounts of information at very low cost.  Zip drives, CD
burners, and now DVD burners156 have enabled home computer users
to encode rich informational content on portable media.  In the past
year, sales of blank CDs, costing barely more than 10 cents each when
purchased in bulk, surpassed sales of pre-recorded CDs.
Manipulability.  The digital environment enables users to alter and
arrange content with tremendous ease and flexibility.  Digital camera
images, for example, can be cropped, shaded, and morphed using a
wide range of software based editing tools on general purpose com-
puters.  Recording engineers and musicians have increasingly used
computer-based editing technology to enhance and mix sound record-
ings.  The rap and hip hop genres make particularly heavy use of the
manipulability of digital content.  Film and animation studios now rely
upon computer graphics and related technologies to produce special
effects and edit their works.  The growing capability of home com-
puters has brought these opportunities for creative expression to a
much broader audience.  Now everyone from a Hollywood director to
an aspiring  musician to an elementary school student can develop new
works of music, art, and film with affordable tools in their own homes.
156. See Andy Patrizio, First DVD Recorder Debuts (Aug. 9, 2000), at http://
www.wired.com/news/technology/0,1282,38145,00.html.
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They can start from scratch, build from existing content, or combine
elements of both.
Of perhaps greater significance for the vast majority of music con-
sumers, the digital platform enables users to assemble their own com-
pilations.  Since the mid to late 1960s, the sound recording industry
has predominantly distributed music in bundles of 8 to 12 songs – first
on 12 inch long-playing (LP) albums157 and later on tapes and CDs.
This strategy enabled the industry to charge substantially more for the
package, even though manufacturing and marketing costs were only
modestly higher than for singles.  Although some albums cohere,
many consumers favor particular songs and have, since the advent of
home recording technology, assembled their own “greatest hits” collec-
tions from across many artists and albums, notwithstanding the incon-
venience of recording and the inevitable loss in fidelity caused by
analog technology.  On a digital platform, consumers can much more
easily produce such compilations without any loss in sound quality.
Management and Searchability.  The vast storage capacity of modern
computers enable consumers to archive vast amounts of content.  Un-
like shelves and drawers of analog content – records, tapes, and CDs –
computer programs can index, arrange, and search these archives with
a few keystrokes or mouse clicks.  In addition, software can search
within stored content for particular attributes.
Portability.  One of the early forces driving the shift to a digital
platform has been consumers’ desire to have portable content.  Porta-
ble hard drives for music became the first versatile digital content de-
vices.  (Traditional compact disk players use digital media, but offer
little more functionality than traditional analog media.)  The success
of these players greatly expanded the market for digital content and
more enhanced devices.  The latest generation of devices can hold
upwards of 10,000 songs.  The DVD format has more recently afforded
comparable portability for feature films.  It has generated new devices
(portable viewers) and enhanced demand for laptop computers with
DVD playback capability.  As the price of these devices have fallen, they
have been installed in airplanes, buses, and automobiles.  Digital tech-
157. The LP standard (33 revolutions per minute (rpm) was first introduced in
1947, but did not surpass sales of 45 rpm singles until the mid-1960s.  The timing of this
shift reflected a number of changes in the marketplace, including the emergence of the
singer-songwriter genre and “album rock” as well as the diffusion of high-fidelity stereo
equipment.  Both of these factors inclined consumers and record labels toward higher
quality, longer playing products.
\\server05\productn\N\NLR\46-1-2\NLR106.txt unknown Seq: 54 24-FEB-03 13:39
116 NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46
nology offers almost unlimited ability to engage in what has come to be
known as space and time shifting.
Network Distribution.  Whereas the general purpose computer has
provided a versatile platform for storing, reproducing, and manipulat-
ing content, the Internet and emerging digital wireless transmission
technologies vastly expand the means for distributing content.  Users
typically gain access to information through the Internet by streaming
or downloading content directly through web sites and sending attach-
ments to e-mail messages.  Web site operators can post content onto
web servers that can be accessed by other Internet users (clients).
The principal technical constraints on the exchange of files are
file size, bandwidth, and server capacity.  In the decade since the
World Wide Web became operational, transmission rates have in-
creased dramatically.  The rollout of broadband Internet service, in
combination with enhanced computer speed, memory capacity, and
compression technology, has already made possible nearly real time
access to high resolution content.
As copyright-protected content began to flow across the Internet,
content owners began to  actively police web sites.  They became quite
proficient at locating unauthorized content and shutting down the rel-
evant site through cease-and-desist letters to site operators or take-
down notices to Internet Service Providers hosting the unauthorized
content.  Although the vast number of sites cannot be fully policed, the
most significant leakage points can be effectively targeted in this man-
ner.  If the content owner searchers cannot find the content, then
neither can most users of the Internet.  Furthermore, any business
seeking to profit from copyright infringement will have difficulty rais-
ing funds under this threat of enforcement.
The amount of content available over the Internet took a quan-
tum leap in 1999 with the introduction of Napster’s peer-to-peer net-
work technology.  This technology vastly expanded the effective
storage and exchange capacity of the Internet by enabling computer
users running Napster’s software to search the computer drives of
thousands of other users for files encoded in the MP3 compression
format commonly used for music files.  Napster’s server contained the
labels of MP3 files, typically some combination of band and song titles,
which could be searched by users of the Napster software.  Searches
produced a list of Internet addresses of computers containing the
search term.  The Napster software would then form a connection
through the Internet to the particular computer containing the file,
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establish a link, and quickly and effortlessly transfer the file to the
searcher’s hard drive.  In essence, the Napster platform converted
every computer running the software and connected to Napster into a
“servent” — enabling it to function as both a server and a client.  It
became the fastest adopted software application in the history of com-
puter technology, attaining 70 million users within its relatively brief
period of operation. Even before Napster was shut down on contribu-
tory and vicarious copyright infringement grounds, a range of more
decentralized peer-to-peer architectures had taken root.  MusicCity’s
Morpheus file-sharing software program and Sharman Networks’
KaZaa application have each been downloaded nearly 100 million
times since their release a little more than a year ago.158  Although the
content industries continue to pursue these new services, the level of
unauthorized distribution of copyrighted works continues to grow.  In
addition, popular movies have found their way into peer-to-peer net-
works.  One consulting firm estimates that 400,000 to 600,000 films are
being downloaded without authorization each day.159
Convergence.  Analog platforms have typically been device-specific
and quite limited in terms of interoperability.  Although multiple de-
vices (e.g., tuner, record player, cassette deck, CD player) could plug
into a single preamplifier, a CD player cannot play a record.  This
meant that if a consumer wanted to acquire the latest and highest qual-
ity media, they would have to maintain multiple devices in order to
play their entire library of content.  The digital platform promises to
be much more unified and backward compatible.  Just as computer
users can access old file formats on new word processors, so can they
play older content formats within the same computer (so long as they
have appropriate software).  This has two important implications for
the future of content distribution.  Consumers will increasingly be able
to access the same content through multiple devices – computers, tele-
vision sets, game players, home stereos, and portable devices. Various
new technologies integrating these various devices, such as the Moxi
Media Center, are just entering the marketplace.  This product can
store and stream a wide variety of content from the Internet, DVD and
CD players, and cable or DSL routers, as well as digitally record televi-
sion content.  It also allows the user to browse the Internet, send in-
158. See Napster Eclipsed by Newcomers (Sept. 6, 2001), at http://www.wired.com/
news/business/0,1367,46596,00.html.
159. See Reuters News Service, For Movie Pirates, It’s Full Speed Ahead (May 30, 2002),
at http://news.com.com/2100-1023-928426.html.
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stant messages, and access video-on-demand services.  Another
affordable new product establishes a wireless network within a local
area — such as a house or office — enabling multiple users on multi-
ple computers and devices to access, share, and transfer content files.
Although the future for any particular implementation remains un-
clear,160 digital technology will undoubtedly bring together more and
more content-related capabilities.
Secondly, the introduction of new technology will not necessarily
require consumers to jettison the old, as has frequently been the case
with analog formats.  As a technical matter, the adaptability and versa-
tility of digital information and software make it more likely that old
formats can be accommodated on new devices.  Nonetheless, the con-
tent and technology industries may use encryption in combination
with incompatibility as a means of transitioning to a constrained digital
platform in order to combat unauthorized distribution and reproduc-
tion of copyrighted works.161
b. Implications of Digital Content for the Principal
Entertainment Industries
The coalescence of this broad array of capabilities, almost all of
which can be currently obtained with the purchase of a moderately
priced microcomputer (for approximately the cost of a premium color
television just a few years ago) and a modest monthly subscription
charge for connection to an Internet Service Provider, has afforded
consumers unprecedented power to access, store, manipulate,
reproduce, and distribute entertainment content.   Advances in digital
technology have brought about, at affordable cost, nearly unlimited
access to high quality content virtually anytime and anywhere.  This
brave new digital world, however, raises difficult questions about the
supply of new content.  The digital platform has untethered content
from the inherent limitations on reproduction and distribution that
ensured a steady flow of revenue to content publishers and creators —
160. See Richard Shimm, Picture Unclear for Moxi Digital (Feb. 28, 2002), at http://
news.com.com/2100-1040-848492.html.
161. See, e.g., Consumers Squeezed in Battle Between Hollywood, Silicon Valley (Jan. 30,
2002) (discussing proposed legislation that would require the installation of piracy-de-
tection devices into all digital consumer products), at http://www.siliconvalley.com/
mld/siliconvalley/3576962.htm (last visited Oct. 8, 2002); Will Knight, Microsoft’s Anti-
Piracy Plans Spark Controversy (July 1, 2002), at http://www.NewScientist.com (describ-
ing a recent software update for Microsoft’s Media Player that requires users to permit
the automatic installation of future anti-piracy measures).
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the traditional basis for funding and raising capital for the creation of
new content.  Once a work has been released, it can be propagated
through digital networks, supplanting traditional markets for content.
As technology advances, the bandwidth of the networks will expand as
will the proportion of the society that they reach.  Enforcement of
copyrights throughout the Internet and beyond becomes increasingly
difficult as information flows ever more freely, decentralized networks
take root, and the cost of memory devices and faster processors
continue to fall.  The content industries must evolve new business
models and distribution media if they are to appropriate revenue
streams for their investments.  In addition, they face new forms of com-
petition as the Internet opens up new channels of marketing and dis-
tribution.  All of this is very threatening to industries that have enjoyed
relatively stable and robust growth rates for decades.  The implications
will, of course, vary across content industries and over time.
Music Industry.  Thus far, the sound recording industry has faced
the most direct effects of the digital revolution, caused in part by their
decision more than 20 years ago to embrace a digital format (the Com-
pact Disk).  World-wide CD sales fell in 2001 for the first time since the
introduction of this format in the early 1980s.162  This year, U.S. music
sales are down steeply.163  Although many factors affect music sales,
including general economic conditions and the number of releases by
popular artists, surveys of consumer behavior,164 data on piracy,165 and
162. See Brad King, Slagging Over Sagging CD Sales (Apr. 17, 2002), at http://
www.wired.com/news/mp3/0,1285,51880,00.html (reporting data compiled by the In-
ternational Federation of the Phonographic Industry (IFPI)).
163. See Anna Wilde Mathews & Bruce Orwall, Music Labels Go After Song-Swappers:
Recording Companies Plan Lawsuits Against Individuals, WALL ST. J., July 3, 2002.
164. See Edison Media Research, National Record Buyers Study II, athttp://
www.edisonresearch.com/R&RRecordBuyersII.htm (last visited July 8, 2002); Reuters,
RIAA Blames Web Pirates for Loss (Feb. 25, 2002), at http://news.com.com/2100-1023-
844919.html; Adam Creed, RIAA Blames Digital Music Pirates for Bad Year, NEWSBYTES,
Feb. 25, 2002 (citing RIAA survey finding that 23 percent of music consumers say that
they buy less music because of opportunities for free copies); Gwendolyn Mariano, Mu-
sic Industry Sounds Off on DC Burning (June 1, 2002), at http://news.com.com/2102-
1023-935120.html. Although some studies suggest that those who download music tend
to purchase more music than they otherwise would and that the Internet has helped to
promote music sales more than it has hurt. See, e.g., Matt Richtel, Access to Free Online
Music is Seen as a Boost to Sales, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 2002 (reporting on a survey conducted
by Jupiter Research), the aggregate data and market valuation of major record labels
suggest that the net effect is negative and worsening.
165. Unauthorized distribution of recordable CDs has contributed significantly to
the rising tide of black market sales of sound recordings. See IFPI, Music Piracy Report
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business assessments of record labels166 increasingly establish that un-
authorized distribution of music represents a serious threat to the
sound recording industry’s principal revenue stream: retail sales of
CDs and tapes.  Having released their “master” recordings in unen-
crypted digital form, record labels lack the ability to put the genie back
in the bottle.  In addition, more so than in the publishing or film mar-
kets, music consumers enjoy listening to works multiple times, archiv-
ing works, arranging their own collections, and shifting the time and
place that they can access sound recordings.167  Therefore, they have
been drawn toward the enhanced functionality afforded by the digital
platform.  They have also been dissatisfied with the practice of bun-
dling songs on albums when they desire only a part of the package.
The digital platform provides a ready means for building music collec-
tions and circumventing CD bundles.
The rapid deployment of peer-to-peer networks for acquiring mu-
sic has taken the industry by storm.  Efforts to develop new fee-based
business models – either streaming or download based – have come up
against direct competition from free alternatives.  The early business
models – such as Emusic.com, which offered downloads of songs (from
independent record labels) for 99 cents – failed to gain traction
against Napster and its successors.  The major record labels have been
slow in developing their own subscription services.  They have been
preoccupied with litigation to shut down the peer-to-peer channels
and thus far fruitless attempts to develop an effective and broadly ac-
(June 2002), at http://www.ifpi.org/site-content/library/piracy2002.pdf; see also John
Borland, Movie Studios Tout First DVD Bust in U.S. (Mar. 22, 2002), at http://
news.com.com/2100-1023-867314.html.  Before Eminem’s latest record reached store
shelves, it had become the second most played CD in computer drives and was widely
available through bootleg channels. See John Borland, Eminem CD Spotlights New Piracy
Patterns (May 28, 2002), at http://news.com.com/2100-1023-923472.html.
166. See Chuck Phillips, Industry Woes Hit Vivendi’s Music Unit Media: With Piracy
Surging and Profit Falling, No Buyer is Seen for a Possible Sale, L.A. TIMES, July 8, 2002
(“Studies show CD burning and Internet piracy have decimated sales of new hits and
old catalog albums, shrinking international revenue by about 20% over the last three
years.”); David D. Kirkpatrick & David Carr, A Media Giant Needs a Script: Grumbling at
AOL Time Warner, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 2002, § 3, at 1 (noting a 60% drop in the stock
price of the merged company and internal strife between the content and technology
divisions).
167. See Tim Hanrahan & Jason Fry, Real Time – Net Music: You Can’t Always Get
What You Want, or What You Need, WALL ST. J., July 8, 2002 (noting the importance of
“portability, permanence and selection” to music fans).
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ceptable means of encrypting sound recordings.168  Most recently, they
have begun to allow their catalogs to become part of new on-line sub-
scription services, in substantial part out of fear that the consuming
public, especially the younger age cohort that has traditionally pur-
chased the lion’s share of new music, are coming to see unauthorized
peer-to-peer as a convenient and legitimate means of accessing and
acquiring music.169  After much delay, the major record labels have
begun to experiment with selling downloads of songs,170 while
continuing to assess and experiment with encryption and more sophis-
ticated digital rights management techniques for controlling new re-
leases.  They have vowed to battle peer-to-peer services in court and
through other means (such as flooding peer-to-peer networks with de-
coy music files)171 while lobbying Congress for stronger legal protec-
168. In December 1998, the recording, consumer electronics, and information
technology industries launched the Secure Digital Music Initiative (SDMI) in order to
develop open technology specifications for protected digital music distribution.  RIAA
Press Release, Worldwide Recording Industry and Technology Companies Kick-Off Work of
SDMI (Feb. 26, 1999), at http://www.riaa.com/PR_Story.cfm?id=68. After a much pub-
licized fiasco surrounding its challenge to crack a prototype and disagreement among
the participants, the SDMI suspended operations on May 18, 2001. See http://
www.sdmi.org/; Associated Press, SDMI: Quintessential Vaporware, WIRED NEWS, Apr. 29,
2002.
169. See Amy Harmon, Grudgingly, Music Labels Sell Their Songs Online, N.Y. TIMES,
July 1, 2002, at C1.  A recent survey by Edison Media Research found that nearly three-
quarters of 12- to 17-year-olds do not feel “there is anything morally wrong with
downloading music for free on the Internet,” 10.1% who actively download music from
the Internet did not purchase a single CD or cassette in the last 12 months, and 53%
have burned someone else’s copy of a CD instead of buying their own copy. See The
National Record Buyers Study II, at  http://www.edisonresearch.com/
R&RRecordBuyersII.htm (last visited July 8, 2002).
170. The major record labels have thus far resisted providing downloads of the
most popular recordings in their catalog. See Jon Healey, AOL Selling Songs Online in
Unprotected Format – Music: The Company is Offering 99-cent MP3 Singles from New and Estab-
lished Acts as Part of a 90-Day Experiment, L.A. TIMES, June 15, 2002, available at http://
www.latimes.com/business/la-0000041910jun15.story.  Universal Music Group (UMG),
the largest record label, recently announced that it plans to make 1,000 of its 11,000
albums available in unprotected MP3 format to subscribers who pay between $10 and
$15 a month.  Rather than offering the work of best-selling artists like Eminem and U2,
UMG has chosen older, less popular content that does not sell quickly in stores.  UMG’s
executives view this initiative as both a response to the rising level of unauthorized
distribution of digital files and as a means of assessing the effects of legitimate online
access on retail sales. See Simon Avery, Company to Put Music Library Online (July 9,
2002), at http://www.siliconvalley.com/mld/siliconvalley/news/3625461.htm.
171. See Dawn C. Chmielewski, Music Industry Swamps Swap Networks with Phony Files
(June 27, 2002), at http://www.siliconvalley.com/mld/siliconvalley/3560356.htm (last
visited Sept. 15, 2002).
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tions, such as requirements that new digital consumer products
contain piracy-detection protections.172
Notwithstanding the generally pessimistic view that the major re-
cord labels have taken of the digital future, advances in digital technol-
ogy and the Internet offer cause for at least guarded optimism for the
future of sound recording, although not necessarily for the current
major record labels.173  Various digital technologies have significantly
reduced the costs of producing, marketing, and distributing content.
Recording artists today can afford or have easy access to home record-
ing studios and software tools comparable to the most elite profes-
sional studios of a generation ago.174  Furthermore, the Internet
enables record labels and artists to promote new music easily and effec-
tively through label and artist-supported web sites.175  Moreover, new
artists can gain exposure through new distribution channels, such as
MP3.com176 and Garageband.com.177  New subscription models, such
as Listen.com’s Rhapsody service which streams a vast library of music
172. See Declan McCullagh, AntiCopy Bill Hits D.C. (Mar. 22, 2002) (reporting on
the Consumer Broadband and Digital Television Promotion Act sponsored by Senator
Fritz Hollings), at http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,51245,00.html.
173. Cf. Steve Morse, Burned?, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 21, 2002, at L1 (quoting rock
artist Elvis Costello stating that the record labels “loaded the game so the house has
been winning for a long time.  Now it’s time maybe for the house not to win for a while.
Maybe they have to take some losses.”).
174. In the words of Jon Anderson, cofounder and lead singer of the 1970s rock
supergroup Yes, “the great Apple and Digidesign equipment I’m using affords me the
opportunity to have a perfectly good studio at home, capable of producing truly profes-
sional quality work.” See Jon Anderson, Embarking on a New Solo Project, at http://
www.apple.com/creative/musicaudio/jonanderson/ (last visited July 2, 2002).
175. See Richard Morin, New Musical Acts Get Lift from Internet; Downloading Levels
Field, Study Finds, S.F. CHRONICLE, Apr. 17, 2002; Reuters News Service, Dave Stewart of
Eurythmics Launches Record Label (June 5, 2002) (discussing Artists’ Network, a new re-
cord label promising a more artist-friendly business model), at  http://
story.news.yahoo.com/news?tmpl=story&u=/nm/20020605/en_nm/
people_stewart_dc_2.
176. Begun as an independent venture but now owned and operated by one of the
major record labels, MP3.com provides clearinghouse for artists to showcase their mu-
sic to fans worldwide.  As one of the first and best known music download destinations
on the web, it receives a half-million visitors per day. See MP3.com site, at http://
help.mp3.com/help/article/general_what.html (last visited July 2, 2002).
177. According to Garageband.com’s website,
[t]raditional major labels spend between $500,000 to $5 million to find,
launch and market a single artist or band, based on the hunches of a few
individuals. Garageband uses the opinions of hundreds of thousands of ac-
tual consumers to make these decisions.  Furthermore, Garageband will si-
multaneously be helping musicians find their way through the traditional
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on a monthly service charge basis, may become a viable source of in-
come.  Webcasting offers new opportunities for streaming music with-
out losing control over the content, although the economic basis for
that marketplace remains in doubt.178  Moreover, the Internet allows
sound recording companies to promote new music more effectively.
Perhaps most significantly, digital technology may provide the basis for
various new revenue streams should an effective digital rights manage-
ment standard become workable.
Film Industry.  Due to the large size of feature length digital mo-
tion picture files and the use of DVD encryption in digital release of
film products, the film industry has only recently begun to experience
the challenges posed by unauthorized on-line distribution of its con-
tent.  The rapid advance of digital technology has now brought feature
films into peer-to-peer and other unauthorized online distribution
channels.  Recent releases of much anticipated feature films – such as
Spiderman, Harry Potter and the Sorcerer’s Stone, and Star Wars: Epi-
sode II Attack of the Clones – found their way onto peer-to-peer net-
works and black markets soon after (and in some cases before) their
release to theaters.179  A media and entertainment consulting group
estimates that 400,000 to 600,000 movies are downloaded over the In-
ternet per day, a 20 percent rise from over a year ago.180
Nonetheless, the film industry differs from the sound recording
industry along multiple dimensions that make it less vulnerable to un-
authorized distribution.  Thus far, the time to download feature films
record industry and exploring less capital-intensive alternatives to tradi-
tional distribution mechanism.
at http://www.garageband.com/htdb/companyinfor/profile.html (last visited July 2,
2002).
178. See Christopher Stern, Curtain Call for Webcasts? Some Decry Order to Pay Royalties
to Musicians, WASH. POST, June 21, 2002, at E1 (describing reaction to recent decision
by the Librarian of Congress establishing compulsory licensing rates for webcasting).
179. See Brian McWilliams, “Spidey” Already Being Swapped by Online Pirates, NEW-
SBYTES, May 6, 2002; Elizabeth Rosenthal, Counterfeiters Turn Magic into Cash: Pirated Cop-
ies of “Harry Potter” Film Already for Sale in China, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 2001, at A26; Jon
Healy & Richard Verrier, Latest Plot Twist for “Star Wars”: Attack of the Cloners – Internet:
Bootlegged Copies Hit the Web Before Movie Debuts, in Latest Challenge to Industry, L.A. TIMES,
May 10, 2002, at A1.
180. See Reuters News Service, For Movie Pirates, It’s Full Speed Ahead (May 30, 2002),
at http://news.com.com/2100-1023-928426.html (last visited Sept. 15, 2002); Andrew
W. Frank, Reinhold Beutler & Aaron Markham, The Copyright Crusade (June 2001) (Vi-
ant Media and Entertainment Report), at http://www.viant.com/pages2/downloads/
innovation_copyright.pdf (last visited Sept. 15, 2002) (hereinafter The Copyright
Crusade).
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as well as the generally poor quality of the first wave of online copies
distributed has not significantly affected the market for film products.
Relatively few consumers have the bandwidth, storage capacity, exper-
tise,181 and patience to acquire film content in this way.  In fact, online
availability of poor quality versions may help to promote consumer in-
terest.  Furthermore, even as bandwidth and memory storage expand,
the fact that consumers do not tend to view films repeatedly in the way
that they listen to music suggests that archiving will not play the same
role in film as it does in music.
Most importantly, the film industry can still control the important
first waves of distribution without significant leakage in unauthorized
channels.  They continue to hold tight controls over theatrical release,
pay-per-view, and premium channel distribution.  Such versioning
strategies will continue to work into the digital future.182  Moreover,
the video market is already built upon an encrypted format, which will
hinder, although not entirely defeat, unauthorized distribution of
films.  Furthermore, competitive pricing of DVDs and the potential for
directors’ cuts (with previously unreleased scenes), behind-the-scenes
footage, game and merchandising tie-ins, and other added features will
keep many consumers within the legitimate market for content.183  As
bandwidth and memory capacity expand and new devices, such as
DVD burners, become more widely diffused, the film industry will ex-
perience somewhat greater competition for the video market as well as
marginal effects on what they can charge for theatrical release, but the
181. Most films circulate on what is referred to as the Internet Relay Chat (IRC)
Network, an infrastructure that predates the World Wide Web (Web).  The Web pro-
vides a network architecture that allows information (including text, data, audio and
video content, and software programs) to be stored on servers in hypertext documents
(commonly referred to as “web pages”).  Internet users can easily store, search, and
access such pages.  Its great versatility and ease of use has made the Internet popular
among a wide range of computer users.  IRC enables individuals to participate in live
typed discussions over the Internet.  It requires use of an IRC software program and has
thus far been used principally by more sophisticated computer users. See The Copy-
right Crusade, supra note 180, at 14-17.
182. See, e.g., Rick Lyman, Box Office Has a Record Weekend, “Men in Black” Leading the
Way, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 2002, at E1 (noting that July 4th box office revenues for the top
dozen films exceeded $219 million, shattering prior records and that ticket sales grew
16% despite a rise in ticket prices), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2002/07/08/
movies/08BOXO.html.
183. See Patrick Goldstein, The Big Picture: Technology is Movies’ Angel, But Record In-
dustry’s Devil, L.A. TIMES, July 2, 2002, Part 6, at 1.
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multi-faceted nature of its business model will be able to adapt reason-
ably effectively.
Ultimately, digital technology may significantly improve the film
industry’s delivery and revenue models.  There is substantial opportu-
nity to reduce the costs borne by consumers in renting and purchasing
movies.  Online business models can eliminate the video store interme-
diary as well as offer tremendous convenience to consumers.  Thus far,
however, the difficulty of protecting content online has impeded  the
rollout of online film distribution channels.184
Television Industry.  As noted above, the television industry has for
most of its history operated on an advertising-based business model in
which content was freely available to anyone with a receiving set.  Even
before the arrival of digital technology, the expansion of channels, par-
ticularly through cable and satellite television, the use of VCRs to “time
shift” viewing, and remote control devices (for easy channel surfing
and muting) have gradually eroded the traditional three networks’
hold on viewer attention.  The introduction of digital video recorders
(DVRs, also known as personal video recorders (PVRs) has raised con-
cerns across the television and advertising industries about the future
of advertiser-supported programming.
The first generation of DVRs functioned largely as more capacious
and easily programmed video cassette recorders.  These devices could
record many hours of programming and had software to seek out
shows that the user had shown prior interest in viewing.  Because the
information was stored digitally, commercials could be skipped more
conveniently than with the fast forward of analog VCRs.  Since TiVo,
the first major player in this marketplace, received substantial financial
backing from the television industry, it downplayed this feature of its
product.  The second major player to enter this market, ReplayTV, has
been less concerned with the television industry’s reactions to its prod-
uct’s functionality.185  In addition to prominently advertising its “Com-
mercial Advance” (which automatically skips over advertisements on
recorded programs) and “QuickSkip” (which lets views skip in 30 sec-
ond intervals, the length of most commercials) features, ReplayTV al-
184. See Jack Valenti, Movies Get Framed: Films on the Net – We’d Love It.  But Not for
Free, WASH. POST, Feb. 25, 2002, at A23.
185. See Farhad Manjoo, TiVo Town or Sonicblue City? (June 6, 2002), at http://
www.wired.com/news/business/0,1367,53008,00.html (last visited Sept. 15, 2002).
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lows consumers to distribute stored content over the  Internet.186
Recent studies show that approximately three-fourths of DVR owners
frequently or always skip commercial advertisements.187
These new technologies have reshaped viewing habits in ways that
erode the ability of advertisers to predictably reach target audiences.
Round the clock news cable shows, DVRs, and the ubiquity of syndi-
cated series available throughout the day have diluted the traditional
prime time window.  Commercial skipping technology has reduced the
number of viewers watching a particular show that actually see the ad-
vertisements.  Nonetheless, as with the film industry, the television
marketplace has developed a range of revenue models.  Whereas par-
ticular players, such as the traditional networks may lose share and rev-
enue, the industry as a whole has ample means for adapting to digital
technology.
As a starting point, it is important to recognize that advertisement-
based programming is no longer the only appropriability mechanism.
Cable television, satellite delivery, premium channels, and pay-per-view
programming have augmented the “free” television platform on which
the industry was built.  Premium channels now offer some of the most
critically and commercially successful programming, as demonstrated
by Home Box Office’s award winning series “The Sopranos” and “Sex
and the City.”  They have also enjoyed success in producing  their own
feature length movies.  Although these channels are not vulnerable to
commercial skipping, they can be hurt by unauthorized distribution
186. The United States is currently in a transition process from analog to digital
television transmission.  According to Federal Communication Commission (FCC) reg-
ulations, all over-the-air television viewers will have some access to digital television
(DTV) by the end of 2002.  At the same time, analog service will also continue until
2006, after which all broadcasters will transmit only DTV. See FCC, Digital Television
Frequently Asked Questions, at http://www.fcc.gov/mb/policy/dtv/#12 (last visited Aug.
22, 2002).  This new format will vastly improve resolution and sound quality and enable
a wide range of interactive features.  The television and movie industries have, however,
stated that they will not release their most valuable programming in digital format until
the transmission platform incorporates protections against this content being copied
and distributed by way of the Internet.  Representatives of Hollywood studios and tech-
nology companies have formed the Broadcast Protection Discussion Group to develop
standards for such a platform. Progress on this effort has been slow and it remains to be
seen whether the FCC’s 2005 target date for full transition can be achieved. See Amy
Harmon, Hollywood Has a Setback in Controls for Digital TV, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 2002, at
C4.
187. See Benny Evangelista, Hot Button Issue: TV Moguls Are Threatened by DVRs that
Zip Past the Ads, S.F. CHRON., May 27, 2002, at E1.
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over the Internet to non-subscribers.  These providers already have sig-
nificant experience dealing with various forms of signal piracy.188
Television networks have also responded to the changing land-
scape of new devices and viewing habits by moving advertisements
more directly into programming.  Television shows now routinely in-
clude logos, short advertisements, and coming attractions in a corner
of the screen.  Signs in sporting venues and on-air graphics during
sports broadcasts also bring advertisements directly to the viewer.  Tel-
evision shows, like films, now sell product placements and marketing
tie-ins as part of the scripting and set design for their productions.189
Television networks can also adjust to reductions in advertising reve-
nues by shifting toward lower cost programming, such as reality and
game shows.  While these effects will erode the “quality” of advertise-
ment-supported programming, they may simply shift production of
better produced shows toward the premium channels and public-sup-
ported networks.  In a reversal of sorts, shows developed for premium
cable channels may one day be syndicated into network broadcasting.
Furthermore, various forms of programming are less vulnerable to
commercial skipping, such as news, current affairs shows, sports, reality
programs, and game shows, which derive their value from being live or
first run.  Eventually, digital rights management technology may foster
a wide array of business models catering to the diversity of tastes and
willingness of consumers to pay for access to television programming.
Publishing Industry.  The traditional publishing industry spans a
wide range of markets, from traditional books (a wide domain itself) to
daily newspapers and periodic magazines.  The Internet has opened
up vast new distribution channels for all imaginable types of written
content.  Legal research services, Lexis-Nexis and Westlaw, were
among the first successful ventures in providing modern online infor-
mation services.  Most major newspapers and periodicals today have
online offerings, most commonly based upon web-advertising and tie-
ins to newsstand and subscription channels.  A few sources, most nota-
bly the Wall Street Journal, have experimented with a subscription
model with mixed success.190
188. See, e.g., Jennifer 8. Lee, In Satellite Piracy War, Battles on Many Fronts, N.Y.
TIMES, May 9, 2002, at G1.
189. See Bill Carter, New Reality Show to Place Ads Between the Ads, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30,
2001, at A1.
190. See Alex Salkever, Special Report: The Future of E-Business – The Battle of the Online
Content Models: In the Pay-to-Read Corner is the Journal.  In the Give-it-Away Corner is the
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Thus far, the online distribution model has made only modest in-
roads into the direct distribution of novels and more traditional books,
by which I mean the downloading of book text in electronic book
(“eBook”) form.191  The technology for reading books in digital form
has been available for four years,192 but consumers have been slow to
adopt this means of reading books.193  The devices are relatively ex-
pensive and lack the resolution of the printed page.  Nonetheless, they
offer search capabilities, the ability to store multiple books, and other
features not available in bound books.
Over the longer term, the eBook market can be expected to make
substantial inroads into  traditional book markets and to provide new
opportunities for distributing literary works.194   Although the first
generation of products incorporate encryption technology,195 ulti-
mately the publishing industry may be the most vulnerable content in-
dustry to unauthorized reproduction and distribution because the
content (text) will always be directly perceptible (and hence subject to
copying, even if through scanning or re-typing).  Furthermore, librar-
ies have become interested in distributing eBooks through their web-
Times.  Which One Will Prevail? (May 13, 2002), at http://www.businessweek.com/maga-
zine/content/02_19/b3782608.htm (last visited Oct. 8, 2002).
191. Amazon.com and other on-line book retailers have, of course, had a substan-
tial effect on the selling of traditional books through the Internet.
192. See Steve Silberman, E-Books’ Bash in Big Apple (Oct. 23, 1998), at http://
www.wired.com/news.culture/0,1284,15808,00.html (last visited Sept. 26, 2002).  Com-
puters have provided a means for reading ASCII text on screens since the 1950s, but
relatively consumers have considered this a serious substitute for bound books as a
source of pleasure reading.
193. See M.J. Rose, 2001 Was a Tough Read for E-Books (Dec. 25, 2001) (reporting on
disappointing results in eBook publishing), at http://www.wired.com/news/culture/
0,1284,49297,00.html.
194. A recent report suggests that the eBook market has experienced rapid growth,
albeit from a small base. See eBooks by the Numbers: Open eBook Forum Compiles Industry
Growth Stats, Report Points to Solid Growth of Electronic Publishing, at http://
www.businesswire.com/index/html (July 22, 2002); M.J. Rose, Promising Chapter in E-
Book Story (July 9, 2002) (noting tremendous growth in visits to eBook web sites,
purchases of eBook readers, and sales of eBooks), at http://www.wired.com/news/cul-
ture/0,1284,53699,00.html (last visited Sept. 26, 2002); see also Open eBook Forum, at
http://www.openanebook.org. Random House’s eBook revenues doubled from 2000 to
2001, while other publishers experienced double-digit growth.  Average monthly
downloads of Adobe’s Acrobat eBook Reader increased by approximately 70% from
2001 to 2002.
195. See M. J. Rose, At What Cost, E-Books? (Oct. 17, 2000), at http://www.wired.
com/news/culture/0%2C1284%2C39471%2C00.html (last visited Sept. 26, 2002).
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sites.196  More than 7,300 public libraries provide remote access to the
texts of hundreds to thousands of electronic books.  These activities
may seed the market for eBooks.197  Whereas music and audiovisual
content can be encrypted in such a way that the user cannot see the
content without authorization, the essence of books (the text) will al-
ways be available to the extent that the books are sold in hard copy
form.  Therefore, would-be copyists will be in a position to scan such
content into digital form within hours of a book’s release.
B. The First Waves of Digital Copyright Law
The content industries have increasingly focused their energies on
forestalling and bracing for the blossoming of a digital platform.  Even
before the free flow of content in the Napster and post-Napster era,
the content industries actively resisted the introduction of digital tech-
nologies and used the threat of such technologies as a basis for ob-
taining new legislation expanding rights and enforcement powers of
copyright owners.198  This section summarizes the various amend-
ments to copyright law during the 1990s and the efforts by the content
industries to preclude and combat technologies that contribute to the
unauthorized reproduction and distribution of copyrighted works.
1. Digital Copyright Legislation
a. Record and Software Rental Legislation
Even before the availability of home digital recording technology,
the sound recording industry became concerned that home copying
on widely available and improving analog cassette recorders
196. See David D. Kirkpatrick, Battle Over Access to Online Books, N.Y. TIMES, June 17,
2002, at C7.
197. The new role for libraries, however, puts them at odds with traditional and
online booksellers.  Whereas traditional libraries circulated books to one patron at a
time, ebooks can be made available to multiple patrons at once.  Many ebook ventures
that initially sought to partner with traditional publishers have instead turned their at-
tention to libraries, some consummating intriguing licensing deals.  RosettaBooks, for
example, which distributes a wide range of ebooks including works by some leading
contemporary authors such as Kurt Vonnegut, Jr. and William Styron, has offered to
license distribution of a collection of 100 20th Century classics to libraries for an annual
fee of $200 to $1,000. See Random House, Inc. v. Rosetta Books, 283 F.3d 490 (2d Cir.
2002) (upholding denial of preliminary injunction sought by print publisher); See
David D. Kirkpatrick, Battle Over Access to Online Books, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 2002, at C7.
198. See  Pamela Samuelson, The Copyright Grab  (Jan. 1996), at  http://
www.wired.com/wired/archive/4.01/white.paper_pr.html (last visited Oct. 8, 2002).
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threatened the retail market for sound recordings.199  In 1984, the in-
dustry persuaded Congress to amend the first sale doctrine – which
affords purchasers of authorized copies of a copyrighted work freedom
to do with the copies as they wish200 – to prohibit the rental of sound
recordings.201  The software industry obtained comparable prohibi-
tions on rentals of software in 1990.202
b. Audio Home Recording Rights Act of 1992
As analog recording technology grew during the 1980s, the sound
recording industry became particularly concerned about the inevitable
arrival of digital recording technology.203  Such equipment could pro-
duce the viral spread of high quality copies.  By the mid-1980s, just a
few years after the release of the record labels’ catalogs in unencrypted
digital format (on CDs), consumer electronics companies sought to
introduce a host of new products that would enable consumers to
make digital copies of audio recordings.  These technologies (digital
audio tape (DAT) and mini-disc (DCC)) made it possible to produce
identical copies of copyrighted works without any significant degrada-
tion of quality. As occurred with the introduction of video cassette re-
cording technology in the early 1980s,204 copyright owners
immediately sued the principal manufacturer of this technology, the
Sony Corporation.205
In the shadow of costly and uncertain litigation (and following
Sony’s acquisition of CBS Records, one of the leading record labels, in
1987),206 the various interests resolved their differences through nego-
tiations, which culminated in Congress’ passage of the Audio Home
Recording Rights Act of 1992.207  For the first time in the history of
199. See generally United States Office of Technology Assessment, Copyright and
Home Copying: Technology Challenges Law (Oct. 1989).
200. See 17 U.S.C. § 109.
201. See Record Rental Amendment of 1985, Pub. L. No. 980450, 98 Stat. 1727
(1984).
202. See Computer Software Rental Amendments  of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104
Stat. 5089, 5134-37 (1990) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 109(b) (2002)).
203. See generally United States Office of Technology Assessment, Copyright and
Home Copying: Technology Challenges Law (Oct. 1989).
204. See Sony Corp. of America v. Universal Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
205. See Cahn v. Sony Corp., 90 Civ. 4537 (S.D.N.Y. filed July 9, 1990).
206. See Sony Music: History, at http://www.sonymusic.com/world/aboutus/
history.html.
207. See Pub. L. No. 102-563, 106 Stat. 4237 (1992) (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 1001-
10 (2002)).
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copyright, the government imposed technological design constraints
on the manufacture of copying devices.  This legislation also estab-
lished a royalty on the sale of devices and blank recording media.  Sec-
tion 1002(a) prohibits the importation, manufacture, and distribution
of any digital audio recording device that does not incorporate techno-
logical controls (Serial Copy Management System or functional
equivalents) that block second-generation digital copying.  This tech-
nology control allowed users to make copies directly from a compact
disk, but not from digital copies made using this technology.  In so
doing, the AHRA sought to limit the viral spread of copies.  Consumers
could make first-generation copies, but no further copies could be
made from those copies.
As a means to compensate copyright owners for the copying that
could result from these new technologies, the Act requires manufac-
turers and importers of digital audio recording equipment and blank
tapes, disks, or other storage media to pay a percentage of their trans-
fer prices (2% for digital audio devices and 3% for storage media) into
a royalty pool, which is distributed to owners of musical compositions
(one-third) and sound recordings (two-thirds) based on prior year
sales and air time.208  This compensation mechanism is administered
by the Register of Copyright, with provisions for arbitration of disputes.
Section 1008 affords immunity for the manufacture, importation,
and distribution of digital audio devices meeting the §1002 design re-
quirements, any analog audio recording devices, and any recording
media.  It also immunizes consumers from infringement liability for
the noncommercial use of analog or qualifying digital devices for mak-
ing copies.  Violations of the AHRA are not copyright violations.
Rather, the AHRA contains its own enforcement, remedy, and dispute
resolution provisions.
c. Digital Performance Rights in Sound Recording Act of
1995
Sound recordings, as distinguished from the underlying musical
compositions, did not receive federal copyright protection until
1972.209  By that point in time, radio broadcasters had sufficient politi-
cal clout to exclude a public performance right from the rights ac-
corded owners of sound recording copyrights.  As a result, when a
208. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 1003-07 (1992).
209. See Sound Recording Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391 (1971).
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radio station broadcasts a post-1972 Frank Sinatra rendition of Cole
Porter’s “I’ve Got You Under My Skin,” only Cole Porter receives a
public performance royalty payment (typically through ASCAP’s or
BMI’s blanket performance right license regime for musical composi-
tions).  This arrangement has always rankled record labels and record-
ing artists.210  When the Internet opened up a new distribution
channel for sound recordings – what has come to be known as webcast-
ing – record labels seized the opportunity to establish a performance
right, even if only with respect to digital audio performances.211  They
voiced great concern that this new medium could seriously disrupt the
market for sound recordings.  If consumers could access and possibly
even download high-quality recordings of their favorite songs over the
Internet whenever they desired, then there would be little demand for
retail record (CD) sales.
Interestingly, the prospect of webcasting and other online sub-
scription services united traditional broadcasters and the sound re-
cording industry in support of a digital performance right.  Recording
artists and record labels could at least partially rectify the omission of a
public performance right in sound recordings while traditional broad-
casters could impose an extra licensing requirement (and cost) upon
new competitors.  Since this new industry was not yet well-developed, it
lacked the political clout to block this new right, although the owners
of musical composition copyrights (and their performing rights socie-
ties, ASCAP, BMI, and SESAC), which did not wish to empower an-
other set of music licensing claimants, succeeded in constraining the
reach of this new right along a number of dimensions.  Furthermore,
Congress sought to ensure that the new right would not unduly inter-
fere with the development of new digital transmission business models.
The ultimate compromise amended sections 106 and 114 of the
Copyright Act to establish an exclusive right to perform sound record-
ings “publicly by means of a digital audio transmission.”  The practical
effect of this provision is that record companies who hold a right in the
sound recording can demand a royalty on digital “performances,”
which include downloading, uploading, and streaming of the digital
transmissions.  The Act tempers this new right with various exemptions
210. See Steven J. D’Onofrio, In Support of Performance Rights in Sound Recordings, 29
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 169 (1981).
211. See Lionel Sobel, A New Music Law for the Age of Digital Technology, 17 ENT. L.
REP. 3 (Nov. 1995).
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and limitations212 and a compulsory licensing regime applicable to
non-interactive services meeting various complex requirements.213
d. No Electronic Theft Act of 1997
Congress enacted the No Electronic Theft (NET) Act in order to
strengthen criminal prosecution and penalties against those who dis-
tribute copyrighted works without authorization. It specifically re-
sponded to the ruling in United States v. LaMacchia,214 in which the
court held that a computer bulletin board operator215 providing users
with unauthorized copies of copyrighted software without charge
could not be prosecuted under federal copyright law because the gov-
ernment could show that the operator benefitted financially from the
copyright infringement.   The NET Act closed this loophole by
criminalizing various intentional acts of copyright infringement with-
out regard to whether the defendant received any financial benefit
from such acts.  It also stiffened the criminal penalties applicable to
copyright infringement committed through electronic means.  A per-
son found guilty under this provision can receive three years in prison
for a first offense and be forced to pay a substantial fine, even for ille-
gally distributing sound recordings valued as little as $1,000.216
e. Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998
Somewhat analogous concerns prompted computer software com-
panies and content owners to lobby national and international authori-
ties for greater protections against digital piracy in the mid-1990s.217
212. Traditional television and radio broadcasters may continue to perform sound
recordings without being subject to this new right, even if they convert their signal to
digital form. See 17 U.S.C.  § 114 (d)(1).  In addition, various secondary transmissions
of exempt primary transmissions and transmissions within business establishments
(such as MUZAK) do not implicate the digital performance right.
213. 17 U.S.C. § 114(d), as amended by the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of
1998. Cf. Bonneville Int’l v. Peters, 153 F.Supp.2d 763 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (addressing the
problems of categorizing Internet broadcasters).
214. 871 F.Supp. 535 (D. Mass. 1994).
215. Electronic bulletin boards were precursors to modern Internet web pages, in
which users could access information – typically organized by interests areas, such as
science fiction or particular software areas – and chat rooms through modems.  They
are still used today, often as proprietary systems for technical support, software up-
grades and patches, and the like. See MICROSOFT PRESS, COMPUTER DICTIONARY 46 (3d
ed. 1997).
216. See 18 U.S.C. § 2319.
217.  See Samuelson, supra note 198.
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These content distributors came to see encryption and digital rights
management as critical elements in the development of the online
marketplace for content.  They recognized, however, that such tech-
nologies would be vulnerable to hacking.  As a result, they sought to
expand copyright protection beyond its traditional prohibitions
against infringement of copyright’s exclusive rights to include limits on
the decrypting or circumventing of technological protection systems
and the trafficking of such decryption tools.  They argued that without
such protection, they would be unwilling to release content onto the
Internet, which in turn would hamper the adoption of broadband ser-
vices.  Various other interests – ranging from Internet service providers
and telecommunications companies to consumer electronic manufac-
turers,218 library associations, computer scientists, and copyright
professors219 – expressed concern about chilling effects of such an ex-
pansion of copyright law upon those who transmit content and wish to
make “fair use” of copyrighted works.  The resulting legislation – the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 (DMCA) – accepted the con-
tent industries’ premises and responded to their core concerns220 by
enacting anticircumvention and anti-trafficking bans, while assuaging
218. Many of these companies participated in the Home Recording Rights Coali-
tion (HRRC), an organization formed after the Sony Betamax dispute to oppose the
imposition of technical constraints upon the design of consumer products.  The HRRC
seeks to foster technological innovation in consumer electronics and consumer free-
dom to engage in time shifting, place shifting, and other private, noncommercial repro-
duction of lawfully obtained music and video content. See HRRC Core Principles, at
http://hrrc.org/html/core_principles.html (last visited Aug. 22, 2002).
219. Educational, scholarly, library, consumer, consumer electronics, computer,
telecommunications, and network access industries forged the Digital Future Coalition
(DFC) in 1995 in response to the release of the Clinton Administration’s White Paper
on Intellectual Property and the National Information Infrastructure.  The DFC seeks
to strike “an appropriate balance in law and public policy between protecting intellec-
tual property and affording public access to it.” See A Description of the Digital Future
Coalition (July 7, 2002), at http://www.dfc.org/dfc1/Learning_Center/about.html.
220. As explained in the Senate Report,
Due to the ease with which digital works can be copied and distributed
worldwide virtually instantaneously, copyright owners will hesitate to make
their works readily available on the Internet without reasonable assurance
that they will be protected against massive piracy.  Legislation implement-
ing [the World Intellectual Property Organization] treaties provides this
protection and creates the legal platform for launching the global digital
online marketplace for copyrighted works.  It will facilitate making available
quickly and conveniently via the Internet the movies, music, software, and
literary works that are the fruit of American creative genius.  It will also
encourage the continued growth of the existing off-line global marketplace
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the concerns of the most powerful opposing interest group coalition –
ISPs and telecom companies – by creating a series of online service
provider safe harbors.  The DMCA addressed the various other com-
peting interests through a series of narrow limitations and exemptions,
producing a bewildering labyrinth of rules that raise myriad interpre-
tive issues.221
Anticircumvention and Anti-trafficking Provisions (Title I).  Somewhat
like the AHRA, Title I of the DMCA goes beyond traditional copyright
approaches in order to address the threat of unauthorized reproduc-
tion and distribution of copyrighted works in the digital age.222  But
rather than mandating specific technology controls,223 the DMCA fo-
cuses on ensuring the efficacy of technological control measures put in
place by copyright owners.  The Act distinguishes between technologi-
cal measures that effectively control access to a work (e.g., being able to
read an eBook) and technological measures protecting particular
rights of a copyright owner by regulating use of a work where access is
granted (e.g., preventing scenes from being altered in an encrypted
movie).
With regard to technological measures controlling access to a
work, Section 1201(a) prohibits both specific acts to circumvent the
technological measure224 and the manufacture, import, trafficking in,
and marketing of devices that: (1) are primarily designed or produced
for the purpose of circumventing a technological measure that effec-
tively “controls access to” a copyrighted work; (2) have only limited
commercially significant purpose or use other than to circumvent such
for copyrighted works in digital format by setting strong international copy-
rights standards.
S.REP. NO. 105-190, at 8 (1998); H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, pt. 2, at 23 (1998).
221. See David Nimmer, Puzzles of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 46 J. COPY-
RIGHT SOC’Y U.S. 401 (1999); David Nimmer, A Riff on Fair Use in the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act, 148 UNIV. PA. L. REV. 673 (2000).
222. Although codified as part of Title 17 of the U.S. Code, violations of the DMCA
do not constitute copyright infringements. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 1203-04 (specifying civil
and criminal remedies for violations of the DMCA’s anticircumvention and anti-traffick-
ing provisions).
223. While generally eschewing technology mandates, see 17 U.S.C. § 1201(c)(3)
(the “no mandate” provision), the DMCA does impose limited technology controls on
some video cassette recorders. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(k) (requiring future analog VCRs
to incorporate new anticopying technology).
224. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1).  To circumvent a technological measure is defined as
descrambling a scrambled work, decrypting an encrypted work, or “otherwise to avoid,
bypass, remove, deactivate, or impair a technological measure, without the authority of
the copyright owner.” Id. at § 1201(a)(3)(A).
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technological protection measures; or (3) are marketed for use in cir-
cumventing such technological protection measures.225  With regard
to technological measures regulating use of a work where access has
been lawfully obtained (e.g., through the purchase of a DVD), section
1201(b) prohibits only trafficking in and marketing of circumvention
devices.  This more limited protection was designed so as not to impair
users’ ability to make fair use of content to which they have been given
access.226  This limitation, however, provides little solace to advocates
of broad fair use standards because although it allows circumvention of
use controls, the ban on trafficking of circumvention devices (includ-
ing instructions) puts the means for such access beyond the reach of
all but the most technically adept – those possessing the ability to
decrypt restricted works.  Section 1202 further bolsters encryption ef-
forts by prohibiting the removal or alteration of “copyright manage-
ment information” conveyed along with a copyrighted work.227
The DMCA addresses the many objections and concerns raised by
various groups through a complex series of narrow exemptions.228  In
order to reduce adverse effects of Section 1201 upon fair use of copy-
righted works, the DMCA authorizes the Librarian of Congress, in con-
sultation with the Register of Copyrights229 and the Assistant Secretary
for Communications and Information of the Department of Com-
merce, to exempt any classes of copyrighted works where persons mak-
ing noninfringing uses are likely to be adversely affected by the
anticircumvention ban.230  Perhaps of most significance, the DMCA
225. 17 U.S.C. §1201(a)(2).
226. See H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, pt. 1, at 18 (1998); Exemption to Prohibition on
Circumvention of Copyright Protection Systems for Access Control Technologies, 65
Fed. Reg. 64, 557 (2000) (codified at 37 C.F.R. §201).
227. See 17 U.S.C. § 1202.  This provision is designed to discourage counterfeiting
by stripping identifying information from a work or falsely identifying the author of a
work.
228. Detailed exemptions exist for law enforcement activities, radio and television
broadcasters, libraries, encryption researchers, filtering of content to prevent access by
minors, and protection for personally identifying information. See 17 U.S.C.
§§ 1202(d), (e), (h), (i).
229. The Copyright Office is an arm of the Library of Congress.
230. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(B).  The Library of Congress is required to review such
classes every three years.  In its first review, the Librarian of Congress exempted two
relatively narrow classes of work: (1) compilations consisting of lists of websites blocked
by filtering software applications; and (2) literary works, including computer programs
and databases, protected by access control mechanisms that fail to permit access be-
cause of malfunction, damage or obsolescence.  These exemptions are in effect from
October 28, 2000 to October 28, 2003. See Recommendation of the Register of Copy-
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authorizes the circumvention of technological protection measures for
purposes of reverse engineering of computer programs for the “sole
purpose of identifying and analyzing those elements of the program
that are necessary to achieve interoperability of an independently cre-
ated computer program.”231
Online Service Provider Safe Harbors (Title II).  Online service provid-
ers (“OSPs”), such as America Online (AOL) and Yahoo, warned that
potential third party copyright liability could severely impair their rap-
idly emerging industry and impede the growth of economic activity on
the Internet.  At their urging (and over the resistance of the content
industries), Congress established a series of safe harbors insulating
OSPs from liability for various acts, such as transmitting, storing, or
linking to unauthorized content.  In order to qualify for safe harbor
treatment, an OSP must meet three general threshold conditions: (i)
adopt, implement, and inform its subscribers of its policy for providing
for termination of users who are repeat copyright infringers;232 (ii)
adopt standard technical measures used by copyright owners to iden-
tify and protect copyrighted works;233 and (iii) designate an agent to
receive notification of claimed infringement from copyright owners
and register that agent with the Copyright Office.  The Act imposes
more specific criteria in order to qualify for the particular safe harbors:
(1) transmission and routing – transmitting copyrighted material with-
out authorization;234 (2) storage – storing such material on their serv-
ers;235 (3) caching – making temporary copies on their systems (system
rights and Determination of the Librarian of Congress, 65 Fed. Reg. 64555 (Oct. 27,
2000).
231. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(f)(1).  Many observers consider the exemptions to be overly
narrow, severely restricting the traditional fair use of copyrighted works. See Pamela
Samuelson, Intellectual Property and the Digital Economy: Why the Anti-Circumvention Regula-
tions Need to Be Revised, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L J. 519 (1999); David Nimmer, A Riff on Fair
Use in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 673 (2000).  The DMCA’s
reverse engineering exemption to the anticircumvention provisions, for example, is far
more limited than what the courts have permitted under the fair use doctrine. See supra
text accompanying notes 58-78.
232. See 17 U.S.C. §512(i)(1)(A).
233. See 17 U.S.C. §512(i)(1)(B).
234. The OSP must act as a passive conduit, neither directing, initiating, selecting,
or modifying the content being transmitted by third parties. See 17 U.S.C. §512(m); see
also MARSHALL LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW 425 (3d ed. 1999).
235. See 17 U.S.C. §512(c). The OSP must not have actual knowledge that infring-
ing material resides on its servers.  Upon learning of copyright violations, the OSP must
remove or block access to such material expeditiously.  In order to protect users’ rights,
however, the OSP must promptly notify users that material has been blocked or re-
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caching);236 and (4) linking – providing links to infringing material.237
OSPs satisfying these requirements are shielded from monetary relief
and most forms of equitable relief.
2. Enforcement and Judicial Articulation of Digital Copyright
Law
In addition to their various efforts to strengthen and reorient
copyright protection to address the risks posed by digital technology,
the Recording Industry Association of America (“RIAA”), which repre-
sents more than 500 companies engaged in the creation, manufactur-
ing, and distribution of sound recordings, has spearheaded an
aggressive campaign against the entire MP3 pipeline.238  In view of the
vast reaches of digital technology, the recording industry has focused
its efforts on the most significant “leakage” points in order to have the
greatest impact.  Its most prominent legal battles have focused on MP3
devices and peer-to-peer networks, although it has also stepped up ef-
forts against the end points of the pipeline (such as universities and
businesses), and has considered taking action against the most active
individuals involved in distributing content files through peer-to-peer
networks.  More recently, the Motion Picture Association of America
(MPAA), which represents the major film and television production
studios, has also become active in enforcing copyrights in cyberspace.
Its major battle has focused on ensuring that the DVD encryption code
remains secure.  The MPAA has also acted quickly to shut down pirate
movie distribution sites around the Internet.  In addition, some of its
members have pursued an action against new devices and services ena-
moved.  The user may then provide a “counter notification” stating that the material
may be properly stored, which the OSP must promptly pass along to the copyright
owner.  The OSP must replace or unblock the material within 10 to 14 business days of
receiving the counter notification unless the copyright owner informs the OSP that it
has filed a court action to restrain the infringement. See 17 U.S.C. §512(g)(2).
236. See 17 U.S.C. §512(b) (detailing various conditions that must be met in order
to qualify).
237. See 17 U.S.C. §512(d).  As with the storage safe harbor, the OSP must not have
actual knowledge that it is providing links to sites containing infringing material and
must comply with the notification, take down, and counter notification process. See
supra note 235.
238. The National Music Publishers Association and individual copyright owners,
such as the rock group Metallica and the famed music composers Jerry Leiber and Mike
Stoller (authors of such classic hits as Hound Dog, Yakety Yak, Love Potion No. 9, Char-
lie Brown, and Stand by Me, among others) have also brought suit in some of these
cases.
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bling consumers to distribute television content through the Internet.
This section reviews the broadening copyright enforcement battle-
ground, focusing in turn upon actions targeting devices, search en-
gines, online services and software, publishers of decryption code, and
increasingly OSPs and end users.
a. Digital Devices
In 1998, Diamond Multimedia introduced the Rio portable digital
audio technology, a portable hard drive capable of storing approxi-
mately one hour of music compressed using the MP3 file format.  This
product dramatically increased consumer interest in downloading MP3
files over the Internet and extracting or “ripping” sound recording
files from CDs to a computer hard drive and compressing them.  Prior
to the introduction of this product, the principal benefit that consum-
ers could derive from downloading or ripping sound recordings was to
listen to these files through headphones or speakers at their com-
puters. The Rio rendered these files portable.  In comparison to porta-
ble cassette players, the Rio 300 was more compact, easier to use, and
more resistant to motion.
The RIAA brought suit to enjoin the manufacture and distribu-
tion of the Rio, alleging that it violated the requirements for digital
audio recording devices under the Audio Home Recording Act of 1992
because it does not employ a Serial Copyright Management System
(“SCMS”)239 and Diamond Multimedia failed to pay royalties on sales
of a digital audio recording device.240  Recognizing that the legislative
bargain effectuated by the AHRA applied narrowly to digital audio re-
cording devices (and not general computer technology), the Ninth
Circuit held that the Rio device did not implicate the AHRA and dis-
missed the action.241  Echoing the Supreme Court’s decision in the
Betamax case that “time shifting” fell within the fair use doctrine, the
Ninth Circuit observed, in dicta, that “space shifting” was “paradig-
matic noncommercial personal use.”242
In November 2001, television networks and production studios
brought suit against ReplayTV, alleging that its features enabling con-
sumers to skip commercials and to transmit digital copies of television
239. See 17 U.S.C. §1002(a)(2).
240. See 17 U.S.C. §1003.
241. See Recording Industry Ass’n of America v. Diamond Multimedia Systems, 180
F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 1999).
242. Id. at 1079.
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programming over the Internet to other ReplayTV owners violate copy-
right law.243  Various ReplayTV users, represented by the Electronic
Frontier Foundation, have since filed an action requesting that a court
declare that use of ReplayTV to record and skip commercials falls
within the scope of the fair use doctrine.244
These lawsuits test the limits of the scope of the fair use doctrine
in the digital age.245  Although the recording capabilities of DVRs par-
allel those of the VCRs at issue in the Sony Betamax case, the facility
with which digital technologies enable consumers to record and skip
advertisements can be shown to have a larger market effect than was
established in the Sony case.  The trial court concluded that the plain-
tiffs failed to adduce adequate evidence of any adverse effects on the
market (or potential market) for the copyrighted works, including lost
advertisement revenue.246  In assessing the likelihood of harm from
commercial skipping, the trial court noted that
to omit commercials, Betamax owners must view the pro-
gram, including the commercials, while recording. To
avoid commercials during playback, the viewer must fast-
forward and, for the most part, guess as to when the com-
mercial has passed. For most recordings, either practice
may be too tedious. As defendants’ survey showed, 92% of
the programs were recorded with commercials and only
25% of the owners fast-forward through them. Advertisers
will have to make the same kinds of judgments they do
now about whether persons viewing televised programs
actually watch the advertisements which interrupt
them.247
243. See Doug Isenberg, ReplayTV Lawsuit: Napster Redux? (Nov. 12, 2001), at http:/
/news.com.com/2010-1079-281601.html.
244. See Joanna Glasner, Craig Gets Listed in Replay Suit (June 7, 2002), at http://
www.wired.com/news/privacy/0,1848,53032,00.html.
245. See Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984)
(finding that the manufacturer of video cassette recorders may not be held liable for
contributory copyright infringement because this “staple article of commerce” has sub-
stantial noninfringing uses and that consumers who record television shows using VCRs
for purposes of time shifting do not infringe copyright in the shows because their ac-
tions fall within the fair use doctrine.)
246. Id. at 453-56.
247. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America, 480 F.Supp. 429, 468
(C.D. Cal. 1979).
\\server05\productn\N\NLR\46-1-2\NLR106.txt unknown Seq: 79 24-FEB-03 13:39
2002-2003] ENVISIONING COPYRIGHT LAW’S DIGITAL FUTURE 141
ReplayTV vastly simplifies advertising skipping through the use of a 30
second advance button and allows consumers to set its latest model to
skip commercials automatically.248  A recent survey of consumers using
digital video recorders finds that 35 percent say they never watch com-
mercials while nearly 60 percent say they watch them only occasion-
ally.249  The content industries contend that these differences in
consumer behavior provide a basis for distinguishing this case from the
Betamax decision.
b. Search Engines, Services, and Software
The first legal skirmishes over the unauthorized distribution of
copyrighted works over the Internet took place at the level of web sites.
The RIAA began sending cease-and-desist letters to thousands of sites
containing protected works without authorization.  As the Internet
grew and websites and services evolved to ease the search for and ac-
cess to content, the record industry took aim at these businesses.  Of
greatest significance, the development of peer-to-peer networks vastly
expanded the stakes and legal complexity surrounding online distribu-
tion of content.  The legality of these various tools, software products,
and service-based systems centers around the application of the fair
use doctrine,250 the Sony Betamax decision,251 and doctrines of contrib-
utory252 and vicarious253 liability to decentralized distribution architec-
tures in which the consumers engage in reproduction, uploading, and
downloading of protected works.
Search Engines.  In 1999, MP3board.com developed a generalized
search engine that automatically scours the Internet for MP3 files and
248. ReplayTV claims that “[u]nder controlled test conditions with major network
daytime and prime time broadcasts, approximately 96% of intraprogram commercials
are eliminated.” See ReplayTV 4500 Features, at httpp://www.sonicblue.com/video/
replaytv/replaytv_4000_features.asp (last visited July 8, 2002).
249. See Benny Evangelista, DVRs Alter Habits – Ads Aren’t Watched, S.F. CHRONICLE,
Apr. 22, 2002, available at http://sfgate.com/cgi?bin/article.cgi?file=/chronicle/
archive/2002/04/22/BU15029.DTL.
250. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
251. See Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
252. See, e.g., Elektra Records v. Gem Elec. Dist., 360 F.Supp. 821 (E.D.N.Y. 1973)
(extending contributory copyright liability to those who have knowledge of infringing
activity and induce, cause or materially contribute to such activity); Gershwin Publ’g
Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971).
253. See, e.g., Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259 (9th Cir. 1996)
(holding that vicarious copyright liability extends to those who have the right and abil-
ity to control the infringer’s acts and derive direct financial benefit from the
infringement).
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provides links to such sites.  In October of that year, the RIAA sent
cease-and-desist letters to MP3board.com and its online service provid-
ers demanding that they halt operation of this service.  In order to
remove the liability cloud hanging over its business, MP3board.com
filed an action in June 2000 seeking to declare that hypertext linking
created by automated processes does not constitute copyright infringe-
ment even if the destination of a link is to a website containing copy-
righted material was posted without authorization.254 Although the
litigation still proceeds, MP3Board.com has since modified its site to
enable copyright owners to block links to sites containing infringing
content with relative ease.255
Online Music “Lockers.”  First introduced in October 1997,
MP3.com quickly gained great popularity as a portal for recording art-
ists to make available their songs for downloading and general infor-
mation about the music industry.  Its high traffic rate enabled the site
to earn substantial advertising revenues from banner advertisements
and attract substantial venture capital financing.256  In order to ex-
pand its operations and open up new revenue sources, MP3.com
launched its “MyMP3.com” service in January 2000.  This service ena-
bled subscribers to develop a virtual online music locker from which
they could access sound recordings from any Internet portal through a
password protected user interface.  The service was premised on the
idea that the fair use doctrine authorizes consumers to “space shift”
music that they have lawfully acquired.
254. See Brad King, MP3 Site Sues RIAA Over Linking (June 5, 2000), at http://
www.wired.com/nes/culture/0,1284,36778,00.html; Plaintiff’s Complaint for Declara-
tory Judgment, Damages, and Injunctive Relief and Demand for Jury Trial (filed N.D.
Cal, June 2, 2000), available at http://www.techfirm.com/briefs/riaacomp.pdf.  The
RIAA filed a counter suit three weeks later. See Brad King, RIAA: No Hyperlinking Allowed
(June 26, 2000), at http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,37227,00.html.
255. See MP3Board Offers to Server Links (June 26, 2000), at http:www.wired.com/
news/politics/0,1283,37775,00.html. MP3Board.com implemented this modification to
its site through LinkBlaster, the software allows music copyright owners to review and
request the removal of links that they allege to be violating copyright law.  The software
automates the notice and take-down process set forth in the DMCA. See supra note 235.
Once a user requests to terminate a link, the software sends an email to the owner of
the allegedly infringing websites, who can then submit a counter-affidavit refuting the
claim.  If the site owner submits a counter affidavit and the copyright owner fails to take
legal action within 10 days, then MP3Board.com restores the link.
256. See Jennifer Sullivan, Big Money Backs MP3.com (Jan. 15, 1999), at http://
www.wired.com/news/business/0,1367,17354,00.html.
\\server05\productn\N\NLR\46-1-2\NLR106.txt unknown Seq: 81 24-FEB-03 13:39
2002-2003] ENVISIONING COPYRIGHT LAW’S DIGITAL FUTURE 143
The MyMP3.com service operated in the following way. MP3.com
purchased and uploaded thousands of CDs onto its servers.  Subscrib-
ers to this service could establish that they lawfully acquired particular
CDs either by purchasing the CD online through a cooperating online
retailer (the “Instant Listening Service”) or by loading a CD that the
subscriber owned into his or her computer CD-ROM drive (the “Beam-
it Service”).  Software on the computer could verify the presence of the
particular CD.  Once “ownership” was established in one of these two
ways, MyMP3.com provided access to the copy of the CD stored on
MP3.com’s server.  Thus, subscribers did not in fact access their own
copy but rather MP3.com’s copy. The notion of an actual private
locker was metaphorical.  In fact, subscribers had differential access to
the same “locker” on MP3.com’s servers.
The major record labels sued MP3.com a week after the launch of
MyMP3.com257 and promptly moved for summary judgment on the
ground that MP3.com’s initial copying of CDs onto its server and its
distribution of such music to its subscribers over the Internet infringed
their copyrights.  MP3.com defended both activities as falling within
fair use.  The court had little trouble finding that MP3.com could not
meet its burden.258  The court found the service to be commercial in
purpose and non-transformative in character, rejecting MP3.com’s ar-
gument that  “space shifting” of a copyrighted work transforms it in
legally cognizable ways.  The court instead applied a more literal test:
whether the defendant added “new aesthetics, new insights and under-
standings” to the sound recordings.  The second and third fair use fac-
tors – the nature of the copyrighted work and the amount taken –
clearly favored the plaintiffs.  MP3.com relied principally upon the
fourth factor – the effect upon the potential market for or value of the
work – arguing that its service promotes sales of CDs by providing a
means to make them more readily available.  The court concluded,
however, that this service impinged upon copyright owners’ ability to
develop their own online distribution channels.259
257. See Christopher Jones, RIAA Sues MP3.com (Jan. 22, 2000), at http://
www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,33634,00.html.  The National Music Publishers
Association joined the suit two months later. See MP3.com Comes Under Fire Again (Mar.
22, 2000), at http://www.wired.com/news/business/0,1367,35107,00.html.
258. Judge Rakoff opened his opinion by noting that “The complex marvels of
cyberspatial communication may create difficult legal issues; but not in this case.”  UMG
Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., 92 F.Supp.2d 359 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
259. Id. at 352-53.
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MP3.com subsequently settled the case with four out of the five
major record labels for approximately $80 million.260  After the court
assessed liability to Universal Music Group (UMG) at $25,000 per CD
copied, MP3.com and UMG settled for another $53.4 million.261
MP3.com faced further exposure to independent record labels and
music publishers.262  The various legal problems and licensing com-
plexities eventually led MP3.com to abandon its efforts to establish a
broad-based “music locker” service, limiting this venture to the files
voluntarily loaded onto its website by independent artists and a few
smaller record labels.  In a somewhat surprising shift in direction,
Vivendi Universal, UMG’s parent corporation, acquired MP3.com in
April 2001.263
Peer-to-Peer Networks.  As discussed earlier, Napster’s peer-to-peer
technology has had the most dramatic effects on the traditional music
distribution marketplace, vastly expanding the public’s access to and
interest in MP3 encoded sound recordings.  Within weeks of its public
release, millions of copies were downloaded and hundreds of millions
of copies of sound recordings had been exchanged.  It is no exaggera-
tion to say that Napster caused profound changes in consumer behav-
ior, transforming within a matter of months how millions of consumers
gained access to music and accelerating the transition to a digital mu-
sic platform.  Napster’s technology involved two principal dimensions:
the software that consumers downloaded from Napster’s servers and
the centralized indexing service running on Napster’s servers.  Al-
though Napster itself did not engage in any direct acts of copying or
distributing copyrighted works (apart from its own software), its
software and file indexing service facilitated others in reproducing and
distributing millions of sound recordings.  The major record labels
260. See Brad King, MP3.com: Four Down, One to Go (Aug. 22, 2000), at http://
www.wired.com/news/business/0,1367,38351,00.html.
261. See MyMP3.com Reborn, But for a Price (Nov. 15, 2000), at http://
www.wired.com/news/business/9,1367,40196,00.html.
262. See Brad King, Now It’s the Indies Suing MP3.com (Nov. 17, 2000), at http://
www.wired.com/news/business/0,1367,40245,00.html.
263. See Brad King, MP3.com Goes Universal (May 21, 2001), at http://
www.wired.com/news/mp3/0,1285,43972,00.html.  Michael Robertson, MP3.com’s out-
spoken founder and CEO, earned a prominent reputation for his barbed comments
about the traditional music labels.  In one characteristically blunt message to MP3.com
visitors in late 1998, Robertson commented that “What the music industry really needs
is an Internet enema.  It needs to start over.  This is the promise of music in the digital
age.” See Jim Hu & John Borland, MP3.com Buy: The Taming of a Generation (May 21,
2001), at http://news.com.com/2100-1023-257993.html.
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promptly sued Napster,264 seeking a preliminary injunction against dis-
tribution of its software and operation of its indexing service on the
grounds of contributory and vicarious copyright infringement.
Napster raised several defenses, including immunity under the
DMCA’s online service provide safe harbor (for linking), the staple ar-
ticle of commerce doctrine articulated in the Sony Betamax case (argu-
ing that Napster’s technology had substantial noninfringing uses, such
as “space shifting” of works already owned by users and distribution of
authorized works), noninfringement by Napster’s users under the fair
use doctrine265 and the AHRA’s §1008 immunity for noncommercial
home taping, and copyright misuse, arguing that the major record la-
bels were improperly using their copyrights to squelch the develop-
ment of alternate distribution channels for sound recordings.  In May
2000, Chief Judge Patel of the Northern District of California denied
Napster’s motion for partial summary judgment on grounds that Nap-
ster did not “transmit, route, or provide connections through its sys-
tems” within the meaning of §512(a) and therefore did fall within the
definition of the transmission immunity under the OSP safe harbor.
The court further found that Napster had not adequately established
compliance with the general threshold requirements under §512 be-
cause it had not adopted, reasonably implemented, and informed
users of a termination policy for repeat copyright infringers.266
In August 2000, Chief Judge Patel found that the record labels
had established a prima facie case of copyright infringement, that Nap-
ster’s defenses were unlikely to succeed, and that the balance of hard-
ships favored the issuance of a preliminary injunction enjoining the
Napster service.267  In particular, the district court found that the
264. See Jennifer Sullivan, RIAA Suing Upstart Napster (Nov. 15, 1999), at http://
www.wired.com/news/business/0,1367,32559,00.html. A few recording artists, most no-
tably the widely popular heavy metal rock group Metallica and the rapper Dr. Dre, and
the music composers (Lieber and Stoller) also filed suit against Napster relatively early
in the litigation process. See Christopher Jones, Metallica Rips Napster (Apr. 13, 2000), at
http://www.wired.om/news/politics/0,1283,35670,00.html. 27,000 music publishers
from the National Music Publishers Association later joined the lawsuit.  Brad King,
Publishers Set to Pile on Napster (Apr. 12, 2001), at http://www.wired.com/news/busi-
ness/0,1367,43007,00.html.
265. Napster asserted that its users were merely engaged in noncommercial uses,
such as sampling music, time shifting and place shifting.  Since they would not be liable
for direct infringement, Napster could not be held liable for contributory or vicarious
liability.
266. A&M Records v. Napster, 2000 WL 573136 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
267. A&M Records v. Napster, 114 F.Supp.2d 896 (N.D. Cal. 1999).
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plaintiffs had established that most of Napster’s users would likely not
fall within the fair use doctrine.268  In assessing the first fair use factor
– the purpose and character of the use – the court found that although
Napster’s users’ activities in uploading and downloading song files
could not be considered “paradigmatic commercial activity,” nor could
it be characterized as “personal in a traditional sense.”269  In finding
that this factor weighed in the plaintiffs’ favor, the court observed that
“the fact that Napster users get for free something they would ordina-
rily have to buy suggests that they reap economic advantages from Nap-
ster use.”270  The court readily found that the second and third factors
– the nature of the copyrighted work and the amount taken – favored
the plaintiffs.271  With regard to the crucial fourth factor – the effect
upon the potential market for or value of the work – the court found
that Napsters’ users supplanted the current retail market272 and hin-
dered potential online distribution channels that the record labels
were in the process of developing.273
The court separately rejected arguments that Napster’s users have
a fair use privilege to sample music (as they might in a record store
listening kiosk or through a stream from a record label’s online pro-
motional site) and space shift music that they have already purchased.
With regard to sampling, the court refused to equate permanent physi-
cal possession of a sound recording (as occurs with downloads) and
transitory access through record store devices or streamed clips of a
song.  Even if Napster’s service were shown to have systematically stim-
ulated CD sales, the court observed that a positive impact on sales does
not necessarily negate the copyright holder’s entitlement to licensing
268. The court also rejected Napster’s argument that §1008 of the Audio Home
Recording Act immunized all noncommercial home taping or authorized space shift-
ing. Napster, 114 F.Supp.2d at 916, n.19.  As more fully explained by the Ninth Circuit,
the AHRA immunity applies only to those digital reproductions on media for which the
AHRA royalties has been paid.  Since no royalty is paid on hard drives, Napster users
derived no immunity under the AHRA. See Napster, 239 F.3d 1004, 1024-25 (9th Cir.
2001).
269. Napster, 114 F.Supp.2d at 912.
270. Id.
271. Id. at 913.
272. The court relied upon sales data showing that retail purchases of CDs in col-
lege area retail markets were down relative to national averages.  The plaintiffs’ expert
witnesses attributed this pattern to the wide use of the Napster service among college
students. See Napster, 2000 WL 1170106 at *2-*3 (N.D.Cal. 2000); Napster, 114 F.Supp.2d
at 909-13.
273. Napster, 114 F.Supp.2d at 913.
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fees or access to derivative markets.  On balance, the court held that
sampling in the manner accomplished on the Napster system did not
constitute a fair use because of its likely adverse effects on the royalty
streams of music publishers and the potential online opportunities
available to record labels.274
The district court rejected the argument that “space shifting” us-
ing Napster’s service constituted fair use on factual and legal grounds.
As a factual matter, the court was persuaded by survey evidence indicat-
ing that most Napster users do not already own copies of the music
that they download.  As regards to the legal standard, the court distin-
guished the Sony Court’s finding that “time shifting” using a VCR con-
stituted fair use from the Napster “space shifting” scenario on the
ground that time shifting represented the principal use of VCRs
whereas space shifting represents an occasional use of Napster’s
software and service.275
The court also rejected Napster’s argument that the use of its
software and service to “space shift” and to access authorized works –
such as works distributed by independent artists – constitute substan-
tial noninfringing uses and hence shield Napster from contributory
copyright liability under the “staple article of commerce” doctrine ar-
ticulated in the Sony decision.  Without directly addressing the thresh-
old for “substantiality” of a noninfringing use, Chief Judge Patel
determined that Napster fell outside of this doctrine because of the
service nature of its business.  Unlike Sony, which lost control of its
VCRs after they were sold, Napster exercised ongoing control of its
network and therefore can be said to actively facilitate its users’ illegal
activities.276  The court further determined that the staple article of
doctrine did not apply to claims of vicarious liability.  Although Nap-
ster did not in fact have a revenue model in place, the court stretched
the second prong of the vicarious liability (derive direct financial bene-
fit from the infringement)277 to include ability to raise capital through
having a larger user base.278
274. Id. at 915.
275. Id. at 916.
276. Id. at 916-17.
277. See Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259 (9th Cir. 1996).
278. Napster, 114 F.Supp.2d at 921-22.
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Based upon these findings,279 the district court issued a broad in-
junction requiring that Napster ensure that no “copying, downloading,
uploading, transmitting, or distributing” of plaintiffs’ works occur on
its system.  Napster immediately appealed and requested a stay of the
injunction pending the appeal.  After granting the stay, the Ninth Cir-
cuit ultimately affirmed Chief Judge Patel’s principal conclusions.280
The Ninth Circuit did, however, clarify the proper application of the
doctrines of vicarious and contributory liability on the Internet281 and
remand the case for a narrowing of the injunction.
With regard to the application of the Sony Court’s “staple article of
commerce” doctrine, the Ninth Circuit held that the district court had
“improperly confined the use analysis to current uses, ignoring the sys-
tems’ capabilities,” placing “undue weight on the proportion of cur-
rent infringing use as compared to current and future noninfringing
uses.”282  Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit backed off of the district
court’s statement that a service can never qualify for immunity from
contributory copyright infringement.  Instead, the court articulated
how the doctrine applies in the context of an online activity where a
party becomes aware of specific acts of infringement within its power
to regulate: “If a computer system operator learns of specific infringing
material available on his system and fails to purge such material from
the system, the operator knows of and contributes to direct infringe-
ment.”283 The Ninth Circuit concluded that because Napster had ac-
tual knowledge of specific infringing material within its system (based
on information provided by the plaintiffs) and the ability to block ac-
cess to the system by such suppliers, the district court’s conclusion of
likely contributory infringement was proper.284
279. The court also dismissed various other defenses – First Amendment, copyright
misuse, and waiver – as lacking substance. Id. at 923-25.
280. Napster, 239 F.3d 1004.
281. The Ninth Circuit also questioned the district court’s determination that the
DMCA OSP safe harbor could not shelter Napster from indirect liability, but inexplica-
bly postponed resolution of that issue until trial. Id. at 1025.  Even if this defense were
successful, however, Napster would have been subject to nearly the functional
equivalent of the injunction that did ultimately issue.  Under the DMCA’s notice and
takedown provisions, see supra note 235, Napster would have had to block files identi-
fied by the plaintiffs as infringing.
282. Napster, 239 F.3d  at 1021.
283. Id.
284. Id. at 1022.
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Although affirming the district court’s finding of vicarious liabil-
ity,285 the Ninth Circuit more carefully circumscribed the scope of
such liability to “the boundaries of the premises that Napster ‘controls
and patrols.’”286 The court noted:
that Napster’s reserved ‘right and ability’ to police is
cabined by the system’s current architecture. As shown by
the record, the Napster system does not ‘read’ the con-
tent of indexed files, other than to check that they are in
the proper MP3 format.  Napster, however, has the ability
to locate infringing material listed on its search indices,
and the right to terminate users’ access to the system. The
file name indices, therefore, are within the ‘premises’ that
Napster has the ability to police. . . .  As a practical matter,
Napster, its users and the record company plaintiffs have
equal access to infringing material by employing Nap-
ster’s ‘search function.’287
Based upon these amendments to the district court’s indirect lia-
bility analysis, the Ninth Circuit held that the district court’s prelimi-
nary injunction, placing on Napster the entire burden of ensuring that
no “copying, downloading, uploading, transmitting, or distributing” of
plaintiffs’ works occur on the system, was overbroad.  The appellate
court remanded the case for the district court to craft a narrower in-
junction that both placed the burden on plaintiffs to provide notice to
Napster of unauthorized works on its system, which Napster would
then be obliged to block, and imposed upon Napster responsibility to
police its system within the limits of its architecture.288  The district
court issued a revised injunction along the lines set forth by the Ninth
Circuit shortly thereafter.289  The deluge of artists, song titles, and vari-
ations that might be used to identify protected works as well as com-
plaints by the record labels that Napster was not doing an adequate job
285. Id. at 1022-24.  The Ninth Circuit confirmed that Sony’s staple article of com-
merce doctrine affords no defense to such claims of vicarious liability, id. at 1022-23,
and that deriving a “direct financial benefit” can encompass greater likelihood of “fu-
ture revenue,” id. at 1023.
286. Id. at 1023.
287. Id. at 1024.
288. Id. at 1027-28.
289. See Napster Forced to Police System (Mar. 6, 2001), at http://www.wired.com/
news/business/0,1367,42231,00.html.
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of cleansing its network quickly brought about Napster’s demise.290
Napster was ultimately acquired by Bertelsman, one of the major re-
cord labels, with hopes of using its software, customer list, and trade-
mark in developing a legitimate subscription service.291
While the Napster case was being litigated, the MPAA filed suit
against Scour, another peer-to-peer software company and website
(Scour.net) that was capable of distributing movie files over the In-
ternet.292  The prospect of potentially billions of dollars in damages
quickly dried up funding for the venture and eventually forced Scour
into bankruptcy.293
Over the two years during which the Napster litigation unfolded,
several new generations of file sharing technology evolved, ranging
from the highly decentralized Gnutella platform to various intermedi-
ate architectures using a supernode structure.294  Internet users
quickly migrated to these new architectures, with Morpheus, KaZaa,
and Grokster, all based on the supernode architecture, attracting the
most users.295  Therefore, even after prevailing in the Napster case, the
record labels found themselves back where they started.  According to
Webnoize, a company that measures Internet traffic, the top four file-
sharing systems were used to download more than 3 billion sound re-
cording files in August 2001.296   The record labels sued the operators
of the Morpheus, KaZaa, and Grokster services in October 2001 and
the case is scheduled for trial in early 2003.297
The Napster case provides relatively clear guidance on some of the
defenses, while leaving others open to debate.  It is relatively clear, for
example, that most users of these systems who upload or download
290. See John Borland, Judge: Napster Filtering Efforts “Disgraceful” (Apr. 10, 2001), at
http://news.com.com/2100-1023-255634.html; Brad King, The Day the Napster Died
(May 15, 2002), at http://www.wired.com/news/mp3/0,1285,52540,00.html.
291. See Brad King, Napster Now Bertelsmann’s Baby (May 17, 2002), at http://
www.wired.com/news/business/0,1267,52626,00.html.
292. See Brad King, Movie Industry Skewers Sour (July 20, 2000), at http://
www.wired.com/news/business/0,1367,37697,00.html.
293. See Associated Press, Scour Files for Bankruptcy (Oct. 13, 2000), at http://
www.wired.com/news/business/0,1367,38444,00.html.
294. See supra notes 158-59; David P. Anderson & John Kubiatowicz, The Worldwide
Computer, SCIENTIFIC AM., Mar. 2002, at 40-47.
295. See Brad King, While Napster Was Sleeping (July 24, 2001), at http://
www.wired.com/news/mp3/0,1285,45480,00.html; Melanie Warner, Free Music: The New
Napsters (Aug. 12, 2002), at http://www.fortune.com/indext.jhtml?channel= print_arti-
cle.jhtml&doc_id=208834.
296. See Brad King, File Trading Sites in Crosshairs (Oct. 3, 2001), at http://
www.wired.com/news/mp3/0,1285,47296,00.html.
297. See Brad King, Jury to Hear File-Trading Case (Mar. 4, 2002), at http://
www.wired.com/news/business/0,1367,50836,00.html.
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unauthorized works would be deemed to be direct infringers and that
banner advertising by these services would constitute financial benefits
for purposes of the second prong of the vicarious liability standard.
Unlike Napster, however, these architectures are not limited to MP3
format (and hence may have a broader range of noninfringing uses),
run autonomously, and afford the system operator relatively little con-
trol over the system.  Furthermore, the operators were careful to set up
their systems so as to meet the threshold requirements of the DMCA’s
OSP safe harbor.  They all feature prominent notices stating their pol-
icy of terminating repeat infringers and compliance with the notice
and take-down provisions.  Thus, the resolution of these cases may turn
on the subtleties alluded to by the Ninth Circuit’s decision – the extent
to which the computer system operator can regulate downstream be-
havior, the range of future noninfringing uses, the boundaries of the
premises that the operator “controls and patrols,” and the applicability
of the DMCA’s partial immunities.  The Ninth Circuit’s Napster deci-
sion can be read to allow the indirect liability of peer-to-peer networks
to be judged on the architectural limitations built into the system.
Thus, a suitably autonomous system might avoid indirect liability.
Under the Ninth Circuit’s Napster decision, a peer-to-peer system oper-
ator must have “actual knowledge that specific infringing material” is
being transmitted over its system and the ability “to block access to [its]
system[ ] by the suppliers of the infringing material” in order to be
held contributorily liable for the infringing acts of its users.  On the
other hand, courts might be willing to consider the extent to which a
system operator designed its software and revenue model in order to
profit from copyright infringement.298
The ReplayTV litigation also raises a file sharing issue.  The plain-
tiffs have alleged that the “Send Show” feature of the ReplayTV device,
which allows users to transmit television programming over the In-
ternet to others, infringes copyright law.  Although this feature plausi-
bly increases the exposure of commercial advertising on “free”
television (depending upon whether the advertisements are included
and are watched) as was found in the Sony Betamax case, it has no paral-
lel in the Sony case and potentially circumvents the subscription pay-
ment mechanism relied upon by premium channels such as Home
Box Office and Showtime.  Furthermore, the greater storage capacity
298. Cf. Lisa M. Bowman, Judge Puts File Swappers in Hot Seat (Mar. 4, 2002) (noting
that the judge hearing the second generation file-sharing case against Morpheus,
KaZaa, and Grokster denied defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment under
the staple article of commerce doctrine), at http://news.com.com/2100-1023-
851332.html.
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and ease of skipping advertisements compared with the VCR at issue in
Sony could produce a different result.299
Stream Capture Technology.  In order to enable content owners to
exercise greater control over the distribution of protected works in
cyberspace, RealNetworks developed the RealPlayer technology for
streaming music over the Internet.  Internet users can download the
enabling software for free.  Once loaded, their computers can access
RealNetworks servers, establish a digital handshake, and stream con-
tent (coded in RealNetworks’ proprietary .RMA format) to be per-
ceived in realtime at their computer.  The user cannot, however, store
the content on their computer (unless the content provider activated
the download capability).  Streaming technology has greatly expanded
the range of copyrighted works accessible over the Internet.
In December 1999, RealNetworks sued Streambox, the manufac-
turer and distributor of the Streambox VCR and Ripper techhnologies,
for violations of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.300  The
Streambox VCR product enables users to access and download copies
of RealMedia files that are streamed over the Internet. This product
enables the user to mimic the operation of RealPlayer software.  It then
circumvents the authentication procedure in order to gain access to
streamed content.  Unlike the RealPlayer, however, the Streambox
VCR bypasses the copy switch so that users can download content, even
if the content owner had intended that it only be streamed.  Once
downloaded, the content can then be accessed, copied, and distrib-
uted at the user’s discretion.  Streambox’s Ripper technology enables
users to convert files from RealMedia (.RMA) format to other formats
such as .WAV (a format commonly used for music editing), .WMA
(Windows Media Player) and MP3, as well as among these formats.
On RealNetworks’ motion for a preliminary injunction, the court
held that aspects of the Steambox VCR were likely to violate the
DMCA’s anticircumvention provisions.301  In particular, the court
found that the authentication process used to establish a handshake
between the RealPlayer and a RealNetworks’ server constitutes a “tech-
nological measure” that “effectively controls access” to copyrighted
works.  The VCR’s means of establishing access and then bypassing the
299. It should also be noted that the Sony case was a close decision (5-4).  On the
other hand, the decision has not seriously been questioned and the effects on the film
and television industry have proven quite the opposite of what the plaintiffs had pre-
dicted. See supra text accompanying notes 179-89.
300. See Jeff Pelline & Greg Sandoval, Real Wins Temporary Injunction in Copyright
Suit (Dec. 28, 1999), at http://news.com.com/2100-1023-234941.html.
301. See RealNetworks, Inc. v. Streambox, Inc., 2000 WL 127311 (W.D. Jan. 18,
2000).
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copy switch circumvents the technological protection measures. The
court further found that it had no significant commercial purpose
other than to enable users to access and record protected content.
The court rejected Streambox’s defense that its software allows con-
sumers to make “fair use” copies, such as to time or space shift access
to content.  It distinguished the Sony case on two grounds: (1) many of
the copyright owners there authorized or would not object to having
their content time shifted whereas all of the content owners using the
RealNetworks’ technology to stream their works specifically chose not
to authorize downloading; and (2) Sony did not address the new pro-
tections afforded by the DMCA.302  The court declined to enjoin
Streambox’s Ripper software, raising serious doubts as to whether the
.RMA format constituted a “technological protection measure” within
the meaning of the DMCA and noting that it could serve significant
legitimate purposes.
c. Distributors and Publishers of Decryption Code
As first presented by the Streambox case, content industries have
sought to use the DMCA to choke off distribution of technology that
can decrypt technological protection measures.  Such decryption code
can be distributed in the form of software products or more generally
through any publishing channel.  In a series of high profile cases, the
content industries have pursued publishers of decryption code under
the DMCA.   These cases have brought Title 17 into tension with the
First Amendment.
Universal City Studios v. Corley.  The most prominent and economi-
cally important such case involves a decryption algorithm developed to
decode the Content Scrambling System (CSS) designed to protect the
content contained on DVDs.  In order to protect itself from the
problems the music industry has faced from distribution of its master
works in an unencrypted format (CDs), the film industry sought to
agree upon an encryption format for commercial release of its digital
content.  In 1996, the major studios adopted CSS, an encryption stan-
302. The court cited Nimmer on Copyright for the proposition that “those who manu-
facture equipment and products generally can no longer gauge their conduct as per-
mitted or forbidden by reference to the Sony doctrine. For a given piece of machinery
might qualify as a staple item of commerce, with a substantial noninfringing use, and
hence be immune from attack under Sony’ s construction of the Copyright Act – but
nonetheless still be subject to suppression under Section 1201.” 1 NIMMER ON COPY-
RIGHT §§ 12A.18[B] (Supp. 1999).  As such, “[e]quipment manufacturers in the twenty-
first century will need to vet their products for compliance with Section 1201 in order
to avoid a circumvention claim, rather than under Sony to negate a copyright claim.” Id.
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dard developed by Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. and Toshiba
Corp.  The system is designed so that DVDs can only be played on
hardware devices (DVD players and computers) loaded with software
to unscramble CSS-encrypted content.  Matsushita and Toshiba
granted a royalty-free license to the DVD Copy Control Association,
which in turn licenses this technology to hardware manufacturers and
motion picture studios for a modest administrative fee.303
Notwithstanding the substantial investment into the development
of CSS technology, a fifteen year-old computer enthusiast from Norway
named Jon Johansen succeeded in reverse engineering CSS and devel-
oping DeCSS, a program that decodes CSS, in September 1999.  Using
this program, a user can rip DVD content onto a hard drive in unen-
crypted form.  Although the full code version of a feature length mo-
tion picture typically fills 5 gigabytes, compression using the DivX
algorithm can reduce the file to approximately the capacity of a re-
cordable CD.304  Jan Johansen posted this code on his personal web
site, from which it spread throughout the Internet.  At the behest of
the movie industry, authorities in Norway eventually arrested Johansen
and removed the DeCSS code from his site.305
In November 1999, Eric Corley, the publisher of 2600: The Hacker
Quarterly, posted the DeCSS code on his publication’s website and pro-
vided links to other sites posting DeCSS.  Eight major motion picture
studios sued Corley, alleging that his posting of this code on his web-
site violated the DMCA’s antitrafficking ban.  Corley defended his ac-
tions on three principal bases: (1) that his sole motivation for posting
DeCSS was to enable people with computers running the Linux oper-
ating system to enable a Linux-based DVD player and hence fell within
the DMCA’s reverse engineering exception;306 (2) that the purpose of
DeCSS is to allow others to make fair use of the plaintiffs’ copyrighted
303. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp.2d 294, 310
(S.D.N.Y. 2000).
304. See supra note 150.
305. See Courtney Macavinta, Teen Charged in Connection with DVD Cracking Tool (Jan.
25, 2000), at http://news.com.com/2100-1023-236054.html.
306. Under §§1201(f)(1) and (2), a person may circumvent, or develop and em-
ploy technological means to circumvent, access control measures in order to achieve
interoperability with another computer program provided that doing so does not in-
fringe another’s copyright.  In addition, under §1201(f)(3), that person may make in-
formation acquired through such efforts “available to others, if that person . . . provides
such information solely for the purpose of enabling interoperability of an indepen-
dently created computer program with other programs, and to the extent that doing so
does not constitute” copyright infringement.
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works (e.g., for educational use in comparing films, time shifting); and
(3) that the DMCA violated his First Amendment freedom of expres-
sion by preventing him from speaking, namely posting and linking to
DeCSS, a form of speech.
The court rejected the statutory arguments without much diffi-
culty.  Judge Kaplan found the reverse engineering defense inapplica-
ble because the statute limits its application to only the person who
successfully reverse engineers the program (i.e., Jon Johansen), not an-
yone who seeks to disseminate the program (even if for the sole pur-
pose of promoting interoperability).307  As regards the fair use
argument, the court reviewed the DMCA’s legislative history and deter-
mined that Congress intended that the anticircumvention and antitraf-
ficking provisions would trump traditional fair use (and Sony’s staple
article of commerce doctrine).308  In the court’s view, Congress deter-
mined that fair use under the DMCA would be handled through limi-
tations built into the anticircumvention ban,309 specific exemptions,
and the periodic rulemaking process set forth in §1201(a)(1)(B)-(E)
for exempting particular classes of works for which fair use is likely to
be adversely affected.310
The First Amendment defense generated the most heat.  The
court held that computer code, including decryption algorithms, con-
stituted “protected speech” under the First Amendment.311  Nonethe-
less, the court upheld the DMCA’s limitations on such speech.
Because these limitations were in the court’s view content-neutral
(they target the “functional” aspect of the speech and only incidentally
307. Even if Johansen had been the defendant, the court found that he would not
be eligible for this defense as the record established that he was not motivated “solely”
by a desire to achieve interoperability with the Linux operating system.  In the words of
Judge Kaplan, “Mr. Johansen is a very talented young man and a member of a well
known hacker group who viewed ‘cracking’ CSS as an end it itself and a means of dem-
onstrating his talent and who fully expected that the use of DeCSS would not be con-
fined to Linux machines.” Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp.2d at 320.
308. Id. at 323-24.
309. For example, violation of the anticircumvention ban cannot be the basis to
prohibit “fair use” of content obtained through such circumvention. See 17 U.S.C.
§ 1201(c)(1).
310. The court expressed some concern that the DMCA’s anticircumvention ban
might one day be used to deny access to works already in the public domain, such as
pre-1972 sound recordings, but concluded that Congress “clearly faced up to and dealt
with this question in enacting the DMCA.” Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp.2d at 322.
311. Id. at 327.
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affect its message),312 they were subject to intermediate scrutiny.  They
were adequately justified by the substantial governmental interest in
developing effective means for restraining unauthorized distribution
of copyrighted works in the digital age, were not related to the sup-
pression of free expression, and did not burden substantially more
speech than necessary to further the interest in arresting piracy.313
The court also upheld the constitutionality of the DMCA’s application
to linking on similar grounds.314  Analogizing copyright piracy in the
digital age to spread of disease, the court determined that injunctive
relief was proper due to the great harm caused by unauthorized distri-
bution of copyrighted works to copyright owners and the need to take
strong preventive measures, including restrictions upon the freedom
of expression, to reduce the risk of widespread piracy via the In-
ternet.315  Corley appealed the First Amendment rulings to the Second
Circuit.  In a decision written by Judge Newman, the court affirmed
Judge Kaplan’s analysis and conclusions on somewhat broader
grounds.316
Felten v. RIAA.  The recording  industry has also invoked the
DMCA’s trafficking ban in an effort to restrain the publication of
decryption code through academic research.  This case grew out of an
embarrassing series of events.  In an effort to develop and call atten-
tion to the Secure Digital Music Initiative (SDMI), the RIAA and other
participants issued a “hacker challenge”: anyone who could success-
fully strip out prototype watermarks without degrading the audio qual-
ity of the recording would win a $10,000 prize.317  Participants in the
challenge agreed not to disclose information that would defeat the
technologies presented.
Professor Edward Felten, a well-known computer security expert
from Princeton University, and other researchers at Princeton, Rice
University, and Xerox Corporation succeeded in removing the water-
marks.  Upon learning that Professor Felten planned to share his find-
ings at an academic conference, SDMI representatives informed
Professor Felten that such disclosure “could result in significantly
312. Id. at 328-29.
313. Id. at 329-33.  The court also rejected prior restraint, overbreadth, and vague-
ness challenges.  Id. at 333-39.
314. Id. at 339-41.
315. Id. at 332, 341-46.
316. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001).
317. See John Borland, SDMI Offers $10,000 Challenge to Hackers (Sept. 8, 2000), at
http://news.com.com/2100-1023245518.html.
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broader consequences and could directly lead to the illegal distribu-
tion of copyrighted material.”318
Professor Felten and his colleagues ultimately filed a lawsuit ask-
ing a court to declare that presentation of this research at a USENIX
(Advanced Computing Systems Association) Security Symposium and
publication of their research, including a paper entitled Reading Be-
tween the Lines: Lessons from the SDMI Challenge, do not violate the
DMCA’s anti-trafficking ban and, if they do, such provisions violate the
First Amendment.  The trial court dismissed the matter on justiciability
grounds, noting that the defendants had disavowed the letter threaten-
ing to sue and would not take any such action.319
United States v. ElcomSoft and Dmitry Sklyarov. The eBook publishing
industry has also invoked the DMCA in order to curtail the distribution
of decryption code.  Adobe Systems Corporation, a leading software
manufacturer best known for creating the de facto industry standard
for electronic document distribution (Portable Document Format
(PDF)) and the Acrobat Reader, developed the Adobe Acrobat eBook
Reader to provide publishers with a secure system for distributing their
content.  Publishers requested that this platform afford them the abil-
ity to prevent eBook files from being copied from one computer to
another.320
ElcomSoft, a Russia-based company, developed Advanced eBook
Processor, a program that cracks the encryption protection on Adobe’s
eBook format and converts it to Adobe’s PDF format.  In June 2001,
Adobe requested that ElcomSoft cease distributing the program.321
Adobe also requested that the FBI investigate the matter.  In July 2001,
the FBI arrested Dmitry Sklyarov, a programmer for ElcomSoft and
one of the developers of ElcomSoft’s Advanced eBook Processor, as he
was preparing to speak at Def Con, a conference billed as the “the
largest underground internet security gathering on the planet” and
318. See Lisa M. Brown, Researchers Face Legal Threats over SDMI Hack (Apr. 23, 2001)
(quoting letter from SDMI to Professor Felten), at http://news.com.com/2100-1023-
256277.html.
319. See Final Hearing Transcript, Felten v. RIAA, Case No. 01 CV 2669 (D.N.J.
Nov. 28, 2001) (Hon. Garrett E. Brown), available at http://www.eff.org/Legal/Cases/
Felten_v_RIAA/20011128_hearing_transcript.html.
320. See Gwendolyn Mariano, Consumers May Find e-Books a Tough Read (Nov. 20,
2000), at http://news.com.com/2100-1023-249189.html?tag=bplst.
321. See Robert Lemos, Russian’s Arrest Latest in Copyright Fight (July 18, 2001), at
http://news.com.com/2100-1001-270129.html?legacy=cnet.
\\server05\productn\N\NLR\46-1-2\NLR106.txt unknown Seq: 96 24-FEB-03 13:39
158 NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46
“the largest hacker convention on the planet!”322 held in Las Vegas.323
The government charged Sklyarov and ElcomSoft with criminal viola-
tions of the DMCA, with penalties ranging up to five years imprison-
ment and fines up to $2.25 million.324
The arrest outraged the computer science and civil liberties com-
munities.325  The Electronic Frontier Foundation, a civil liberties or-
ganization working to protect rights in the digital world, took on
Sklyarov’s cause.  Responding to a boycott and vocal protests, Adobe
withdrew its support for the government’s prosecution of Sklyarov326
and the government eventually dropped the charges against him on
the condition that he testify against his employer.327  The government
continued to pursue its prosecution against ElcomSoft.
In the first stage of this prosecution, ElcomSoft filed a motion
seeking to dismiss the complaint on grounds that the DMCA violates
the First Amendment.328  In ElcomSoft’s view, Congress’ effort to both
ban circumvention tools and to maintain fair use produced a statutory
regime that is unconstitutionally vague.  Judge Whyte rejected this ar-
gument on the grounds that the DMCA in fact prohibits trafficking in
and marketing of all circumvention devices.329  The court dismissed
many of the First Amendment challenges following the analysis ap-
322. See http://www.defcon.org./
323. See Lemos, supra note 321.
324. See IDG, Russian Arrested for Alleged DMCA Violations (July 18, 2001), at http://
www.thestandard.com/article/0,1902,28048,00.html.
325. See, e.g., Declan McCullagh, Hacker Arrest Stirs Protest (July 19, 2001), at http://
www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,45342,00.html; John Leyden, Boycott Adobe Cam-
paign Launches (July 19, 2001), at http://www.theregister.co.uk/content/4/20499.html;
Will Knight, Computer Scientists Boycott US Over Digital Copyright Law (July 23, 2001), at
http://www.newscientist.com/news/news.jsp?id=ns99991063 (last visited Sept. 19,
2002).
326. See Robert Lemos, Adobe: Free the Russian Programmer (July 23, 2001), at http://
news.com.com/2100-1001-270440.html?legacy=cnet&tag=mn_hd%20tag=pt.salon.
327. See Michelle Delio, Russian Hacker Charges Dropped (Dec. 13, 2001), at http://
www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,49122,00.html.
328. See United States v. Elcom, Ltd., N.D. Cal., No. CR 01-20138 RMW (Order
Denying Motions to Dismiss Indictment), available at http://www.eff.org/IP/DMCA/
US_v_Elcomsoft/20020508_dismiss_deny_order.pdf.
329. See Order Denying Motions to Dismiss Indictment, at 7-12.  Judge Whyte
viewed the statute as serving a prophylactic purpose:
Congress sought to ban all circumvention tools because most the time these
tools would be used to infringe copyright.  Thus, while it is not unlawful to
circumvent for purposes of engaging in fair use, it is unlawful to traffic in
tools that allow fair use circumvention.  This is part of the sacrifice Con-
gress was willing to make in order to protect against unlawful piracy and
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plied in the Corley case.330  The court rejected ElcomSoft’s assertion
that enactment of the DMCA exceeded Congress’ constitutional
authority.331
d. OSPs, Investors, Advisors, and End Users
While focusing their attention upon peer-to-peer networks,
decryption of protection measures, and other critical choke points in
the unauthorized distribution of copyrighted works, the content indus-
tries have also devoted attention to lower levels of the digital distribu-
tion pyramid. These industries have always felt some reluctance to
pursue individual copyists and distributors out of practical concerns
and potential backlash among their customers.  Nonetheless, as the
level of unauthorized distribution has risen, the content industries
have expanded their efforts to both stop and deter unauthorized re-
production and distribution as well as educate the public about the
structure and benefits of copyright protection.  These efforts have
taken place at a number of levels: online service providers, universities,
investors and advisors, businesses, and end users.  The content indus-
tries have also lobbied the government to step up public enforcement
of copyright law.
Online Service Providers.  While immunizing OSPs from monetary
damages and most forms of injunctive relief, the DMCA’s safe harbor
provisions also imposed responsibilities upon OSPs to promptly block
or take down sites containing unauthorized content.  Pursuant to these
provisions, the RIAA and the MPAA have sent out thousands of cease-
and-desist letters and shut down thousands of sites with the coopera-
tion of Internet Service Providers.332
Recognizing the heavy use of “file sharing” sites by college stu-
dents and the large portion of CDs purchased by 18 to 24 year olds, the
RIAA has pressured universities to block access to file sharing sites
promote the development of electronic commerce and the availability of
copyrighted materials on the Internet.
Id. at 11.
330. Id. at 12-23.
331. Id. at 26-32. ElcomSoft was ultimately acquitted of the charges in a jury trial.
The defense successfully argued that the company was not aware it was violating the
DMCA, and therefore did not meet the willfulness element of the crime. See Joanna
Glasner, Jury Finds ElcomSoft Not Guilty (Dec. 17, 2002), at http://www.wired.com/news/
business/0,1367,56897,00.html.
332. See Education, Innovation, and Enforcement, at http://www.riaa.org/Protect-
Online-3.cfm (last visited Sept. 19, 2002).
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through university networks.  Many universities initially erected
firewalls blocking student access to Napster based in part on network
performance and bandwidth concerns,333 although most have backed
off restrictions on Internet use.334 The RIAA has also begun filing take
down notices directly with universities in their capacity as OSPs for
their students.335  Indeed, college students have been the target of
RIAA initiated crackdowns that have resulted in arrest and
discipline.336
Digital Distribution Venture Investors and Advisors.  As the legal expo-
sure for digital distribution ventures became apparent after the Scour,
MyMP3.com, and Napster cases, venture capitalists became increas-
ingly wary of the legal costs, economic risk, and potential vicarious lia-
bility associated with investing in these ventures.337  The recording
industry has substantially raised the stakes for investors by bringing
suits directly against officers, directors, and venture capitalists involved
in Napster.338  Universal Music Group has sought to expand the net of
exposure one step further.  After winning a large verdict from
MP3.com in its litigation over the MyMP3.com service and later acquir-
ing the company, it turned around and sued MP3.com’s former attor-
neys for malpractice.339  The net effect of these actions could be to
333. See Schools Recess on Napster (Aug. 30, 2000) (reporting a Gartner Group survey
finding that 17 of 59 U.S. colleges and universities had banned students from accessing
Napster’s website), at http://www.wired.com/news/culture/0,1284,38525,00.html (last
visited Sept. 19, 2002).
334. See Brad King, Campus Music Trades Continue (Aug. 27, 2001), at http://
www.wired.com/news/school/0,1383,45817,00.html (last visited Sept. 19, 2002).
335. See Scott Carlson, Company Identifies Student and Complains to Their Colleges,
Chronicle of Higher Education (Nov. 7, 2001), at http://chronicle.com/free/2001/11/
1001110701t.htm; see also Diana Kilmanis, Campus Students Liable for Copyrighted Music,
THE DIAMONDBACK, Nov. 7, 2001 (University of Maryland student newspaper), available
at  http://www.inform.umd.edu/News/Diamondback/archives/2001/11/07/
news6.html (last visited Sept. 19, 2002).
336. See Janelle Brown, MP3 Crackdown (Nov. 17, 1999), at http://www.salon.com/
tech/log/1999/11/17/riaa/index.html (last visited Sept. 19, 2002).
337. See Dawn Kawamoto, Lawsuits Dampen VCs’ File-Sharing Enthusiasm (Sept. 4,
2000), at http://news.com.com/2100-1023-245275.html.
338. See Paul Elias, Lawyers in Napster Suit Go After Deep Pockets: Venture Backer Hummer
Winblad Could Be Held Liable if the Music-Swapping Company is Found Guilty of Piracy (Aug.
18, 2000), at  http://www.redherring.com/industries/2000/0818/ind-le-
gal081800.html.  Chief Judge Patel ultimately dismissed claims against these parties.
339. See Brenda Sandburg, MP3.com Sues Cooley Over Legal Advice (Jan. 21, 2002), at
http://www.law.com/servlet/ContentServer?pagename=openMarket/Xcelerate/
View&c=LawArticle&cid=101573988432&live=true&cst=1&pc=0&pa=0; Sonia K. Katyal,
A Legal Malpractice Claim by MP3.com: In The Changing Area of Cyberlaw, Is A Crystal Ball
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chill both investment in and advising of new technology ventures relat-
ing to reproduction and distribution of content.
Businesses.  The record industry has also begun focusing upon pri-
vate companies.  After receiving an anonymous tip, the RIAA sued In-
tegrated Information Systems alleging that its employees had set up a
computer server that allowed co-workers to download and access MP3
files.  The firm settled the case, agreeing to pay a large fine.340 This
case and others have led companies to establish policies prohibiting
downloading of music on company computers.341
End Users.  Thus far, the content industries have declined to pur-
sue typical end users directly, even though it is relatively clear (from
the Napster litigation) that such lawsuits could succeed.  Recent re-
ports suggest that the recording industry may be reassessing this strat-
egy,342 possibly with an eye toward targeting those end users most
responsible for the unauthorized spread of music files.  A study by re-
searchers at Xerox’s Palo Alto Research Center revealed that the top
20 percent of the users of Gnutella, one of the more decentralized
architectures, are responsible for 98 percent of all files shared.343
Therefore, by targeting the most egregious conduits of unauthorized
content, the RIAA might be able to reduce the flow of unauthorized
sources as well as deter Internet users from exposing themselves to lia-
bility.   This strategy risks  further alienating the industry’s customers
and fueling a legislative backlash.
Government Enforcement.  As reflected in the ElcomSoft case, the
federal government has taken an active and increasing role in the en-
forcement of copyright law in cyberspace.  The NET Act was specifi-
cally created to ease such prosecutions.  In the first NET Act
prosecution, completed in November 1999, federal prosecutors pro-
Necessary to Avoid Liability? (Feb. 7, 2002), at http://writ.news.findlaw.com/commen-
tary/20020207_katyal.html.
340. See Christine L. Romero, Music Piracy Costs Temp Firm $1 Million (Apr. 11,
2002), at http://www.arizonarepublic.com/news/articles/0411music11.html.
341. See Betty Evangelista, Deleting Downloads: Companies Concerned Over Employees’
File-Sharing at Work, S.F. CHRONICLE, June 3, 2002; Lisa M. Bowman, Kiss Your MP3s at
Work Goodbye (June 27, 2002), at http://news.com.com/2100-1023-939791.html.
342. See Anna Wilde Mathews & Bruce Orwall, Music Labels Go After Song-Swappers:
Recording Companies Plan Lawsuits Against Individuals, WALL ST. J., July 3, 2002; See also
Brad King, File Trading Furor Heats Up (July 3, 2002), at  http://www.wired.com/news/
mp3/0,1285,53662,00.html.
343. See Eytan Adar & Bernardo A. Huberman, Freeriding on Gnutella, (5 First Mon-
day: Peer-Reviewed Journal on the Internet, No. 10 (Oct. 2000)), available at http://
www.firstmonday.org/issues/issue5_10/adar/index/html.
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ceeded against a college student who had posted MP3 files, movie
clips, and software on his web site.344  Although a plea bargain kept the
student out of jail, the case received substantial publicity.345  The more
general problem of computer crime – fraud and the spreading of com-
puter viruses – has led the United States Department of Justice to es-
tablish specialized cybercrime units throughout the nation.346  In
December 2001, federal agents carried out raids in 27 cities as part of
an effort to break up a particularly notorious software piracy ring
known by the name “DrinkorDie.”347
C. The Emerging Array of Forces Bearing on Copyright’s Digital Future
Notwithstanding the tremendous expansion of copyright and re-
lated protections during the past decade and largely favorable judicial
decisions in enforcement actions, the major content industries have
come to believe that existing law may not be adequate to protect con-
tent in the digital age.348  The rapid rise of peer-to-peer networks and
the success of hackers in cracking and disseminating means of decrypt-
ing the DVD Content Scrambling System (and other technological
protection measures) demonstrate the vulnerability of the current net-
work architecture to widespread unauthorized distribution and the rel-
344. See Kristine Olson & Sean B. Hoar, District of Oregon Nets First Conviction for
Copyright Infringement on the Internet, 47 FED. LAWYER 28 (July 2000).
345. See, e.g., Jennifer Sullivan, MP3 Pirate Gets Probation (Nov. 24, 1999), at http://
www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,32276,00.html.
346. See Lisa M. Bowman, U.S. to Cybercriminals: You’re Going Down (July 11, 2001)
(reporting on Attorney General Ashcroft’s vow to increase enforcement of cybercrime
by expanding 10 specialized units so they can better concentrate on catching hackers
and pirates), at http://news.com.com/2100-1001-270322.html?tag=rn.
347. See Robert Lemos, U.S. Plans New Raids on File Swappers (Dec. 12, 2001), at
http://news.com.com/2100-1023-276885.html; Associated Press, Feds Zero in on Piracy
Ring (Dec. 11, 2001), at http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,49026,00.html
(last visited Sept. 19, 2002); Reuters, DrinkorDie Leader Pleads Guilty (Feb. 27, 2002), at
http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,50715,00.html (last visited Sept. 19,
2002).
348. See Declan McCullagh, Anti-Copy Bill Hits D.C. (Mar. 22, 2002), at http://
www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,51245,00.html (last visited Sept. 19, 2002);
Declan McCullagh, The DMCA is the Toast of D.C. (May 17, 2002) (“To Hollywood, the
DMCA is just the first step: It only made most types of ‘circumvention’ illegal.  Now
movie studios want to require copy-protection technology in most software and hard-
ware”), at http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,52602,00.html (last visited
Sept. 19, 2002).
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ative impotence of existing legal protections.349  Of comparable
significance, the shift toward a digital platform has shaken up and aug-
mented what was already a complex set of players vying to influence
public policy.  For these reasons, concern for the future of copyright
law has moved beyond the relatively specialized content industry cir-
cles to encompass the digital technology world (computer hardware
vendors, semiconductor manufacturers, software companies, Internet
service providers, and computer scientists) as well as civil libertarians
and the public at large.  Just about everyone with a computer, an In-
ternet connection, and a desire to access content has become aware of
the raging debate over copyright’s proper role.  Therefore, in order to
envision the future of copyright law, it is necessary to examine the
emerging array of forces bearing on its evolution. This section begins
by exploring the larger economic themes affecting the role and con-
tours of copyright law.  It then discusses how technological considera-
tions and evolving social movements may bear on copyright’s future
course.
1. Economics: Content versus Technology
Copyright law has traditionally centered on economic interests –
assuring content creators and distributors means of appropriating suf-
ficient return in the marketplace in order to promote investment in
creative endeavors.  Throughout much of its history, new technologies
for storing and distributing expressive works have by and large served
the interests of content creators and distributors.  Innovations in me-
dia and distribution channels have created new markets for content.
Although tensions have certainly arisen from time to time and some
particular content niches have suffered from the new technologies,350
from an overall perspective both the content and technology sectors of
the economy have generally benefitted from new technology in what
can best be described as a symbiotic relationship.
349. See Melanie Warner, Free Music: The New Napsters (Aug. 12, 2002), at http://
www.fortune.com/indext.jhtml?channel=print_article.jhtml&doc=208834.
350. For example, many performing artists and musicians lost economic opportuni-
ties as motion pictures and recorded music supplanted some of the public’s enthusiasm
for live performances. Similarly, the player piano and piano rolls decreased demand for
sheet music, cutting into the revenues of sheet music publishers and, for at least a time,
music composers. The advent of radio and the development of a vibrant market for
sound recordings proved a great revenue source for authors of musical compositions.
See M. WILLIAM KRASILOVSKY & SIDNEY SHEMEL, THIS BUSINESS OF MUSIC (8th ed. 2000)
(describing the licensing of music).
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One of the key factors harmonizing this relationship has been the
inherent limitations of analog technology platforms on unauthorized
reproduction and distribution of works of authorship.351  The princi-
pal digital technology platform today — general purpose microcom-
puter (and portable devices) and unencrypted file formats in
conjunction with peer-to-peer networks operating on the World Wide
Web — lacks such constraints.  Among its defining characteristics are
the ease with which content can be inexpensively, quickly, and flaw-
lessly reproduced and distributed widely with relatively little risk of de-
tection.  Thus, while digital technology offers great promise to content
creators and distributors, it exposes content to unauthorized reproduc-
tion and distribution dramatically beyond that what used to be possible
on prior technology platforms.
Not surprisingly, the transition from analog to digital storage and
distribution technology has generated deepening conflict between the
content and technology sectors, producing what has increasingly been
referred to as a battle between the content and high technology sectors
of the economy.352  The conflict took root in earlier battles over the
VCR and digital audio tape players, but has taken on unprecedented
fury with the growth of peer-to-peer technology.  Whereas these prior
controversies proved tractable – through Hollywood’s eventual recog-
nition that VCRs opened markets without adversely affecting viewer-
ship and the largely consensual imposition of technological constraints
on DAT devices through the AHRA compromise353 – the current con-
flict represents a far greater challenge.  The current digital piracy
threat vastly exceeds these prior controversies while cutting at the
heart of the technology sector: the design of general purpose com-
puters, related devices, and computer software and the architecture of
the Internet.
While sharing a common interest in preventing unauthorized re-
production and distribution of copyrighted works – whether computer
software or music and audiovisual content – the computer software in-
dustry and content sector have been bitterly divided over the means of
351. See supra text accompanying notes 138-45.
352. See Thomas C. Greene, MS Denounces Hollywood DRM Jihad (June 6, 2002), at
http://www.theregister.co.uk/content/4/25593.html; Amy Harmon, Piracy, or Innova-
tion? It’s Hollywood vs. High Tech, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2002, at C1; Declan McCullagh,
Digital Security Fomenting a Feud (Feb. 27, 2002), at http://www.wired.com/news/polit-
ics/0,1283,50702,00.html; Declan McCullagh, High Tech: U.S. Out of Hollywood (Feb. 27,
2002), at http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,50716,00.html.
353. See supra note 299 and text accompanying notes 203-08.
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accomplishing this objective.  Both supported the enactment of the
DMCA,354 which bolsters privately developed and implemented tech-
nological protection measures against piracy.  They also joined forces
in launching the Secure Digital Music Initiative (SDMI).355
The ineffectiveness of the DMCA in combating decryption of
DVDs, the proliferation of unauthorized distribution of copyrighted
works, and the demise of the SDMI, however, have forced a wedge be-
tween the technology and content sectors of unprecedented propor-
tions.  While the leakage of protected content has begun to disrupt the
sound recording industry’s business models356 and sent a chill through
the film and television sectors, the computer hardware industry has
benefitted from the ease with which consumers can access content
through illicit channels. The popularity of file-sharing has stimulated
demand for hard drives, faster microprocessors, and new portable digi-
tal devices, even in a generally sluggish economic period.  Word
processing and traditional spreadsheet analysis has never required 40
gigabyte hard drives or burners for writing large files to CDs and DVD
capacity media.  Computer product design and advertising have in-
creasingly appealed to this new generation of computer users with slo-
gans such as “rip, mix, burn.”  Content sector leaders now openly
attack the marketing tactics of Apple and Gateway,357 two of the more
aggressive marketers of new lines of consumer products targeting
354. John Borland, D.C. Anti-Piracy Plans Fuel Culture Clash (Mar. 27, 2002), at
http://news.com.com/2100-1023-869902.html.  Computer hardware manufacturers,
however, opposed the DMCA, fearing that it would lead to regulation of technology.
355. See Paul Festa, RIAA to Address Music Downloads (Dec. 11, 1998), at http://
news.com.com/2100-1023-219026.html.
356. The record industry has seen a 15 percent drop in CD shipments in the past
year.  While the record industry has attributed the downturn to unauthorized distribu-
tion, see Reuters, Downloads Blamed for Low CD Sales (Aug. 26, 2002), at  http://
www.wired.com/news/business/0,1367,54767,00.html, others have suggested that de-
clining sales can be attributed to the economic recession and increased competition
from other media (such as DVDs and video games). See Reuters, Forrester Sees $2 Billion
Digital Music Market by 2007 (Aug. 13, 2002), at  http://www.siliconvalley.com/mld/
siliconvalley/news/editorial/3856253.htm.  In one of the first empirical assessments of
record sale trends through this period, Professor Stan Liebowitz finds the recent dip in
CD sales supports the claim that unauthorized distribution is causing harm to the re-
cording industry and that this trend will likely continue. See Stan Liebowitz, Record Sales,
MP3 Downloads, and the Annihilation Hypothesis (Aug. 22, 2002), at http://www.utdallas.
edu/~liebowit/knowledge_goods/rl6310.html (last visited Sept. 26, 2002).
357. See Brad King, Are Ads a Gateway to Illegal CDs? (Apr. 11, 2002), at http://
www.wired.com/news/mp3/0,1285,51719,00.html.
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young music fans, and question the technology industry’s commitment
to developing adequate protection for digital content.
The content industries have resolved to press for more powerful
controls over the architecture of digital technology and at their urging,
Senator Ernest Hollings recently proposed the Consumer Broadband
and Digital Television Promotion Act358 which calls for the Federal
Communications Commission, in consultation with the Copyright Of-
fice, to establish security system standards and encoding rules for all
digital media devices sold or offered for sale in the United States.  The
bill allows a one year period for representatives of digital media device
manufacturers, consumer groups, and copyright owners to agree upon
such standards before the FCC which would initiate formal rule-mak-
ing proceedings and also requires that any standards – whether negoti-
ated or administratively determined – satisfy various criteria such as
effectiveness in preventing piracy, reasonable cost, and accommoda-
tion of fair use.359
Technology companies and industry associations have bitterly de-
nounced the Hollings proposal and have more generally voiced oppo-
sition to any government-mandated anti-piracy controls.360  In their
view, such standards would threaten product, software, and network
358. See S. 2048. 107th Cong. (2002); John Borland, Anti-Piracy Bill Finally Sees Sen-
ate (Mar.21, 2002), at http://news.com.com/2100-1023-866337.html. This bill largely
incorporates the provisions of an earlier proposal, the Security Systems Standards and
Certification Act (SSSCA). See Declan McCullagh, New Copyright Bill Heading to Congress
(Sept. 7, 2001), at http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,46655,00.html.
359. In addition to a general provision calling for consideration of effects on fair
use in setting the standard, the Act would specifically require that consumers be able to
make personal copies of television broadcasts (including from cable and satellite pre-
mium channels). See CBDTPA § 3(e)(2).
360. See John Borland, D.C. Anti-Piracy Plans Fuel Culture Clash (Mar. 27, 2002), at
http://news.com.com/2100-1023-869902.html; Declan McCullagh, High Tech: U.S. Out
of Hollywood (Feb. 27, 2002) (reporting on a letter from top Silicon Valley executives
noting “consensus within the industry that a government-mandated standard is not in
the best interests of effectively solving this problem” and advocating “voluntary multi-
industry standards setting efforts to be optimally effective in reaching workable market
solutions.”), at http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,50716,00.html; Microsoft
Corporation, Art & Commerce in the Digital Decade: Protecting Intellectual Property Will Take
Cooperation and Innovation (June 3, 2002), at http://www.microsoft.com/issues/essays/
2002/06-03digitalrights.asp; see also Robert MacMillan, Lobbying Group Protests Copyright-
Protection Proposal, NEWSBYTES, Oct. 1, 2001 (describing opposition by the Association for
Computing Machinery to Senator Hollings’ earlier proposal); Charles Cooper, Ted
Waitt Takes on Hollywood (May 28, 2002) (describing Gateway Computer’s criticism of
the content industries and its aggressive marketing of products that enable consumers
to access digital content), at http://news.com.com/2008-1082-923477.html; Declan Mc-
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innovation, undermine market solutions to the piracy problem, and
risk implementation of premature and inefficient standards. Most sig-
nificantly, such a policy would place government officials in the middle
of basic product design decisions.  In the view of the technology sector,
the technology marketplace is far too dynamic for any such govern-
ment intervention to succeed.
This impasse does not show signs of easy, quick, or stable resolu-
tion.  Although technology industry leaders have indicated that they
are willing to collaborate with the content industries in combating
piracy,361 they have pointedly stated their support for peer-to-peer
technology.  A recent letter from technology industry leaders to their
counterparts in the content sector asserts that such technology repre-
sents “a basic functionality of the computing environment today” and
is “critical to further advances in our economy.”362  The technology
industry leaders propose addressing the piracy problem through con-
sumer education, enforcement of existing laws, and the development
of new ways to use the Internet to distribute content.  They caution
that “[a]ny solutions to the problem of piracy must not compromise
the innovations [peer-to-peer technology] has to offer.”363  Further dis-
tancing themselves from the priorities of the leading content compa-
nies, the technology industry executives note that many consumers
have expectations about “fair use” of entertainment products that must
be factored into the resolution of this controversy.364
This posture bodes poorly for cross-sector consensus on how to
combat unauthorized reproduction and distribution of copyrighted
works.  While continuing to pursue enforcement and new, albeit mod-
est, business initiatives,365 the content industries have placed new legis-
lation high among their strategic priorities.  Although the content
sector has contributed heavily to political candidates over the years366
Cullagh, Why Telecoms Back the Pirate Cause (Aug. 27, 2002), at http://news.com.com/
2102-1082-955417.html.





365. See supra text accompanying notes 175-78.
366. The television, film, and music industries combined have ranked among the
top 10 industrial groups in terms of political campaign contributions during most of
the past decade. See Center for Responsive Politics, TV/Movies/Music: Long Term Contri-
bution Trends, at http://www.opensecrets.org/industries/indus.asp?Ind=B02 (last vis-
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and maintained a strong lobbying presence in Washington for many
years, it cannot expect to ride roughshod over the political interests of
the technology sector.  Any significant incursions into the freedom to
develop new products will encounter forceful opposition from the
technology sector, which, over the past decade, has invested substantial
resources in the legislative process and gained valuable experience in
working the halls of Congress.367  The economic significance of the
technology sector to the United States economy vastly exceeds the con-
tributions of the content industries and technology companies have
strong financial motivation to maintain their freedom to innovate.368
ited Sept. 19, 2002).  As a percentage of industry revenues, the content industries rank
at the very top in terms of campaign contributions.
367. Prior to the mid-1990s, technology companies tended to disdain lobbying and
resolved their battles in the marketplace.  They did not devote significant resources to
campaign contribution or lobbying infrastructure. See Center for Responsive Politics,
Computers/Internet: Long-Term Contribution Trends (reporting that the computer/Internet
industrial category ranked between 30th and 53rd among industrial categories in terms
of campaign contributions, a rather lower contribution rate in comparison to the eco-
nomic size of the industry), at http://www.opensecrets.org/industries/indus.asp?Ind=
B02 (last visited Sept. 19, 2002).  As the industry has matured, this attitude has gradually
changed. See Claire Tristram, Silicon Valley Grows Up, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 2002. The
concerted effort of Silicon Valley companies to press for antitrust scrutiny of Microsoft
brought about a new awareness of the role of politics. See John Heilemann, The Truth,
the Whole Truth, and Nothing But the Truth: The Untold Story of the Microsoft Antitrust Case
and What it Means for the Future of Bill Gates and His Company (Nov. 2000), at http://www.
wired.com/wired/archive/8.11/microsoft.html. Microsoft itself has since taken an ac-
tive interest in governmental and legislative affairs, becoming one of the leading con-
tributors to political coffers.  Its campaign contributions rose from less than a quarter
million dollars in the 1996 election cycle to more than $4.25 million in 2000, placing it
5th among all donors. See Center for Responsive Politics, Computer Software: Top Contribu-
tors, at http://www.opensecrets.org/industries/contib.asp?Ind=C5120&Cyle=2000 (last
visited Sept. 19, 2002).  In the year 2000 election cycle, the computer/Internet indus-
tries ranked 7th in political campaign contributions, contributing over $40 million to
Democratic and Republican candidates and organizations, pulling ahead of the content
sector for the first time. See Center for Responsive Politics, Computers/Internet: Long-Term
Contribution Trends, at http:/www.opensecrets.org/industries/indus.asp?ind=B02 (last
visited Sept. 19, 2002); see also Center for Responsive Politics, Telecom Services and Equip-
ment: Long-Term Contribution Trends (noting comparable increases in contributions by
the telecom sector), at http://www.opensecrets.org/industries/indus.asp?Ind=B02 (last
visited Sept. 19, 2002).  The content industries have, however, surpassed technology
sector contributions in 2002.  Compare Center for Responsible Politics, TV/Movies/Mu-
sic: Long Term Contribution Trends, at http://www.opensecrets.org/industries/indus.asp?
Ind=B02, with Center for Responsive Politics, Computers/Internet: Long-Term Contribution
Trends, at http:/www.opensecrets.org/industries/indus.asp?ind=B02.
368. The technology sector brings in substantially more revenue than the music
and film industries.  Even the star power of Hollywood cannot overshadow this dispar-
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Nonetheless, even if the content sector cannot push their ideal pack-
age of copyright reforms through Congress, they hope to at least pres-
sure technology companies to the bargaining table.  A recent flurry of
congressional hearings on digital piracy, proposed bills,369 and over-
tures by technology executives to studio executives370 suggest that this
approach is achieving some results, although enactment of a bill re-
sembling the CBDTPA anytime soon remains unlikely.371
At a more basic level, the present controversy challenges long-es-
tablished economic structures and evolutionary paths.  Whereas devel-
opers of new content storage and distribution technologies have often
gained substantial economic power during the formative years of their
technology, owing to patents or other competitive advantages, they in-
evitably have given way to competition in the supply of content, ena-
ity. See John Naughton, Hollywood at War with the Internet (July 26, 2002) (London), at
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,7-365250,00.html.  The consumer electronics
industry alone, with revenues of early $100 billion per year, is several times larger than
the music and film industries combined. See Brad King, ReplayTV Won’t Quit, Won’t Quit
(June 4, 2002), at http://www.wired.com/news/digiwood/0,1412,52944,00.html.
369. See Amy Harmon, Movie Studios Press Congress in Digital Copyright Dispute, N.Y.
TIMES, July 29, 2002, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2002/07/29/technology/
29DIGI.html?tntemail; Declan McCullagh, Could Hollywood Hack Your PC? (July 23,
2002), at http://news.com.com/2100-1023-945923.html; Howard L. Berman, Just Des-
serts for Scofflaws (July 9, 2002), at http://news.com.com/2010-1078-942325.html; Lisa
Bowman, Copyright Holders Praise Proposed Bill (May 1, 2002) (discussing proposal by Sen-
ator Joseph Biden that would expand strong software anti-counterfeiting laws to include
digital content, criminalize replication of authentication measures on copyrighted
materials), at http://news.com.com/2100-1023-896676.html; John Borland, Anti-Piracy
Bill Finally Sees Senate (Mar. 21, 2002), at http://news.com.com/2100-1023-866337.html
(last visited Sept. 19, 2002).
370. See John Borland, Tech Execs: Hands Off P2P (July 15, 2002), at http://
news.com.com/2100-1023-943946.html; Declan McCullagh, High Tech: U.S. Out of
Hollywood (Feb. 27, 20002) (reporting on letter from top Silicon Valley executives), at
http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,50716,00.html; letter archived at http://
216.110.42.179/docs/sssca/opponents/letter.02202.html; Cf. Joint Statement, Press Re-
lease, AOL Time Warner – Intel Joint Statement of Principles (Mar. 21, 2002) (outlining a
common vision for their companies), at http://www.intel.com/pressroom/archive/re-
leases/20020319aol_intel.htm.
371. See Declan McCullagh, White House Cool to Hollings’ Act (Apr. 27, 2002) (report-
ing statements by James Rogan, the Commerce Department’s undersecretary for intel-
lectual property, that “negotiations are presently underway among hardware
manufacturers and content owners to develop improved means for protecting online
content” and urging legislators to await the results of that process before voting on a
proposal such as the Hollings bill), at  http://www.wired.com/news/politics/
0,1283,52145,00.html; Declan McCullagh & Robert Zarate, Content Spat Split on Party
Lines  (Mar. 1, 2002), at  http://www.intel.com/pressroom/archive/releases/
20020319aol_intel.htm.
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bling enterprises better able to develop popular content to control the
emerging industry built upon the new technological platform.372
Thus, motion pictures, sound recording, television, and radio are all
viewed today as content industries, notwithstanding early control by
the technological innovators.  As patents expired and consumer de-
mand grew, these “industries” shifted into the hands of those who
could produce, package, and distribute content more successfully.
The “technology” companies focused on consumer electronics prod-
ucts, broadcasting equipment, and exhibition devices supporting these
content platforms, thereby producing the symbiosis of technology and
content industries.
The largely non-proprietary nature of the microcomputer and In-
ternet architectures has thus far enabled easy entry into the digital dis-
tribution marketplace.  This ease of entry as well as the difficulty of
changing entrenched content industrial structures have contributed to
the content industries’ attitude that they can and should control any
new content distribution channels.373  Thus, they have stifled most en-
trepreneurial ventures by “outsiders” through either lack of coopera-
tion or outright hostility and litigation.  Napster is the most publicized
example.  Napster sought to use its first mover advantage in the peer-
to-peer arena as leverage in negotiating a new distribution vehicle for
372. For example, after the Edison company’s early film patents expired and its
attempt to monopolize the motion picture industry through licensing agreements were
defeated, see Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502
(1917), the Edison Company’s film division rapidly declined as others entered the in-
dustry. See EILEEN BOWSER, THE TRANSFORMATION OF CINEMA, 1907-1915. HISTORY OF
THE AMERICAN CINEMA, VOL. 2 (1994); CHARLES MUSSER, BEFORE THE NICKELODEON: ED-
WIN S. PORTER AND THE EDISON MANUFACTURING COMPANY (1991); History of Edison
Motion Pictures: Decline of the Edison Company (1908-18), Inventing Entertainment
at http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/edhtml/edec.html#D (last visited July 26, 2002).
373. Even in the area of technological protection measures, the content industries
have tended to view such innovations as goods that should be freely provided through
government fiat. See Gwendolyn Mariano, Harry Potter’s DVD Protection Goes Poof (June
20, 2002) (quoting an industry observer speculating that “Hollywood’s rational[e] for
dumping millions of dollars into lobbying and soft money to influence Congress is
viewed as a one-time expense, as opposed to an ongoing expense of paying for the
encryption license for each and every movie they make.”), at http://news.com.com/
2100-1023-938008.html; cf. Amy Harmon, Lawmakers Seek Rules to Stop Redistribution of
Digital TV, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2002 (highlighting that content owners seek the imple-
mentation of content protection through the imposition of hardware standards on de-
vice manufacturers, whereas technology companies contend that entertainment
companies should bear responsibility for protecting their content at the source), availa-
ble at http://www.nytimes.com/2002/07/23/technolgy/23DIGI.html.
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content, but the record labels saw no reason to negotiate with a firm
threatening their principal business model, hampering their develop-
ment of revenue-based digital distribution markets, and lacking effec-
tive intellectual property protection for its technology.374
Other online content ventures have either withered away or been
taken over by major content companies.  After losing a costly legal bat-
tle over its online music locker business model, MP3.com eventually
cut costly settlements with the major record labels before being pur-
chased at a substantial discount by the Universal Music Group.375
Emusic.com, a pay-per-download venture, was unable to license con-
tent from the major record labels.  Although it developed a sizable cat-
alog of music from smaller labels, its business failed to gain traction in
competition with Napster, and it too was eventually purchased by Uni-
versal Music Group at a substantial discount.376  Licensemusic.com de-
veloped an innovative online service for searching and licensing music
but ultimately failed because no major record label was willing to use
the service.  Warner/Chappell Music, a leading music publisher, ulti-
mately entered the market with its own service called OneStopTrax.377
The television industry has taken a somewhat more conciliatory
approach toward the development of digital video recorders by invest-
ing in the digital video recorder industry378 and seeking to develop a
more collaborative working relationship with the developers of this
374. As noted earlier, Bertelsman, one of the major record labels, has invested
(modestly) in Napster in the hopes of gaining some edge in the digital distribution
marketplace based on Napster’s name recognition among music fans and its software
assets. See supra text accompanying note 291.
375. Brad King, MP3.com Goes Universal (May 21, 2001), at http://www.wired.com/
news/mp3/0,1285,43972,00.html.
376. See Jim Hu, Universal to Buy Emusic for $24.6 Million (Apr. 9, 2001), at http://
news.com.com/2100-1023-255492.html.
377. See  OneStopTrax website, at  http://www.onestoptrax.com/wcmost/
home2,jsp; PRNewswire, Warner/Chappell Music and Warner Special Products Launch First
Fully Integrated Online Music Licensing Service (Apr. 29, 2002) (press release), available at
http://biz.yahoo.com/prnews/020429/nym138_1.html.
378. See Jim Davis, New TV Recording Devices a Potential Ad Gold Mine (Aug. 18, 1999)
(reporting investments by Disney, Showtime and Time Warner in TiVo and ReplayTV),
at http://new.com.com/2100-1040-229995.html. Brad King, ReplayTV on Sale Despite
Suits (Nov. 29, 2001) (reporting that Time Warner Cable, Viacom, and Disney have
invested in ReplayTV or it parent company, SonicBlue), at http://www.wired.com/
news/digiwood/2,1412,48691,00.html.
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technology.379  After initially bashing television executives through its
early product advertisements, TiVo has discontinued advertisements
directly attacking the major networks and has downplayed its product’s
ability to skip commercial advertisements.  It has made a conscious de-
cision to try to “bridge the gap” between consumers and networks, rec-
ognizing that “as much as the consumers have difficulties with
networks, they do provide the content — if you’re going to completely
alienate them, what will happen to the content?”380  TiVo has
partnered with broadcasters and advertisers to offer “Advertainment,”
a new form of interactive advertising.381  It has also decided not to in-
clude a commercial skip feature in its product, although it continues
to offer a rapid forward feature.  ReplayTV has taken the opposite tack,
aggressively marketing features of its technology that circumvent com-
mercial advertisements and allow content to be redistributed through
the Internet and honing a public image as a renegade fighting the
television industry’s advertising business model on behalf of consum-
ers.382  As noted previously,383 the television and film industries have
sued ReplayTV for copyright infringement.  These industries have also
pressured Congress and the FCC to adopt rules preventing the unau-
thorized distribution of digital television signals.384
The content industries’ fears of cannibalizing their existing reve-
nue streams through digital distribution initiatives, a lack of effective
encryption technologies, and concerns about adverse consumer reac-
tions to content protection measures have constrained the industries’
embrace of the Internet.   The record labels’ first online services,
379. See Davis, supra note 378 (reporting investments were intended as both a
hedge against the future and a means of ensuring that advertising remains a part of the
TV experience), at http://news.com.com/2100-1040-229995.html.
380. See Farhad Manjoo, TiVo Town or Sonicblue City? (June 6, 2002), at http://
wired.com/news/business/0,1367,53008,00.html.
381. For example, in a campaign for the electronics retailer Best Buy, TiVo users
can hit a button on the remote control whenever they see a Best Buy advertisement and
view a “Video Showcase” of “innovative Best Buy branded entertainment.” See Press Re-
lease, TiVo, Best Buy Launch New Generation of “Advertainment” With Exclusive Sheryl Crow
Jam Session, Electronic Feng Shui Vignettes (May 16, 2002), at http://biz.yahoo.com/
prnews/020516/sfth069_2.html.
382. See King, supra note 368; Manjoo, supra note 380 (quoting a TiVo spokesper-
son characterizing SonicBlue, ReplayTV’s parent, as trying “to make themselves look
like the consumer watchdog who is against the man”).
383. See supra text accompanying notes 243-45.
384. See Amy Harmon, Lawmakers Seek Rules to Stop Redistribution of Digital TV, N.Y.
TIMES, July 23, 200, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2002/07/23/technology/
23DITI.html.
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MusicNet and Pressplay, have been criticized for lacking the variety,
functionality, and flexibility of other online services as well as peer-to-
peer networks.385
In addition to these concerns about the extent and quality of on-
line ventures by major record labels, any legitimate service faces a
daunting challenge in developing a single source for the full range of
music.  Consumers rarely know the label behind any particular artist or
recording and hence would find the task of locating music across indi-
vidual label web sites challenging.386  Furthermore, the dual copyrights
comprising sound recordings – in the underlying musical composition
and the sound recording – complicates the clearances required to of-
fer a broad catalog.387 Furthermore, efforts by the record industry to
385. See Brad King, Music So Nice, You May Pay Twice (Dec. 18, 2001), at http://
www.wired.com/news/mp3/0,1285,49188,00.html; Brad King, Pressplay Arrives in Music
Fog (Jan. 23, 2002), at http://www.wired.com/news/mp3/0,1285,49934,00.html; Jim
Hu, Labels Defend MusicNet, Pressplay (July 8, 2002) (noting complaints about catalog
limitations and “clunky” technology), at http://news.com.com/2100-1023-942066.html;
Universal Music Goes Online (July 9, 2002) (noting that Universal is limiting its download
service to older and less well-known artists so as to assess whether online distribution
erodes record store sales), at http://www.wired.com/news/business/0,1367,53721,
00.html.  CNET provided the following review of Pressplay, which offers music from
Sony, EMI, and Universal Music Group:
THE GOOD: Inexpensive; songs don’t expire; lets you burn music onto com-
pilation CDs; allows songs on two computers.
THE BAD: Limited music selection; CD burning is limited; awful search func-
tion; no cintosh version; low streaming bit rates; no premium content.
THE BOTTOM LINE: Pressplay’s range of music and features don’t justify its
price. We prefer RealOne MusicPass’s [MusicNet] searching options and
simpler interface, but if you are dying to burn CDs, Pressplay is the only for-
pay choice.
Pressplay Product Review, CNET Software, at http://www.cnet.com/software/0-3227898-
1204-8494686.html (last visited July 26, 2002).
386. The music industry eventually solved this problem in the radio industry
through the development of blanket licenses through ASCAP and BMI. See M. WILLIAM
KRASILOVSKY & SIDNEY SHEMEL, THIS BUSINESS OF MUSIC 151-74 (8th ed. 2000) (describ-
ing the role of performing rights organizations).
387. See Richard D. Rose, Connecting the Dots: Navigating the Laws and Licensing Re-
quirements of the Internet Music Revolution, 42 IDEA 313 (2002); Anthony Reese, Copyright
and Internet Music Transmissions: Existing Law, Major Controversies, Possible Solutions, 55
UNIV. MIAMI L. REV. 237 (2001).  The radio industry did not face this problem because
sound recordings were not subject to federal copyright protection until 1972; even after
passage of the Sound Recording Act of 1971, sound recordings were not accorded pub-
lic performance rights.
The many clearances required to establish a rich online music catalog brings to
mind “the tragedy of the anti-commons,” whereby a proliferation of complex rights
undermines productive activities. Cf. Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can
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form cooperative ventures face antitrust scrutiny.  In fact, the major
labels are currently under investigation with regard to the formation of
the MusicNet and Pressplay services and their limitations of licensing
their content to other entities.388  As one means of easing the creation
of broad online catalogs and easing antitrust concerns, legislation has
been introduced which would require record labels that license their
songs to a third-party company to grant licenses to other distributors
on non-discriminatory terms.389  The sound recording industry, how-
ever, has opposed the legislation as imposing excessive regulation.390
On the other side of the debate, the technology sector has exhib-
ited its own arrogance and delusions of grandeur in the digital age.391
The hype surrounding dot com business models generated unrealistic
optimism about what could be accomplished through give away and
Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698 (May
1998); Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from
Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621 (1998).  Such problems doomed the
MyMP3.com service. See supra text accompanying notes 257-63.
388. See John Borland, DOJ Interest Unlikely to Quiet Music Standoff (Aug. 6, 2001)
(reporting that the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice has opened an
investigation into whether the five major record labels have violated antitrust laws), at
http://news.com.com/2100-1023-271140.html?legacy=cnet; see also John Borland, Re-
cord Labels Targeted in Napster Suit (Oct. 10, 2001) (reporting Chief Judge Patel’s con-
cerns in the Napster case regarding the record labels’ exclusionary licensing practices in
setting up MusicNet and Pressplay: “I’m really confused as to why the plaintiffs came
upon this way of getting together in a joint venture.  Even if it passes antitrust analysis, it
looks bad, sounds bad, smells bad.”), at http://news.com.com/2100-1023-274248.html.
389. See Brad King, Music May Yet Stream from the Web (Aug. 4, 2001) (describing the
introduction of the Music Online Competition Act), at http://www.wired.com/news/
mp3/0,1285,45813,00.html.
390. See id. In response to the introduction of this legislation, Hillary Rosen, CEO
of the RIAA, stated that  “This is not only wrong, it is also inconsistent with the strongly
held views of experts and the private sector that government regulation of the Internet
would be a disastrous mistake.” Id. This view seems particularly hypocritical in view of
the RIAA’s strong support of the Consumer Broadband and Digital Television Promo-
tion Act.
391. For example, Mark Andreesen, one of the developers of Netscape, the break-
through Internet browser, has stated that digital technology “is the Trojan horse for the
computer industry to take over the entertainment industry.”  Quoted in Ernie Schenck,
TiVo’s Not the End of the World, Or Is It?  (Mar./Apr. 2001), at  http://
www.commarts.com/CA/colad_d/ernS_47.html; see also Rob Walker, Creating Synergy
Out of Thin Air, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 2002 (dispelling, in retrospect, the promise of “syn-
ergy” anticipated from the merger of AOL and Time Warner), available at http://
www.nytimes.com/2002/07/28/opinion/28WALK.html?tntemail1; Jennifer Sullivan,
Who’s Gonna Own the Music? (Oct. 8, 1999) (quoting one technology CEO as predicting
the extinction of ASCAP and BMI as technology ensures a reliable means for compen-
sating artists), at http://www.wired.com/news/culture/0,1284,31682,00.html.
\\server05\productn\N\NLR\46-1-2\NLR106.txt unknown Seq: 113 24-FEB-03 13:39
2002-2003] ENVISIONING COPYRIGHT LAW’S DIGITAL FUTURE 175
banner advertisement driven commerce.  Somewhat like the failure of
the Edison Company’s attempt to monopolize the early film busi-
ness392 and Matsushita Electrical Industrial’s failed attempt to run
MCA Universal Studios,393 many technology companies have over-
looked or at least downplayed the challenge of building successful con-
tent enterprises.  The failure of AOL-Time Warner to produce any
significant synergy between the largest Internet Service Provider and
one of the largest content companies evidences the difficulties of
merging the diverse competencies and cultures of successful content
and technology companies.394
Nonetheless, a gradual tempering and melding of the opposing
perspectives and cultures can be expected to occur through a variety of
internal and external processes.  The content and technology sectors
have begun to change through merger, diversification, and conglomer-
ation.  A growing number of companies now have feet in both sectors.
Following its costly legal battles over the VCR in the early 1980s, Sony
Corporation acquired CBS Records in 1988 and Columbia Pictures in
1989.  It has since developed a large entertainment empire, which has
gradually been integrated within a larger technology and consumer
electronics business.395  Through its entertainment divisions, Sony has
become a key player in content industry associations such as the MPAA
and RIAA, bringing a nuanced perspective to the challenges facing the
entertainment sector.  AOL/Time Warner reflects another set of cross-
industry interests.  Vivendi, which owns the Universal entertainment
companies, also has investments in satellite broadcasting. It is not sur-
392. See supra note 372.
393. See Ken Belson, Sony Looks Golden, by Comparison, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 2002
(quoting a Japanese technology business executive stating that “[i]t may have been ar-
rogant of us to believe we could control Hollywood as an outsider.”), available at http://
www.nytimes.com/2002/07/25/business/25SONY.html.
394. See David Kirkpatrick with Jim Rutenberg, A Search for Harmony Within a Feud-
ing AOL, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2002 (“[B]itter executives from the Time Warner side of
the house say that some of the plans to synchronize their business with AOL’s were
flawed from the beginning. They say that so far many of the merger’s promised syner-
gies have cramped their businesses, including empty announcements about coopera-
tion between Time Warner magazines and television networks; a proposal, still
unfulfilled, to broadcast shows made by the Warner Brothers studio on Turner Broad-
casting networks; and even a failed companywide push to switch to AOL e-mail ac-
counts.”), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2002/07/21/business/21TIME.html;
Rob Walker, Creating Synergy Out of Thin Air, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 2002, available at htp://
www.nytimes.com/2002/07/28/opinion/28WALK.html.
395. See Belson, supra note 393.
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prising, therefore, that reports have surfaced indicating that the tradi-
tionally monolithic and unified MPAA has became more fractured.396
Bertelsmans’ investment in and ultimate acquisition of Napster no
doubt tweaked the RIAA’s governing body.397
The development of and acquisition of Internet ventures by tradi-
tional content companies can also be expected to alter their percep-
tion of business opportunities.  While many of these activities merely
augment the content company’s principal business models at the pre-
sent time, any such moves bring new people and ideas into a company.
Furthermore, joint ventures and collaborative projects, such as TiVo’s
Advertainment initiative398 and EMusic’s development of a subscrip-
tion service in conjunction with Gateway Computer,399 expand the
boundaries of both industry sectors.400
Over the longer term, the growing opportunity afforded by digital
technology and the Internet for independent recording artists, au-
thors, and to a lesser extent, film producers, to produce and promote
their own works will play a significant role in reshaping the content
industries.  These industries have traditionally been highly concen-
trated as a result of various structural constraints – physical limitations,
such as spectrum, in broadcasting and substantial financial require-
ments to promote and distribute content.  Digital technology has loos-
ened these constraints, enabling artists and authors to reach their
audiences directly.  Artists and eBook authors can now promote their
work through their own websites and larger portals – such as MP3.com,
ArtistDirect.com, and Garageband.com in the case of music – at mini-
mal cost.  A growing number of recording artists – budding and estab-
lished, but no longer represented by major labels – have begun to
396. See Edmunds Sanders, The Voice of Hollywood Shows Signs of Cracking Entertain-
ment: Media Companies’ Competing Interests Threaten a Lobbying Alliance, L.A. TIMES, Apr.
29, 2002, at A1.
397. See Brad King, Napster Now Bertelmann’s Baby (May 17, 2002), at http://
www.wired.com/news/business/0,1367,52625,00.html.
398. See supra note 381.
399. See Gateway, Emusic Team Up to Promote MP3 Subscription Service; Free 30-Day Trail
Includes 100 MP3 Downloads Without Obligation (Apr. 29, 200) (press release), at http://
biz/yahoo.com/prnews/020429/lam047_1.html.
400. See Simon Avery, Company to Put Music Library Online (July 9, 2002), at http://
www.siliconvalley.com/mld/siliconvalley/news/3625461.htm; Amy Harmon, Grudg-
ingly, Music Labels Sell Their Songs Online, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2002, at C1; John Borland,
Listen.com Lands Bast Big Five Label (July 1, 2002), at http://news.com.com/2100-1023-
940841.html.
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derive modest revenue streams through promoting live performances
and selling CDs and merchandise.401
These various internal and external forces have already begun to
shift the ways in which the content and technology sectors operate,
although the power struggle between these two sectors can be ex-
pected to continue for some time to come.  Content industries do not
yet perceive a viable transition path for their businesses to a digital
platform and the technology sector lacks the motivation and coordina-
tion to develop and implement such a platform.  Until this gap can be
bridged, the two sectors will continue to contest the appropriate role
for copyright law.
2. Technology
The rate and direction of technological innovation in content
storage, reproduction, distribution, and encryption will significantly af-
fect the path of copyright law.  As noted earlier, Moore’s law and anal-
ogous concepts related to advances in processor speed, data
compression, and networking can reasonably be expected to continue
to reduce the cost and expand the capability of consumer technology
for storing, replicating, and distributing content for the foreseeable
future.  Focusing just on storage capacity and using the personal video
recorder as an example, consumers will be able to store essentially an
endless quantity of audiovisual content on affordable devices within
the next decade.  Purchasers of a TiVo or ReplayTV device (for ap-
proximately $400) today can store 60 hours of TV programming in an
easily usable and searchable system.  Moore’s law implies that the same
401. See Richard Morin, New Musical Acts Get Lift from Internet: Downloading Levels
Field, Study Finds, S.F. CHRONICLE, Apr. 17, 2002, available at http://sfgate.com/cgi-bin/
article.cgi?file=/chronicle/archive/2002/04/17/DD124027.DTL; Janis Ian, The Internet
Debacle – An Alternative View, Performing Songwriter Magazine (May 2002), available at
http://www.janisian.com/article-internet_debacle.html; M.J. Rose, Self-Publish Stigma Is
Perishing (July 23, 2002) (reporting that “in the last 18 months, thanks in great part to
authors’ ability to use the Internet to market themselves, more than three dozen self-
published novels have been picked up by major houses.”), at http://www.wired.com/
news/culture/0,1284,53996,00.html; Cf. Robert von Goeben, How to Beat the Record La-
bels on the Web (June 5, 2002) (opining that entrepreneurs may better be able to break
through by developing independent record labels attracting promising artists rather
than focusing on building new distribution channels that depend on licensing from the
major labels), at http://news.com.com/2010-1075-932414.html; Michael Kanellos, Gate-
way Tests Waters of Music Business (Apr. 26, 2002) (describing Gateway Computer’s initial
forays into music publishing and distribution), at http://news.com.com/2100-1040-
893463.html.
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$400 will provide over 500 hours of storage capacity within five years
and 5,000 hours within 10 years.  By the same type of extrapolation, a
purchaser of a $400 MP3 player today with a storage capacity of 8,000
songs can expect to be able to store more than 64,000 songs on a com-
parably priced unit in just 5 years and more than half a million songs
in 10 years.   Advances in wireless technology can be expected to ex-
tend the Internet beyond its cable bounds.  Therefore, the vulnerabil-
ity of content to unauthorized reproduction and distribution will likely
increase as storage capacity, data compression, reproduction media,
bandwidth, and networking technology continue to advance.
In view of this backdrop, the vulnerability of content to unautho-
rized reproduction and distribution will depend substantially upon
whether technological protection measures – more generally referred
to as digital rights management (DRM) systems402 – can keep pace
with developments in computing and network technology.  DRM sys-
tems can control access to content (for example, by regulating the
number of times a movie can be viewed or the length of time that a
song may be heard), limit the user’s ability to alter the work, and pro-
hibit the reproduction, printing, or transfer of a file.  Such software
locks can  be embedded within a computer’s operating system,
software programs accompanying the content, or the hardware of a
device.  DRM systems typically secure content by either encrypting in-
formation in a protective shell that can only be accessed by authorized
users (e.g., through password protection) or by placing a watermark,
flag, or XrML tag on content that can only be read by specialized
devices.
As demonstrated repeatedly throughout the past decade, techno-
logical protection measures do not guarantee protection.  All DRM
codes can be cracked by those with sufficient technical proficiency.
The SDMI watermarks, the DVD Content Scrambling System,
RealNetworks’ streaming protection measures, and Adobe’s eBook
Reader are just some of the more prominent examples.  Microsoft’s
highly touted security code for its XBox game console has also been
402. See generally Digital Dilemma Report, supra note 122, at 152-71, 282-303; Elec-
tronic Privacy Information Center, Internet Digital Rights Management and Privacy Act
(Apr. 16, 2001), at http://www.epic.org/privacy/drm/#developers (last visited Sept.
20, 2002).
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cracked.403  Computer experts generally believe that all encryption sys-
tems are vulnerable to cracking by skilled programmers.404  Further-
more, high quality reproductions can be made of any work that a
consumer can perceive.405  Although the DMCA can deter decryption
in legitimate organizations and markets, a vast subculture of skilled
hackers intent on resisting encryption has developed around the In-
ternet.406  Therefore, the path of DRM technology has already begun
to resemble an arms race in which cracking increasingly sophisticated
codes becomes the prize for a growing community of crackers.
The record and film industries have more recently come to see
technology not merely as a means for preventing unauthorized repro-
duction and distribution but also as a means for countering piracy on
the Internet.  Through a tactic known as spoofing, the record industry
has begun flooding peer-to-peer networks with files featuring the
names of popular artists and songs, but containing compromised con-
tent.407  The content industries would like to use more aggressive tech-
niques – possibly including the release of computer viruses, denial of
service attacks, and domain name hijacking – that would disrupt com-
puters making available unauthorized copies, but have concern that
such acts could run afoul of federal or state law.408  As cover for fur-
403. See David Becker, MIT Student Hacks into Xbox (June 3, 2002) (noting that it
cost the student $50 and took three weeks of work for the student to crack the security
code), at http://news.com.com/2100-1040-931296.html.
404. See Electronic Privacy Information Center, Digital Rights Management and Pri-
vacy (“According to Professor Ed Felten, [DRM systems] are vulnerable to cracking by
individuals with ‘moderate’ programming skills.”), at http://www.epic.org/privacy/
drm/ (last visited July 26, 2002); Paul Bond, Expert Says DRM Technology No Cure for
Piracy (Apr. 9, 2002) (quoting Mark Andreesen, co-developer of the Netscape browser,
stating that if software companies could not develop successful DRM technology “for
their own industry, they can’t do it for the entertainment industry”; “DRM is a mere
Band-Aid, and always will be.” “If a computer can display [content] or play it, it can
copy it.”), at http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/hollywoodreporter/convergence/
article_display.jsp?vnu_content_id=1460322.
405. See Jennifer Sullivan, Who’s Gonna Own the Music? (Oct. 8, 1999) (quoting
Brian Zisk, a digital music entrepreneur, as stating that “If you can hear audio, you can
make a copy.  By the laws of physics, [music] cannot be made uncopyable”), at http://
www.wired.com/news/culture/0,1284,31682,00.html.
406. See generally Andrew C. Frank, Reinhold Beutler & Aaron Markham, The Copy-
right Crusade  (June 2001), at  http://www.viant.com/pages2/downloads/innova-
tion_copyright.pdf; Jennifer 8. Lee, Pirates on the Web, Spoils on the Street: Cracking Codes of
Popular Software, A Small Group Can Wreak Havoc, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2002, at E1.
407. See Dawn C. Chmielewksi, Labels Open New Fire on Piracy, SAN JOSE MERCURY
NEWS, June 28, 2002, at 1A.
408. See, e.g., Federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2002).
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ther efforts at counter-piracy activities, Representative Howard Berman
has introduced the Peer-to-Peer Piracy Prevention Act which would
partially immunize copyright holders from federal and state laws for
activities that disable, block, or otherwise impair a “publicly accessible
peer-to-peer network” distributing protected works without authoriza-
tion.409  Under this legislation, no damage actions could be brought
against those authorized to engage in such counter-piracy activities un-
less the damage to a computer exceeded $250 and permission by the
U.S. Attorney General is granted.410  In view of the discussion of the
hacking subculture,411 it is perhaps not surprising that shortly after this
legislation was proposed (with the RIAA’s strong endorsement),
RIAA.org suffered a denial of service attack disabling the site.412
This latest move by the content industries is less directly aimed at
the technology sector413 than it is at the Internet community that has
spawned over the past decade.  It is to that community that we now
turn.
3. Social Forces
The past decade has brought about a new social movement (or
perhaps, more accurately, a range of social movements) focused on
innovation, civil liberties, consumer protection, and artists’ rights in
cyberspace.  Some scholars have analogized this social dynamic to the
enclosure movement in pre-industrial England414 and various parallels
409. See Farhad Manjoo, Sour Notes (July 30, 2002), at http://www.salon.com/tech/
feature/2002/07/30/file_trading/print.html; Declan McCullagh, Could Hollywood Hack
Your PC? (July 23, 2002), at http://news.com.com/2100-1023-945923.html; see also
Howard L. Berman, Just Desserts for Scofflaws (July 9, 2002), at http://news.com.com/
2010-1078-942325.html.
410. See McCullagh, supra note 409.
411. See supra text accompanying notes 304-06; see infra note 427.
412. See Declan McCullagh, RIAA Web Site Disabled by Attack (July 29, 2002) (noting
that the proposed law “would allow the RIAA to engage in precisely this kind of denial-
of-service attack against peer-to-peer networks where illicit copies of music are traded”
that it suffered), at http://news.com.com/2010-1023-947072.html.
413. The Computer and Communications Industry Association, which includes
among its members AOL Time Warner, Oracle, and Sun Microsystems, has denounced
the bill as “vigilante justice.” See Declan McCullagh, Hollywood Hacking Hits House (July
25, 2002), at http://news.com.com/2100-1023-946316.html.
414. See James Boyle, Fencing Off Ideas: Enclosure and the Disappearance of the Public
Domain, DEADALUS, Spring, 2002, at 13, available at http://www.wcl.american.edu/pub/
faculty/boyle/intprop.htm; cf. LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS (2001); Yochai
Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment Constraints on Enclosure of the Public
Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354 (1999); Hannibal Travis, Pirates of the Information Infra-
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can certainly be drawn.  Professor Boyle compares the disappearance
of the public domain (as a result of expanding intellectual property,
contractual limitations, and DRM) to the privatization (and fencing
off) of the commons.  While both shifts in property governance
achieve some social benefits (promoting more productive land use by
overcoming the “tragedy of the commons” and providing incentives
for creation), they impose social costs and contribute to economic ine-
quality (by removing resources and ideas from the common pool and
controlling their use).  In another essay, Professor Boyle analogizes the
new social activism surrounding the Internet to the formation of the
environmental movement of the 1960s.415  Parallels to the civil rights
movement can also be drawn.  Like these movements, the various com-
ponents of the “digital freedom” movement rely upon a mix of protest,
advocacy, litigation, grassroots organizing, and membership and foun-
dation support to bring about social change.  These emerging organi-
zations and coalitions can be grouped loosely under a few general
themes – open software, civil liberties, preserving balance in copyright
law, consumer protection, artists’ rights, and copyright education – al-
though it is important to recognize that many of the organizations cut
across multiple areas.
Open Software. The open software movement traces its origins to
the early 1970s and the culture of collaborative research on computer
software that existed in many software research environments.  In an
effort to perpetuate that model in the face of increasingly proprietary
software, Richard Stallman, a former professor in MIT’s Artificial Intel-
ligence Laboratory, established the Free Software Foundation (FSF) to
promote users’ rights to use, study, copy, modify, and redistribute com-
puter programs.  Such rights obviously conflict with the default bundle
of rights of copyright law.  For that reason, FSF developed the GNU
General Public License (GPL),416 a complex licensing agreement de-
signed to prevent programmers building proprietary limitations into
“free” software.417  Stallman set forth a task list for the development of
structure: Blackstonian Copyright and the First Amendment, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 777
(2000).
415. See JAMES BOYLE, A POLITICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: ENVIRONMENTALISM
FOR THE NET? (1997); see also Pamela Samuelson, Toward A New Politics of Intellectual
Property, 44 COMMUNICATIONS OF THE ACM, Mar. 2001, No. 3, at 98.
416. GNU is an acronym for “Gnu’s not UNIX,” signifying that it is a non-proprie-
tary UNIX-compatible (or interoperable) operating system.
417. See generally David McGowan, The Legal Implications of Open Source Software, 2001
ILL. L. REV. 241 (2001); Yochai Benkler, Coase’s Penguin, or Linux and the Nature of the
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a viable UNIX-compatible open source operating system.418  Many pro-
grammers throughout the world contributed to this effort on a volun-
tary basis and by the late 1980s, most of the components had been
assembled.  The project gained substantial momentum in 1991 when
Linus Torvalds developed a UNIX-compatible kernel, which he called
“Linux.”  Torvalds structured the evolution of his component on the
GNU GPL “open source” model.  The integration of the GNU and
Linux components resulted in a UNIX-compatible open source pro-
gram (referred to as GNU/Linux) and has since become widely used
throughout the computing world.419  In the process, it has spawned a
large community of computer programmers and service organizations
committed to the principles of open source development. The growth
and success of Linux has brought the open source movement into the
mainstream of the computer software industry.  Today, a variety of ven-
dors, such as Red Hat, Caldera, and Debian, distribute open source
software and it has an estimated 17 to 20 million users worldwide.420
The open software movement has itself contributed to other com-
mercial and research endeavors.  As noted in Part I, a central issue in
the early microcomputer was whether copyright protection extended
to the interoperability components of software programs.  The Ameri-
can Committee for Interoperable Systems (ACIS) was formed in 1991
by a coalition of computer companies seeking to promote competition
in their industry through limits on copyright protection for interface
specifications.  Although not committed in any way to the GNU GPL
Firm , 112 YALE L.J. 369 (2002), available at http://www.benkler.org/
CoasesPenguin.html.
418. UNIX was initially developed by researchers at Bell Laboratories in 1969 in an
effort to provide a general purpose operating system that was simple and elegant, writ-
ten in a high level (human programmer readable) language (rather than assembly lan-
guage), and allowed for re-use of code.  The project largely succeeded, with most of the
code written in the high level language C. A small amount of code, referred to as the
kernel, was composed in assembly language.  It became widely used because of its porta-
bility across multiple vendor hardware platforms, vendor independent networking, and
the strength of its application programming interface. See generally Charles Severence,
A Brief History of UNIX, available at http://vertio.hsrl.rutgers.edu/ug/unix_history.html.
As Stallman discovered, however, computer manufacturers adapted it to their particular
hardware.  This interfered with the free computing environment that Stallman and
other programmers valued. See Richard Stallman, The GNU Project, OPEN SOURCES
(Mark Stone, et al. eds., 1999), available at  http://www.gnu.org/gnu/
thegnuproject.html.
419. Torvalds and a small group of programmers oversee the evolutionary process.
420. See Richard Stallman, Web Databases: Science Must “Push Copyright Aside” (June 8,
2001), at http://www.nature.com/nature/debates/e-access/Articles/stallman.html.
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model, ACIS has pursued the more limited goal of promoting the le-
gality of reverse engineering of computer software.421  It has supported
efforts to ensure that copyright law does not interfere with the func-
tional enterprise of developing interoperable systems.  As explained in
Part I, the courts have adopted this interpretation of copyright law.
Furthermore, as noted above, Congress has written a limited reverse
engineering exemption for developing interoperable computer pro-
grams into the DMCA.
The open source movement has reinforced the freedom of com-
puter scientists to engage in research into encryption and security sys-
tems – cryptography.  The Center for Democracy and Technology and
the Electronic Privacy Information Center have projects supporting
this type of research as a means of improving security of communica-
tion and hence privacy on the Internet.422 The Association for Com-
puting Machinery (ACM), while not necessarily endorsing the open
source movement, has generally supported the freedom of computer
programmers to engage in research.423  The defense of Professor Ed-
ward Felten and a more recent action lodged on behalf of encryption
researcher Ben Edelman by the American Civil Liberties Union424 seek
to vindicate these research, privacy, and First Amendment interests as
well.
421. See generally Samuelson & Scotchmer, supra note 58.
422. See Center for Democracy and Technology Principles, at http://www.cdt.org/
mission/principles.html (last visited Aug. 18, 2002); Electronic Privacy Information
Center, Cryptography Policy (“Civil liberties and privacy advocates strongly oppose any
attempts to require key escrow, key recovery or other means of accessing encryption
keys, arguing that they are an unjustified restriction of individuals’ fundamental privacy
rights, detrimental to security, costly, subject to massive abuse, and ultimately ineffec-
tive crime prevention methods.  Technology and security experts also oppose any re-
strictions on encryption, arguing that they would damage consumer trust in e-
commerce transactions.”), at http://www.epic.org/crypto/ (last visited Aug. 18, 2002).
423. The ACM is a scientific and educational organization comprising 80,000 mem-
bers “dedicated to advancing the arts, sciences, and applications of information tech-
nology.” See Association for Computing Machinery, Overview of ACM, at http://
www.acm.org/about_acm/ov.html (last visited Aug. 18, 2002); see also Robert MacMil-
lan, Lobbying Group Protests Copyright-Protection Proposal, NEWSBYTES, Oct. 1, 2001 (describ-
ing ACM’s letter opposing Senator Hollings’ proposed legislation calling for the
imposition of mandatory anti-piracy controls on all digital media devices).  The uproar
over the DMCA’s constraints on encryption research and publication of scientific re-
sults have led Stanford University to offer computer science students a policy course
that includes coverage of the DMCA. See Lisa Bowman, Programmers Enroll in Political
Training (June 10, 2002), at http://news.com.com/2100-1023-934543.html.
424. See Declan McCullagh, On Trial: Digital Copyright Law (July 25, 2002), at http:/
/news.com.com/2100-1023-946266.html?tag=politech.
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The open source philosophy also resonates within the peer-to-
peer networking community and the hacker subculture.  Although
many applications of peer-to-peer technology serve to expand network
functionality without undermining copyright protection,425 the grow-
ing acceptance of unauthorized distribution of music and films by mil-
lions of high school and college students (among other Internet users)
threatens to produce a new generation of citizens who question the
legitimacy of copyright protection.426  Over time, this growing segment
of the population could play a significant role in electoral politics sur-
rounding copyright law.
The hacker subculture represents a more immediate challenge for
the content industries.  This subculture manifests outright animus to-
ward copyright protection as well as a more general defiance of author-
ity.427  Although less likely to play a public role in the debate over
425. Tim O’Reilly has become a focal point for this community.  His website and
press provide a clearinghouse for Linux, Open Source, and peer-to-peer networking.
See generally About O’Reilly (2001), at http://www.oreilly.com/oreilly/about.html (last
visited Sept. 20, 2002).
426. See John Schwartz, Trying to Keep Young Internet Users From a Life of Piracy, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 25, 2001.
427. Richard Stallman proudly proclaims himself to be a “hacker,” although he
rejects the connotation of “hacker” as “security breaker.”  Rather, he interprets the term
to mean “[s]omeone who loves to program and enjoys being clever about it.’” See Stall-
man, supra note 418. Not surprisingly, Stallman perceives copyright protection (as well
as software patents) as antithetical to the progress of science, although in an intellectu-
ally rigourous manner. Id.  Stallman refers to his GNU GPL model as a form of
“copyleft,” a clever inversion of “copyright.” See Free Software Foundation, What is
Copyleft?, at http://www.gnu.org/copyleft/copyleft.html; Ira V. Heffan, Copyleft: Licens-
ing Collaborative Works in the Digital Age, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1487 (1997).
While Stallman presents a  pro-science and libertarian justification for his concep-
tion of hacking, other “hackers” portray a darker, anti-social image that reinforces the
“security cracker” profile.  Eric Corley, the publisher who distributed the DVD decryp-
tion code through his online journal, 2600: The Hacker Quarterly, captures this less en-
lightened defiance of authority associated with computer “hackers.”  Corley named his
“hacker” journal after the frequency (2600 hertz) that formerly could be used to tap
into “operator mode” on the AT&T telephone network so as to make long distance calls
without charge.  Prior to publishing DeCSS, Corley’s journal published articles on “how
to steal an Internet domain name, access other people’s e-mail, intercept cellular
phone calls, and break into the computer systems at Costco stores and Federal Ex-
press.”  Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Remeirdes, 111 F.Supp.2d 294, 308-09 (S.D.N.Y.
2000).  Many hackers seem to care significantly more about getting free software and
digital content than pushing the frontiers of science.  See Jennifer 8. Lee, Pirates on the
Web, Spoils on the Street: Cracking Codes of Popular Software, A Small Group Can Wreak Havoc,
N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2002, at E1; Reuters, DrinkorDie Leader Pleads Guilty (Feb. 27, 2002),
at http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,50715,00.html.
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copyright, the more extreme elements of the hacker community re-
present a substantial impediment to the distribution of encrypted con-
tent.  Members of this community are motivated by the challenge or
defiant thrill of defeating technological protection measures and use
their substantial knowledge of computer systems to evade detection.428
Their efforts to derail both the content and technology sectors’ efforts
to protect entertainment products, computer software, and computer
games escalates the demand for stronger copyright protection and
more intrusive enforcement efforts.
Civil Liberties. The relationship between civil liberties and intellec-
tual property protection has become a contentious philosophical de-
bate in the digital age.429  Whereas many traditional libertarians view
protection of intellectual property as part of a more general right to
own property,430 a new generation of thinkers have come to see such
protection, particularly in the medium of cyberspace, as anathema to
the freedom to think and innovate.  Drawing upon Thomas Jefferson’s
natural rights insight that “ideas should freely spread from one to an-
other over the globe, for the moral and mutual instruction of man,
and improvement of his condition, seems to have been peculiarly and
benevolently designed by nature,”431 John Perry Barlow’s essay “The
Economy of Ideas”432 has emerged as a manifesto for the new libertari-
428. See Lee, supra note 427; Associated Press, Feds Zero In on Piracy Ring (Dec. 11,
2001), at http://www.wired.com/news/print/0,1294,49026,00.html; Michelle Delio, In-
side Russia’s Hacking Culture (Mar. 12, 2001) (describing the sophistication of Russian
and Ukrainian hacking groups), at  http://www.wired.com/news/culture/
0,1284,42346,00.html.
429. See generally COPYRIGHTS: THE FUTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE INFOR-
MATION AGE (Adam Thierer & Clyde Wayne Crews, Jr. eds., 2002).
430. See James V. DeLong, Defending Intellectual Property, COPYRIGHTS: THE FUTURE
OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 17 (Adam Thierer & Clyde Wayne
Crews, Jr. eds., 2002).
431. See 13 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 333-35 (Andrew A. Lipscomb &
Albert Ellery Bergh eds. 1905) (Document 12, letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac
McPherson, 13 Aug. 1813), available at http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/doc-
uments/a1_8_8s12.html.
432. See WIRED, Mar. 1994. Professor Lawrence Lessig expands upon this frame-
work in his books, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A CONNECTED
WORLD (2001) and CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (1999). See also Benkler,
supra note 417; cf. Russ Roberts, Napsternomics: What’s the Most Effective Way to Protect
Intellectual Property? (June 3, 2002) (suggesting, based on successful innovation of effec-
tive anti-theft vehicle protections in response to difficulty of enforcing automobile theft
laws, that exposing the content industry to the risk of widespread piracy will produce
better results (through strong market incentives for development of effective protec-
\\server05\productn\N\NLR\46-1-2\NLR106.txt unknown Seq: 124 24-FEB-03 13:39
186 NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46
anism that resists intellectual property protection in cyberspace.  Bar-
low questions whether a right of property can or should exist in a
medium (digital networks) lacking physical structure or any significant
cost of distribution.433
Inspired by, although not necessarily fully subscribing to this in-
sight, a growing cadre of organizations have taken up the cause of ad-
vocating protection of civil liberties in the digital age.  Some of these
organizations, such as the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) (on
which John Perry Barlow serves on the Board) and Public Knowledge,
focus their attention on the various ways in which copyright law limits
access to and use of content and constrains the freedom of program-
mers and technology companies to innovate.  Other organizations,
such as the Center for Democracy and Technology and the Electronic
Privacy Information Center, focus on protecting privacy.  In particular,
they see DMCA restrictions on cryptography research and dissemina-
tion of research as a threat to digital privacy.  Such restrictions hinder
the advancement of encryption and related privacy protections.  Other
organizations, such as the American Civil Liberties Union “Cyber-Lib-
erties Project” and the Free Expression Network, fear that the ex-
panding domain of copyright law threatens free expression. Some of
these privacy advocacy organizations have begun to work with technol-
ogy firms to resist intrusive means of combatting unauthorized distri-
bution of content.434
These organizations have been particularly effective at using litiga-
tion to raise public awareness of civil liberty issues.  They have been
active in many of the high profile copyright cases noted above, both as
counsel and amicus curiae.  In addition, some of these organizations
have mobilized online communities in efforts to affect law reform and
tion technologies) than other government mandates), at http://www.econlib.org/li-
brary/Columns/robertsnapster.html.
433. While recognizing that the Internet has substantially reduced the cost of dis-
seminating information, traditional intellectual property theorists continue to value the
role of intellectual property in motivating investment in intellectual creativity. See De-
Long, supra note 430.
434. See Electronic Frontier Foundation, Verizon Guards Client Privacy (Aug. 23,
2002) (press release noting that 13 privacy and consumer advocacy groups have filed an
amicus brief on behalf of Verizon, a major ISP, asking the judge to take into account a
user’s privacy rights and deny the RIAA’s request for data on the activities and identity
of Verizon’s customers), at  http://www.eff.org/Cases/RIAA_v_Verizon/
20020830_eff_riaa_pr.html (last visited Sept. 26, 2002); Declan McCullagh, Why Telecoms
Back the Pirate Cause (Aug. 27, 2002), at http://news.com.com/2102-1082-955417.html.
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enforcement.435  These organizations have also prepared policy pa-
pers,436 assembled books and conference volumes,437 and authored
op-ed pieces articulating their views.
Preserving Balance in Copyright Law.  The rapid expansion of copy-
right law during the past decade led in 1995 to the formation of the
Digital Future Coalition (DFC), comprising educational, scholarly, li-
brary, and consumer groups, as well as consumer electronics, telecom-
munications, computer, and ISP industry organizations, to provide
balance in litigation and policy discussions about copyright law’s fu-
ture.438  This coalition, as well as its many constituent organizations,
has advocated that copyright’s limiting doctrines (fair use, first sale
doctrine, preemption of state law, library exemptions) not be overrid-
den in the push to safeguard copyrighted works in the digital age.  In
addition, various copyright professors have become active, submitting
amicus curiae briefs in prominent cases.439
435. Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility’s Privacy and Civil Liberties
Project (which was reorganized as the independent organization EPIC) successfully or-
ganized an electronic petition submitted by 50,000 Internet users (“netizens”) urging
the Clinton Administration to abandon a surveillance technology proposed by the FBI
that carried strong overtones of Big Brother.  The proposal would have mandated the
use of a Clipper Chip, a cryptographic device purportedly intended to protect private
communications while at the same time permitting government agents access to keys.
See CPSR’s Electronic Clipper Petition (Aug. 1995), at http://www.cpsr.org/program/
clipper/cpsr-electronic-petition.html; The Clipper Chip, at http://www.epic.org/crypto/
clipper/ (last visited Sept. 20, 2002).  More recently, EFF successfully organized a cam-
paign pressuring Adobe to drop its support for the prosecution of Dmitry Sklyarov. See
Robert Lemos, Adobe: Free the Russian Programmer (July 23, 2001), at htttp://
news.com.com/2100-1001-270440.html. EFF also led a campaign to permit Professor
Edward Felten to present his encryption research concerning the SMI watermarking
technology. See Stephanie Olsen & Lisa M. Bowman, Free-speech Lawsuit Targets Record
Industry (June 6, 2001), at http://news.com.com/2100-1023-267940.html.
436. See, e.g., Electronic Frontier Foundation, Unintended Consequences: Three Years
Under the DMCA  (May 3, 2002), available at  http://www.eff.org/IP/DMCA/
20020503_dmca_consequences.pdf; Jerry Berman & Paula Bruening, Is Privacy Still Pos-
sible in the Twenty-first Century?, SOCIAL RESEARCH, Spring 2001.
437. See, e.g., MARC ROTENBERG, THE PRIVACY LAW SOURCEBOOK 2001: UNITED
STATES LAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND RECENT DEVELOPMENTS (2001); Michael J. O’Neil
& James X. Dempsey, Critical Infrastructure Protection: Threats to Privacy and Other Civil
Liberties and Concerns with Government Mandates on Industry, 12 DEPAUL BUS. L. J. 97
(1999).
438. See About the DFC, A Description of the Digital Future Coalition, at http://
www.dfc.org/dfc1/Learning_Center/about.html (last visited Sept. 20, 2002).
439. See, e.g., Amicus Brief from Law Professors for the Plaintiffs in MPAA v. 2600
Case (officially Universal v. Reimerdes) (Mar. 12, 2001), available at http://
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Consumer Protection.  A range of organizations have begun focusing
on the implications of copyright law for consumers.  Over the past two
decades, several organizations have sought to protect consumer inter-
ests in the technology and copyright sphere.  With strong support from
the consumer electronics industry, the Home Recording Rights Coali-
tion has sought to ensure that consumers have broad rights to use
VCRs, DATs, MP3 players, and other technology for enjoying music
and video content.  The HRRC has also opposed any laws seeking to
constrain the development of consumer electronic products.  EFF also
considers protection of consumer rights to be an important part of its
mission.  It recently filed a lawsuit on behalf of consumers seeking to
establish the legality of using digital video recorders to record televi-
sion content and use various features, such as the AutoSkip button for
skipping advertisements.440  This past year, DigitalConsumer.org was
formed by a former high technology executive to focus specifically
upon consumers’ interests in the digital age.441  The organization has
established a Consumer Technology Bill of Rights to guide its advocacy
projects and has become active on various fronts in which content in-
dustries seek to limit the use of consumer technology.
Artists’ Rights.  The battle over copyright’s digital future has
brought to the surface growing discontent within the recording artists’
community concerning the contractual and licensing practices of the
major record labels and their role in representing the diverse interests
of the industry’s many participants.442  Although many recording art-
ists ultimately supported the music industry’s efforts to shut down Nap-
ster,443 a few successful artists came out in support of Napster444 while
www.eff.org/IP/Video/MPAA_DVD_cases/
20010312_ny_law_profs_amicus_for_op.html.
440. See Joanna Glasner, ReplayTV Users Sue Hollywood (June 6, 2002), at http://
www.wired.com/news/digiwood/0,1412,53019,00.html.
441. See DigitalConsumer.org, at http://www.digitalconsumer.org.
442. See generally Charles Mann, The Heavenly Jukebox, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Sept.
2000, at 39, 50-51 (noting that most recording artists never cover their advances from
record labels and hence do not typically receive royalties on their recordings);
Courtney Love, Courtney Love Does the Math (June 14, 2000), at http://www.salon.com/
tech/feature/2000/06/14/love/print.html. Recording artists have also become in-
censed by the duration of record contracts. See Mark Allwood, Artists Gather to Protest
Recording Contracts: California’s 7-Year Rule (Jan. 2002), at http://www.bet.com/articles/
0,,c3gb1503-2162,00.html.
443. See John Borland, Musicians Launch National Anti-Napster Campaign (July 11,
2000), at http://news.com.com/2100-1023-243021.html.
\\server05\productn\N\NLR\46-1-2\NLR106.txt unknown Seq: 127 24-FEB-03 13:39
2002-2003] ENVISIONING COPYRIGHT LAW’S DIGITAL FUTURE 189
others embraced the new digital environment.445  A growing number
of artists have questioned whether the major record labels and the
RIAA adequately represent their interests in the debates over copyright
law.446
Don Henley and Sheryl Crow formed the Recording Artists Coali-
tion in 2000 to lobby for artists’ rights.447  It now includes more than
100 well-known artists and has focused its energies on securing a fair
share of revenues from digital rights and loosening restrictions of the
duration of recording contracts, among other issues.  The Future of
Music Coalition (FMC) was formed around the same time to provide
an alternative voice for lesser known musicians and participants in the
music industry in the transition to a digital platform.448  While recog-
nizing the importance of compensating creators, the FMC believes that
RIAA focuses narrowly on the interests of the major labels to the detri-
ment of song writers, artists, and smaller scale enterprises within the
music industry.449
444. See John Borland, Rapper Chuck D Throws Weight Behind Napster (May 1, 2000)
(seeing Napster as a unique promotional tool for lesser known artists), at http://
news.com.com/2100-1023-239917.html.
445. See Beth Lipton Krigel, Tom Petty Joins MP3 Bandwagon (Mar. 1, 1999) (noting
the RIAA’s fear that the MP3 format will fuel unauthorized distribution), at http://
news.com.com/2100-1023-222361.html.
446. See John Borland & Patrick Ross, Desperado Storms Capitol Hill (Apr. 3, 2001)
(quoting Alanis Morrisette as testifying that “for the majority of artists, this so-called
‘piracy’ may have actually been working in their favor”), at http://news.com.com/2100-
1023-255228.html; Steve Morse, Burned?, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 21, 2002, at L1 (quoting
rock artist Elvis Costello stating that the record labels “loaded the game so the house
has been winning for a long time.  Now it’s time maybe for the house not to win for a
while. Maybe they have to take some losses.”); Janis Ian, The Internet Debacle – An Alterna-
tive View, PERFORMING SONGWRITER MAGAZINE, May 2002, available at http://
www.janisian.com/article-internet_debacle.html; Music Revolt, The Newshour with Jim
Lehr, Newshour (July 4, 2002) (“Don Henley, co-founder of the Eagles, is one of the
leaders of the talent revolt.  Although his band is one of the most successful groups in
pop music history, selling over 100 million albums and climbing, Henley has emerged
as an outspoken critic of the music business, arguing that its exploration of performers
has run amok.”), transcript available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/entertain-
ment/July-dec02/musicrevolt_7-4.html.
447. See generally  Recording Artists’ Coalition Website, at  http://
www.recordingartistscoalition.com/ (last visited Sept. 20, 2002).
448. See Future of Music Coalition, at http://www.futureofmusic.org/fmcnews.cfm
(last visited Sept. 20, 2002).
449. See Future of Music Coalition, Future of Music Manifesto, The History of the Music
Industry vs. The Future of Music (June 1, 2000), at http://www.futureofmusic.org/mani-
festo/ (last visited Sept. 20, 2002).
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A few artists have questioned the viability of existing music indus-
try structures in the digital age.  For example, David Bowie, one of the
most successful recording artists, offers this perspective about the fu-
ture of copyright law and the music industry:
I don’t even know why I would want to be on a label in a
few years, because I don’t think it’s going to work by la-
bels and by distribution systems in the same way.  The ab-
solute transformation of everything that we ever thought
about music will take place within 10 years, and nothing is
going to be able to stop it. I see absolutely no point in
pretending that it’s not going to happen. I’m fully confi-
dent that copyright, for instance, will no longer exist in 10
years, and authorship and intellectual property is in for
such a bashing.
Music itself is going to become like running water or
electricity. So it’s like, just take advantage of these last few
years because none of this is ever going to happen again.
You’d better be prepared for doing a lot of touring be-
cause that’s really the only unique situation that’s going
to be left. It’s terribly exciting. But on the other hand it
doesn’t matter if you think it’s exciting or not; it’s what’s
going to happen.450
Copyright Education. It also bears noting that the content industries
themselves have recognized the importance of counteracting the
emerging cultural norm supporting unauthorized distribution of con-
tent and building public support for strong copyright protection.  The
RIAA and MPAA have developed consumer education programs.  In
addition, the Copyright Society of the USA inaugurated Copyright
Awareness Week in April 2002 with a series of events targeted princi-
pally at college students.451
*************
Whether the “digital freedom” movement will have the impact on
public attitudes and law reforms that the environmental or civil rights
movements achieved remains to be seen.  The new wave of political
450. See John Pareles, David Bowie, 21st-Century Entrepreneur, N.Y. TIMES, June 9,
2002, available at  http://www.nytimes.com/2002/06/09/arts/music/09PARE.
html?todaysheadlines (last visited Sept. 20, 2002).
451. See The Copyright Society of the U.S.A., Ways to Participate in Copyright Aware-
ness Week 2002, at http://www.law.duke.edu/copyright/html/events/CAWpartici-
pate.pdf (last visited Sept. 20, 2002).
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battles – centered on government imposition of anti-piracy controls in
all digital devices  and deputizing content industries to engage in ag-
gressive self-help measures to curb digital piracy – will provide an im-
portant test of these organizations’ ability to mobilize political
support.452  Even if they fall short, however, a range of legal and consti-
tutional constraints –  privacy law,453 First Amendment jurispru-
dence,454 and antitrust constraints455 – may constrain copyright’s
further expansion.
D. The Next Chapter in Copyright Law’s Digital Evolution
The next chapter of copyright law is currently being composed in
the courts, the marketplace, and the political arena, where the forces
described in the prior section actively vie to shape the governance of
content and technology.  Due to the high threshold for gaining politi-
cal saliency, legislative change typically comes about only after inter-
ested parties have failed to reach satisfactory resolution through legal
action, negotiation, and market solutions.  The inability of content in-
dustries to plug the many points of intellectual property leakage
through legal action or collaboration with the technology sector has
generated significant pressure for political action.  But unlike the polit-
ical climate surrounding the passage of the DMCA just five years ago –
in which the content and technology industries shared significant com-
mon ground and other interest groups lacked significant clout – the
current political landscape affecting copyright reform is far less cohe-
sive.  Furthermore, the dramatic  implications of peer-to-peer technol-
ogy, the rapid pace of technological change, and the limited
effectiveness of the DMCA raise serious questions about legislators’
452. Declan McCullagh, Bring in the Geeks (July 15, 2002) (describing an initiative
by Public Knowledge, a “public-interest advocacy organization dedicated to fortifying
and defending a vibrant ‘information commons,’” to develop a database of 100,000
“geektivists” over the next six months, what is viewed a particular challenge given the
reserved and generally apolitical profile of many compute geeks), at http://
news.com.com/2010-1074-943785.html.
453. See, e.g., Electronic Privacy Information Center, In the Matter of Digital Entertain-
ment and Rights Management, Before the Technology Administration, Department of Commerce
(July 17, 2002), at http://www.epic.org/privacy/drm/tadrmcomments7.17.02.html.
454. See, e.g., Declan McCullagh, On Trial: Digital Copyright Law (July 25, 2002), at
http://news.com.com/2100-1023-946266.html.
455. See, e.g., Brad King, And Now: Assault on Music Labels (Oct. 19, 2001) (DOJ
antitrust investigation into major-label-backed digital music services), at http://
www.wired.com/news/mp3/0,1285,47698,00.html; Mark Lemley, Intellectual Property
Rights and Standard-Setting Organizations, __ CAL. L. REV. __ (forthcoming 2002).
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ability to mandate effective copyright protection.  These factors suggest
that the copyright law will remain contentious and unsettled well into
the future.  Nonetheless, it is apparent that digital technology will push
the development of copyright law in three significant new directions:
enforcement, antitrust, and regulation.
1. Copyright Enforcement in the Digital Age: A War of
Attrition
Whereas the first two waves of technology propelling copyright law
– mechanical reproduction and broadcasting – focused principally
upon establishing the basic contours of copyright protection and the
division of new markets for exploiting works of authorship, digital
technology brings the problem of enforcement to the fore.456  The
ability to distribute works over the Internet as well as the ability to mass
produce high quality CDs and DVDs with inexpensive and widely avail-
able computer technology has made domestic enforcement of copy-
right a prime concern of content companies.  They have devoted
tremendous resources to enforcing their rights on the Internet, yet this
effort, while growing, appears unlikely to stem the rising tide of unau-
thorized reproduction and distribution of copyrighted works. The in-
exorable advance of digital technology – faster chips, greater memory,
larger and less physically constrained networks, more powerful
software – and the large and entrenched hacker community will
continue to open up new channels of distribution.
This process fuels an escalating war of attrition between content
companies and those participants in unauthorized distribution of con-
tent.  Although a successful outcome in the pending lawsuit against
decentralized file-sharing technologies (such as KaZaa, Morpheus, and
Grokster) could slow the financial harm to the record labels and fore-
stall comparable losses to the film industry, it seems probable that de-
centralized technologies will continue to evolve that enable Internet
users to access content through unauthorized channels.  The content
owners perceive that they must, however, wage this war if only to bol-
ster the need for further legislation.  As noted earlier, content owners
have also begun to target ISPs (through DMCA take-down notices) and
are considering going after individual Internet users, both through
456. Although copyright enforcement has long been a problem in some foreign
markets, see MICHAEL P. RYAN, KNOWLEDGE DIPLOMACY: GLOBAL COMPETITION AND THE
POLITICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (1998), it has not been a core problem in the
United States.
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lawsuits and self-help measures.  These measures will produce counter-
measures, which will fuel pressure for stronger enforcement tools,
such as the immunity for self-help measures contained in the proposed
Peer-to-Peer Piracy Prevention Act.  It seems unlikely, however, that
file sharing can be pushed sufficiently underground to open up satis-
factory opportunities for legitimate commerce in content through en-
forcement alone.  Although enforcement will undoubtedly play a large
role in copyright’s future, pressure will continue to mount to imple-
ment some means of widescale technological measures to protect
content.
2. Private Solutions, Antitrust Concerns
The ability of any single content company or even a broad coali-
tion of content companies to address the growing piracy problem
through unilateral action seems doubtful.  Such a strategy risks con-
sumer backlash and is unlikely to succeed in the face of clever hack-
ers.457  Once such protected content is decrypted, it will find its way
into the same stream of shared content as other works.  Thus, a collec-
tive solution – either through a broad consortium cutting across the
content and technology sectors or public mandate – will be necessary
to bring about effective protection of content in the digital age.  Not-
withstanding the failure of the SDMI consortium, congressional pres-
sure and new opportunities could well produce a more successful
effort.  Any such consortium, however, would necessarily generate sig-
nificant public oversight, either through antitrust scrutiny of the stan-
457. The few experiments that content companies have attempted with distribution
of encrypted content have produced consumer complaints or proved ineffective. See
Andy Patrizio, A Sour Note for Mac Users (May 14, 2002) (playing encrypted disks on
Apple computers can cause the computer to crash), at http://www.wired.com/news/
mac/0,2125,52513,00.html; Reuters, CD Crack: Magic Marker Indeed (May 20, 2002)
(describing how consumers circumvented Sony’s encryption for CDs by running a felt
tip pen around the edge), at  http://www.wired.com/news/technology/
0,1282,52665,00.html.  The software industry encountered similar problems in the mid-
1980s when they introduced copy-protection into their products. See Julie A. Mark,
Software Copying Policies: The Next Step in Privacy Prevention, 2 J.L & TECH. 43, 44-46
(1987); David M. Homik, Combating Software Piracy: The Shoplifting Problem, 7 HARV. J.L &
TECH. 377, 413-14 (1994); Kory D. Christensen, Fighting Software Piracy in Cyberspace: Le-
gal and Technological Solutions, 28 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 435, 466-71 (1997). The indus-
try quickly moved on to alternative strategies.
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dard setting process and licensing terms or through legislation
substituting regulatory approval for antitrust review.458
Another possibility is the emergence of an effective de facto con-
tent protection standard from within the technology sector.  The only
company capable of implementing such a standard anytime soon is the
Microsoft Corporation.  As the developer of the operating system used
by approximately 90% of microcomputers,459 Microsoft could poten-
tially build content protection into future editions of its Windows oper-
ating system.  Along these lines, Microsoft has joined forces with Intel
and Advanced Micro Devices, the leading two chip makers for
microcomputers, to develop “Palladium,” a microcomputer hardware
and software system that would protect encrypted data inside
microcomputers running Microsoft’s operating system.460  Data pro-
tected using the Palladium system could not be read or written to by
other software running on the computer.  This multi-purpose system
could be used to protect users from computer viruses, safeguard secur-
ity information, and enable digital rights management.  While this new
system may well provide a reasonably secure platform for distributing
encrypted content, it will certainly raise antitrust concerns about
Microsoft and the leading chip makers’ efforts to leverage their market
power into new markets.
3. The Shift from Property Rights to Regulation: Copyright as
a Regulatory Regime
Given the urgency of the content industries’ demand for new leg-
islative protections, the pressure for new strategies appear unlikely to
await the introduction of Palladium (tentatively slated for 2004).461  At
a minimum, the content sector seeks to use the threat of new legisla-
tion as a cudgel to motivate the technology sector toward a more se-
cure platform and as a means to achieve universal adoption of anti-
piracy technology.  Content owners are beginning to discover, how-
ever, that the political landscape surrounding copyright law has be-
458. Cf. Lemley, supra note 455 (describing the complex governance issues sur-
rounding standard setting bodies).
459. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
460. See Paul Boutin, Palladium: Safe or Security Flaw? (July 12, 2002), at http://
www.wired.com/news/antitrust/0,1551,53805,00.html; see also Ross Anderson, TCPA/
Frequently Asked Questions, Version 1.0, at http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rja14/tcpa-faq.html
(last visited Aug. 6, 2002).
461. See Boutin, supra note 460.
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come substantially more complicated since the passage of the DMCA,
their last major legislative initiative.  As noted earlier,462 some com-
mentators have analogized the growing array of interests focused upon
copyright reform to the environmental movement of the 1960s.  The
parallel carries over to the expansion and polarization of political in-
terest groups, the complex role of technology, and the emergence of
regulation as an important mode of governance.
During prior eras of copyright reform, the players represented at
the copyright legislation negotiating table largely shared a common
interest in protecting content.463  The principal disputes concerned
how the spoils would be divided.  In the present political climate, the
principal economic forces – the music, film, and television industries
on the one hand and the computer, ISP, telecom, and related technol-
ogy industries on the other – hold somewhat differing views on the
importance of protecting content and strongly opposing views on the
means for achieving such protection — the former favoring govern-
ment-imposed technology standards, the latter market-driven protec-
tions.  Both sets of interests have strong incentives to invest in the
legislative process due to the high stakes involved.  Furthermore, vari-
ous social groups have formed which see expansive copyright protec-
tion as a problematic governance regime.  Political economists
characterize this “conflictual demand pattern” for new legislation464 as
conducive to an outcome in which Congress delegates resolution of
the problem to a regulatory agency.465
The DMCA applied such an approach to diffuse some of the con-
troversy surrounding the anticircumvention provisions.  Congress dele-
gated to the Librarian of Congress authority to exempt any classes of
copyrighted works where persons making noninfringing uses are likely
to be adversely affected by the anticircumvention ban.466  The DPR-
462. See supra text accompanying notes 414-15.
463. Broadcasters were a notable exception.
464. Political economists model the legislative process as an economic transaction
in which interest groups form the demand side of the market and legislators form the
supply side. See generally MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC
GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1965); J. BUCHANAN & G. TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS
CONSENT (1962).
465. See Willaim F. Eskridge, Jr., Politics Without Romance, Implications of Public Choice
Theory for Statutory Interpretation, 74 VA. L. REV. 275, 285-88 (1988).
466. See supra note 230.
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SRA and the DMCA also used a regulatory framework for the setting
(and adjusting) of compulsory license rates for webcasting.467
As in the environmental law field, such a regulatory model pro-
vides a means for promoting new technology, responding to the
changing technological landscape, and balancing competing core
principles.  Just as the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970 used the
threat of regulatory mandates and legislatively-determined deadlines
to foster the development of less polluting technologies,468 the pro-
posed Consumer Broadband and Digital Television Promotion Act
would subject the content and technology sectors to regulation if they
cannot develop satisfactory anti-piracy technology standards within a
designated time frame (one year).  Similarly, any standards – whether
privately agreed or publicly dictated — would have to meet lofty goals
set forth in the legislation (such as effectiveness in preventing piracy,
reasonable cost, and accommodation of fair use), not unlike the lofty
goals of environmental statutes (use of best available technology sub-
ject to availability and cost constraints, protection of human health).
The proposed Peer-to-Peer Piracy Prevention Act also features both
regulatory and technology-based provisions.  Content companies en-
gaging in self-help would be subject to oversight by the Attorney Gen-
eral and would be required to provide advance disclosure of the
interdiction technology that they intended to use.  This would provide
the government with an early warning system for assessing how far self-
help measures may go and for staying up to date on the latest in
counter-piracy technology.  The Federal Communications Commission
has become a focal point in the development of standards for digital
television.469
In prior debates over copyright reform, the protection of works of
authorship occupied center stage.  The Constitution’s grant to Con-
gress of the power “to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,
by securing for Limited Times to authors and inventors the exclusive
467. See 17 U.S.C. § 114; David Nimmer, Ignoring the Public, Part I: On the Absurd
Complexity of the Digital Audio Transmission Right, 7 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 189 (2000).
468. Cf. John E. Bonine, The Evolution of “Technology-Forcing” in the Clean Air Act, 5
BNA ENV’T RPTR., no. 13, July 25, 1975 (Monograph No. 21); Richard B. Stewart, Regu-
lation, Innovation, and Administrative Law: A Conceptual Framework, 69 CAL. L. REV. 1256
(1981).
469. See Amy Harmon, Lawmakers Seek Rules to Stop Redistribution of Digital TV, N.Y.
TIMES, July 23, 2002, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2002/07/23/technology/
23DITI.html.
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Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries”470 was perceived as
cutting solely in the direction of strong protection for the exclusive
rights to make copies.  Relatively modest exemptions for nonprofit or-
ganizations and “fair use” served to moderate the law, but few ques-
tioned the primacy of content protection.  The effort to curtail piracy
in the digital age has revealed an inherent conflict in Congress’ mis-
sion “to promote of Progress of Science and the useful Arts”: regulat-
ing digital devices in the name of content protection hinders progress
of digital technology.  Similarly in environmental policy, legislators
came to see that pollution controls could impair economic growth.
Regulation provided a means for balancing competing goals.  As ef-
forts to secure copyright protections increasingly collide with progress
in the technology sector, we can expect regulatory institutions to
evolve to balance these competing interests as well.
Copyright law has entered a new phase in which the government
will play a more central and ongoing role in the implementation of
copyright protection.  As the broad array of groups interested in copy-
right law become more politically active and as technology advances,
Congress will increasingly delegate authority to regulatory bodies and
administrative officials will take on important roles in the implementa-
tion of complex standards as technology evolves.  Content and technol-
ogy industry associations will need to learn the art of compromise and
copyright lawyers will need to learn a lot more about administrative law
as this new era unfolds.471
CONCLUDING REMARKS
This article began with the equivocal omen “May you live in inter-
esting times.”  Given the tense state of affairs surrounding copyright
law, perhaps all that the divergent interests joining the debate can
agree upon is that we live in such times.  Following the printing press
and the wireless, the digital age represents the third great wave of tech-
nology justifying, challenging, and, ultimately, reshaping copyright
law.  For Judge Newman and the rest of us who tend this field, the soils
could not be more rocky.
470. U.S. CONST., art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
471. Cf. Bonneville Int’l Corp. v. Peters, 153 F.Supp.2d 763 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (defer-
ring to and upholding the Copyright Office’s administrative “final ruling” that AM and
FM radio broadcasting transmissions over the Internet are not exempt “nonsubscrip-
tion broadcast transmission,” and thus have to pay a public performance royalty).
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Not knowing the precise meaning of this widely quoted phrase, I
turned to the Internet for an explanation.  Thanks to its enormous
reach and searchability,472 I quickly discovered that the origins of the
phrase reinforce its sense of mystery and uncertain portent, and hence
applicability to the future of copyright law.  It apparently entered com-
mon parlance through a speech by Robert F. Kennedy in Cape Town,
South Africa, on June 7, 1966, in which he said: “There is a Chinese
curse which says, ‘May he live in interesting times.’ Like it or not, we
live in interesting times. . . .”  The phrase has since become a common
expression, although its Chinese roots have proven difficult to trace.
Some have speculated that it may be a liberal paraphrase of the Chi-
nese proverb, “It’s better to be a dog in a peaceful time that be a man
in a chaotic period.”473  Professor Stephen E. DeLong474 traces the
phrase (and allusion to a Chinese curse) to a story by Duncan H.
Munro (a pseudonym for Eric Frank Russell) entitled U-Turn pub-
lished in the April 1950 issue of Astounding Science Fiction:
For centuries the Chinese used an ancient curse: “May
you live in interesting times!” It isn’t a curse any more. It’s
a blessing. We’re scientific and civilized. We’ve got so
many rights and liberties and freedoms that one can
yearn for chains for the sheer pleasure of busting them
and shaking them off. Reckon life would be more livable
if there were any chains left to bust.
Regardless of its origins, the phrase, especially in Russell’s usage,
embodies important elements of the contemporary challenges con-
fronting content industries, technology companies, computer pro-
grammers, recording artists, legislators, jurists, and the public at large.
It also anticipates the interplay of cyberspace, rights, and liberties that
have come to dominate the battle over copyright’s future.  Whether
such times represent a curse or a blessing remains to be seen.  In the
472. The Internet’s enormous reach and ease of search (with the use of various
search engines) highlight one of the great tensions of surrounding the future of copy-
right law.  Efforts to tame the Internet so as to reduce unauthorized distribution of
copyrighted works may impair the development of even wider ranging and more acces-
sible troves of information.  Yet failure to protect works of authorship effectively may
reduce the flow of new works.
473. See NOBLE (North of Boston Library Exchange), Reference File, May You Live
in Interesting Times, at http://www.noblenet.org/reference/inter.htm (last visited Sept.
20, 2002).
474. See Stephen E. DeLong, Sidebar: Get a(n Interesting) Life? (June 12, 1996), at
http://www.hawk.fab2.edu/sidebar/sidebar.htm (last visited Sept. 20, 2002).
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vortex of “interesting times,” it is often difficult to see the road ahead
clearly.
In contrast to the largely surmountable difficulties posed by ac-
cording copyright protection for computer software, digital reproduc-
tion and distribution technologies represent a profound challenge to
the efficacy and role of copyright law.  By reducing the costs of repro-
duction and distribution to levels enabling substantially anyone to
reproduce and distribute works of authorship, often with little risk of
detection, digital technology has eclipsed the effective limits of tradi-
tional copyright law.  Notwithstanding recent amendments to copy-
right aimed at keeping pace with the new technological landscape,
more recent innovations have quickly outstripped these enhanced pro-
tections.  The effort to reform copyright to reflect the broad array of
societal interests implicated in the face of rapid technological change
will challenge legislators, jurists, the content and technology indus-
tries, the public, and copyright enthusiasts for many years to come.
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